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Foreword 
By L. Gordon Flake 
CEO, Perth USAsia Centre 
 
The Perth USAsia Centre aspires to enrich relations between Australia and its 
Asian neighbours and our location in Perth makes a program focus on Indonesia 
essential. Perth is a mere four hour flight from Indonesia’s bustling capitol 
Jakarta, a major population centre closer to Perth than Canberra or Sydney. 
Perth’s proximity to Indonesia has fostered a vibrant community of Indonesia-
focussed academics, not-for-profits, and businesses. Likewise, Perth is home to 
significant number of Indonesian students who pursue higher education at 
Western Australia’s premier universities.  
Political and diplomatic leaders often refer to Indonesia as Australia’s most 
important bilateral relationship in the region. In support of this, the Perth 
USAsia Centre has sought to contribute to the knowledge-base on Indonesia by 
publishing this informative volume, which takes a look at a changing Indonesia 
as President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, has taken the reins of 
power in Jakarta. This volume features the work of Indonesia analysts across a 
variety of disciplines, all with unique insights into the trends and structures that 
might shape Jokowi’s statecraft.  
I would like to thank the cadre of Indonesia specialists who contributed to this 
timely volume. I would also like to thank our program associate, Kyle Springer 
for his role in driving our Indonesia programs and for contributing to this 
volume and shepherding it through the publication process. Further thanks goes 
to the excellent editing skills of Serge DeSilva-Ranasinghe, research fellow at 
Perth USAsia Centre. As 2015 unfolds, we look forward to developing more 
Indonesia-related programs that seek to enhance and nurture the Australia – 
Indonesia relationship.  
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Strategic Clarity, Political Uncertainty: Prospects for 
Defence and Security under President Joko Widodo, 
by Dr. Greta Nabbs-Keller 
By Dr Greta Nabbs-Keller 
 
Greta Nabbs-Keller is the director of Dragonminster Consulting 
(www.dragonminster.com) a Brisbane-based company providing Indonesia 
expertise to government and private sector clients. She is a former defence 
professional who has worked in various linguist, analytical, policy and 
international engagement roles in Canberra and Jakarta. Greta’s broader 
research interests include Indonesian civil-military relations, Indonesia-China 
relations, politico-security developments in Southeast Asia, and Australian 
regional foreign policy. In March 2014, Greta was awarded a PhD examining 
‘The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’ through Griffith 
Asia Institute. Greta remains active in public policy debate, education and 
government planning processes and is a regular contributor on Indonesian issues 
to The Interpreter, blog site of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. She 
has a record of peer-reviewed publications which include: ‘Growing 
Convergence, Greater Consequence: The Strategic Implications of Closer 
Indonesia-China Relations’, Security Challenges, (Spring 2011) and ‘Reforming 
Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization and Leadership’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 35, no. 1 (April 2013). 
 
Overview 
Expectations that the election of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as Indonesia’s seventh 
president would herald meaningful policy reform and consolidate Indonesia’s 
democratic gains have diminished with the dominance of Indonesia’s legislature 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) by the opposition “Red and White Coalition” 
coalition. Led by defeated presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto’s Gerindra 
Party, the DPR looks determined frustrate the new government’s policy agenda 
and wind back democratic reforms. In a national political scene characterised by 
increasing personal acrimony and legislative dominance by oligarchic elites, 
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Indonesian politics looks set to enter a turbulent and dysfunctional period with 
potential implications for Indonesia’s defence and security policies.  
Currently, Widodo faces a hostile legislature which may choose to contest the 
new president’s authority in foreign policy and security matters. In contrast to 
predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), however, Widodo is a relative 
neophyte in this area. The president-elect is said to lack interest in foreign 
policy and strategic matters. His understanding of international affairs, 
according to sources close to his transition team, is informed more by trade and 
investment concerns, reflecting a background in furniture exports to East Asia. 
Like many new leaders inexperienced or uninterested in foreign policy issues 
before him, President Widodo will soon discover, however, that he will have 
little choice but to contend with a number of compelling international and 
domestic security issues as they intersect with Indonesia’s vital interests.  
The incoming government’s policy emphasis on Indonesia’s maritime domain 
means that maritime security issues, particularly the implications of South 
China Sea territorial disputes, will engage the new president’s attention and that 
of his senior advisors. As the world’s largest Muslim-majority state and fulcrum 
of Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia, moreover, the global threat posed by 
the Islamic State (IS) and subsequent US-led military action in Iraq and Syria 
will no doubt be at the forefront of Indonesia’s diplomatic and domestic security 
concerns. Maritime security challenges, rising strategic tensions in the Indo-
Pacific region and Islamist extremism are among the principal defence and 
security challenges facing Indonesia’s new government. 
As a consequence, this paper is divided into four key sections. It begins by 
analysing Indonesia’s ‘maritime axis’ (poros maritim) doctrine, as the central 
defence and foreign policy pillar of the incoming Widodo Government. It 
contends that the ‘maritime axis’ doctrine marks a policy shift for Indonesia, 
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which, if addressed seriously in terms of implementation and resources, will 
provide both strategic benefit and engagement opportunities for Australia.   
The second part of the paper examines rising maritime tensions in East Asia and 
dimensions of the China threat as perceived by Indonesian policy-makers. It 
explores Indonesia’s conception of the regional order and illustrates how 
Beijing’s increasing encroachment into Southeast Asian states’ Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) has shaped the thinking of Widodo’s strategic advisors.  
The third part of the paper explores Salafist extremism in the form of growing 
support within Indonesia for the Islamic State (IS) and al-Nusra Front. Gains 
made by IS and the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq appear to be re-energising 
Indonesia’s radical Salafist movement, tempered previously by Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI)’s renunciation of violence within Indonesia and highly effective 
counter-terrorism operations by Indonesian National Police (Polri). The revival 
of Salafist jihadism in Indonesia, encouraged by social media and galvanised by 
US-led military action against IS, presents a multidimensional policy challenge 
for Indonesia. 
The final section of the paper concludes by identifying opportunities for 
Australia to enhance its defence and security cooperation with Indonesia. By 
necessity, the section also includes recommendations pertaining to foreign 
policy. It argues that although there is much common ground for cooperation 
with Australia in Widodo’s defence and security platform, the departure of SBY 
from the national political scene, combined with residual distrust among 
Jakarta’s political elites from the spying allegations, will serve as a constraining 
factor on closer engagement.  
 
 
4 | P a g e  
 
 
Maritime Security 
Poros Maritim: A New Strategic Doctrine? 
The Widodo Government has made maritime geography, as conceptualised in 
its ‘global maritime axis’ (poros maritime dunia) doctrine, the centrepiece of its 
defence and foreign policy agenda. The new government’s policy emphasis on 
the maritime domain, however, has broader resonance beyond defence and 
foreign affairs.  Promoting the concept of Indonesia as a global maritime axis 
can be understood as an overarching development doctrine, which seeks to 
augment Indonesia’s prosperity and welfare through economic development of 
the maritime domain. In essence, the geopolitical component of this broader 
developmental agenda, calls for a reconceptualization of Indonesia’s vital 
interests as an archipelagic state strategically located at the crossroads of 
contending major power interests in the Indo-Pacific. 
An appreciation of the significance of Indonesia’s maritime geography is not 
new to the country’s strategic thinking. In the early post-independence period, 
Indonesia developed an acute sense of vulnerability to interference by external 
powers. In the 1950s, Dutch naval patrols off West New Guinea (excluded from 
the 1949 transfer of sovereignty arrangements), combined with US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) logistical support to rebellions in the outer islands, 
illustrated the salience of maritime geography for the country’s national 
security.  
Indonesia’s first attempt as a modern nation state to articulate a strategic policy 
germane to its maritime geography was the Djuanda Declaration of 1957. It was 
the birth of Wawasan Nusantara or Indonesia’s archipelagic doctrine, which 
became the basis of the country’s geopolitical thinking. Prior to the Djuanda 
Declaration, the country’s sovereignty had extended only three miles from the 
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low water mark under a 1939 Dutch ordinance. The ordinance meant, in effect, 
that Indonesia’s islands were separated by international waters or “open seas”.1 
The Djuanda Declaration delimited Indonesia’s territorial sea of 12 nautical 
miles through straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the 
outermost Indonesian islands. It would lead to international legal recognition of 
Indonesia as an ‘archipelagic state’ under the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  
Beyond recognition in international law, however, the concept was not a 
defining factor in government policy formulation. Indonesia’s neglect of the 
maritime domain was attributable to a number of politico-economic factors, not 
least the former political pre-eminence of Indonesia’s Army, at the expense of 
the Navy and Air Force. Meanwhile, the Suharto regime’s preoccupation with 
internal dissent and separatist challenges ensured a defence strategy focussed on 
land-based threats. The sheer scale of the developmental challenges faced by 
one of the world’s largest states in population and area terms, moreover, was a 
powerful factor militating against a more substantive investment in maritime 
infrastructure and resources. Indonesia is the world’s largest archipelagic state. 
It comprises of 17,504 islands with a population of approximately 250 million. 
The country’s total area of water measures 5.8 million square kilometres (sq 
km).2 
 
1 Hasyim Djalal cited in I Made Andi Arsana, "RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoeanda 
Declaration", The Jakarta Post, 14 December 2011, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/14/ri-toward-a-naval-power-54-years-djoeanda-
declaration.html. 
2 Consisting of 0.3 million sq km of territorial waters, 2.8 sq km of internal and archipelagic waters, 
and 2.7 million sq km of EEZ. Prof . Dr. Tulus Warsito, "Geostrategic Maritim Indonesia Dalam 
Perspektif Diplomasi", in Jalan Kemandirian Bangsa, [Path to National Self-Reliance] Tim Ahli Seknas 
Jokowi [Expert Team Jokowi National Secretariat] (Jakarta: Kompas Gramedia, 2014), 150. 
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New Government’s Policy Platform 
Widodo’s policy emphasis on Indonesia’s maritime environment and expression 
of its geo-strategic interests through the ‘maritime axis’ concept presents a long 
overdue reorientation of defence and foreign policy planning. Based on the 
Vision-Mission and Action Program (Visi-Misi dan Program Aksi) released by 
Widodo and Vice President-elect Jusuf Kalla in May 2014, the new government 
will seek to operationalise its ‘maritime axis’ concept by enhancing its foreign 
policy authority and repositioning itself in global affairs. The search for greater 
authority is a reflection generally of the policy platform’s emphasis on Trisakti, 
or the ‘Three Powers’, encompassing political sovereignty, economic 
independence and national character.3 
Under a Widodo government, Indonesia has committed to promoting 
Indonesia’s identity as an archipelagic state through diplomacy and 
international cooperation.  The foreign policy and defence expression of 
Indonesia’s archipelagic status will be realised through five key action items: 
o Maritime diplomacy to expedite the resolution of Indonesia’s 
border disputes, including land borders, with ten neighbouring 
states; 
o Safeguarding the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), maritime sovereignty and security 
and welfare of the outer islands; 
3 "Berdaulat dalam bidang politik, berdikari dalam bidang ekonomi dan berkepribadiaan dalam 
kebudayaan". Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 2014, Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri 
Dan Berkepribadian: Visi, Misi Dan Program Aksi, [Path to Change for an Indonesia which is 
Sovereign, Self-sufficient and United: Vision, Mission and Action Program] Jakarta, May 2014, 
http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf, 3.  
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o Securing natural resources in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone; 
o Intensifying defence diplomacy; and 
o Reducing maritime rivalries between major powers and supporting 
the resolution of regional territorial disputes.4 
Central to the ‘maritime axis’ concept is a greater policy emphasis on the Indo-
Pacific. The Widodo Government seeks to integrate the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans as the primary theatre for its foreign policy implementation. In order to 
realise Indonesia’s active role in the Indo-Pacific region, the government will 
accord priority to following policy objectives: 
o The consolidation of Indonesia’s leadership in ASEAN  as well as 
the strengthening of ASEAN cooperation and centrality; 
o Strengthening of the regional architecture  (especially the East 
Asia Summit) in order to prevent the hegemony of major powers; 
o The strengthening and development of bilateral strategic 
partnerships; 
o Managing the impact of regional economic integration and free 
trade on Indonesia’s national economic interests; 
o Supporting comprehensive maritime cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific region, especially through the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association (IORA).5 
In defence terms, the new government will aim to realise its ‘maritime axis’ 
doctrine through the development of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) into a 
4 Ibid., 12-14. 
5 Ibid. 
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regional maritime power of consequence in East Asia.6 In so doing, the Widodo 
Government will move the basis of its capability planning beyond the Minimum 
Essential Force (MEF) 2024 strategy of the SBY era, best understood as a 
capability-based defence and force readiness level that can guarantee the 
attainment of immediate strategic defence interests, towards a more ambitious 
goal.  This will be achieved through a targeted increase in defence spending  to 
1.5 per cent of GDP during Widodo's five year term from its current 0.82 per 
cent or approximately IDR 83.4 trillion (AUD 7.89 billion).7  
Implementational Challenges 
The government will face both ideational and financial difficulties in the 
implementation of its ‘maritime axis’ doctrine. Turning awareness of 
Indonesia’s archipelagic status and maritime potential from what Widodo 
advisor, Rizal Sukma, characterised as “merely discourse” into policy reality 
will be immensely challenging.8 Despite the modernisation of Indonesia’s 
armed forces, including a growing emphasis on maritime capabilities9, the 
country still lacks comprehensive maritime domain awareness. An integrated 
surveillance and coordination approach by maritime agencies is still some way 
off despite changes to lead agency maritime security agency Bakorkamla 
6 In Indonesian 'membangun TNI sebagai kekuatan maritim regional yang disegani di kawasan Asia 
Timur'. Ibid., 14. 
7 "Dirjen Pothan: Kebutuhan "MEF" Bisa Terpenuhi 2024" [Director-General Defence Potential: "MEF" 
Can be Achieved by 2024], Kemhan [Ministry of Defence], 26 March 2013, http:// 
www.kemhan.go.id/kemhan/?pg=31&id=1013. 
8 Bagus BT Saragih, "Jokowi on people-based diplomacy', The Jakarta Post, September 10, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/10/jokowi-people-based-diplomacy.html 
9 In order to safeguard its sea lanes of communications, TNI AL has purchased advanced primary 
weapon systems including three brand new Changbogo class diesel electric submarines, two Dutch-
built Sigma PKR 10514 frigates, four Dutch-built Sigma corvettes, three ex-Royal Brunei Navy 
Nakhoda Ragam class multirole light frigates, up to 32 locally built fast missile craft and patrol boats, 
CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and AS-565 Panther anti-submarine helicopters. TNI AL is also 
improving the amphibious capability of the Marine Corps by procuring large numbers of Russian 
BMP-3F and Ukrainian BTR-4 amphibious fighting vehicles and improved artillery systems. 
Information courtesy of Marc Keller, Director Dragonminster Consulting, http://dragonminster.com/ 
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(rebadged as Bakamla), which will now direct maritime security operations 
carried out by the twelve agencies under its command.10 The recent discovery of 
four unidentified drones in Indonesia’s territory has further underscored 
Indonesia’s inadequacies in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) and hence weaknesses in its capacity to defend its territorial integrity.11  
There are also cultural constraints to further reform within Indonesia's security 
bureaucracies. Deep rivalry between TNI and Polri since their separation in 
1999 has long frustrated closer coordination.12  There is little incentive for 
agencies to coordinate more closely. Steeped in hierarchical and opaque 
bureaucratic cultures, they are still some way off from internalising the good 
governance principles of efficient service delivery, transparency and 
accountability.13 Finally, the maritime domain presents ample opportunities for 
Indonesian ports, customs, coastguard, immigration, police, and naval personnel 
to engage in rent-seeking opportunities. Despite the Corruption Eradication 
Commission’s (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) successes in prosecuting 
senior police officers, bureaucrats and politicians, Indonesia is still ranked at 
10 These are: TNI AL; Polri's Marine Division; Ministry of Transport's Coast Guard Unit (KPLP); 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries; Ministry of Finance's Customs and Excise Directorate-
General. The following seven agencies listed maintain information coordination without committing 
any assets to sea: Ministry of Law and Human Rights; Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and 
Security Affairs; Ministry of Home Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; State Intelligence Agency; 
Attorney-General's Office and TNI HQ. Ibid.  
11 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 3 September 2014 
12 Indonesian Security Sector Reform analysts, for example, widely attribute the rejection of the 
National Security Bill (UU Kamnas) by the DPR to rivalries between TNI and Polri. Polri fears TNI 
dominance in a proposed National Security Council (Dewan Keamanan Nasional), a key component 
of UU Kamnas bill, and has so far resisted plans to place the Polri chief under a civilian minister. 
There are also broader institutional jealousies and turf rivalries between Polri and TNI personnel that 
on occasion erupt in violence. 
13 For an idea of problems endemic to Indonesia's public service more generally see Staffan 
Synnerstrom, “The Civil Service: Towards Efficiency, Effectiveness and Honesty”, in Indonesia: 
Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance, edited by Andrew MacIntyre and Ross H. McLeod, 
160, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 159–177. 
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114 among 177 countries by Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index.14 
The realisation of the defence and security aspects of the ‘maritime axis’ 
doctrine such as "safeguarding Indonesia's maritime sovereignty" and "securing 
natural resources in Indonesia’s EEZ"15 will require a long term investment, 
which will not be realised within a five year presidential term. The increase in 
defence spending is contingent upon solid economic growth rates and the 
competing imperatives of service delivery in health and education, as well as 
investment in infrastructure and agriculture. Whilst Indonesia remains unable to 
police its expansive territorial waters it remains prone to myriad security threats 
and criminal activities including  arms, drugs and people smuggling, piracy, 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing and territorial violations by 
state actors.  
Indonesia, the South China Sea and Broader Strategic Stability 
The end of complacency 
Widodo’s presidential candidature has provided an opportunity to reappraise the 
strategic realities of Indonesia’s archipelagic status and reflect it in policy terms. 
This comes after a sustained period of democratic consolidation in which 
Indonesia’s economic fortunes and global diplomatic stature have risen. 
Indonesia’s rise has also corresponded with an increase in regional strategic 
tensions driven in large part, by China’s brinkmanship in its maritime territorial 
disputes with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. In the twenty first century, 
14 "RI improves ranking on global corruption perception index", Antara news, 3 December 2013, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91680/ri-improves-ranking-on-global-corruption-perception-
index. 
15 Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 2014, Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri Dan 
Berkepribadian: Visi, Misi Dan Program Aksi, [Path to Change for an Indonesia which is Sovereign, 
Self-sufficient and United: Vision, Mission and Action Program], 12. 
11 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
both sea and air power will be critical for defence against conventional threats 
in the Indo-Pacific region. As a consequence, the vulnerabilities and immense 
potential of Indonesia’s maritime geography have been at the forefront of the 
minds of the key intellectuals who drafted the President-elect’s policy platform 
and coordinated the work of the transition team.  
Based on an analysis of Widodo’s May 2014 Vision-Mission and Action 
Program, policy input by Indonesian academics16 and “off the record” 
comments by Widodo advisors, Indonesia’s neglect of its maritime environment 
and the country’s relative complacency about the intersection of China’s South 
China Sea ambitions with its territorial waters appears to be coming to an end. 
One of Jokowi’s principal defence advisors, for example, called recently for a 
psychological shift from a weak state mentality to a more offensive defence 
posture which better reflects Indonesia’s geographic character. To illustrate the 
point that Indonesia’s defence posture was too passive, he quipped recently to 
seminar participants, including mid-ranking TNI officers, that instead of 
providing a credible military deterrent, “Natuna would be snatched and 
Indonesia forced to snatch it back again!”17  
The China Threat 
China’s determined pursuit of its national interests in the South China Sea — 
hydrocarbons, fish stocks, and territory — presents a security challenge for 
Indonesia in two important ways. First, China’s nine-dash line claim which is 
the basis of its “indisputable sovereignty” over most of the South China Sea 
intersects with Indonesia’s EEZ just north of the Natuna Islands, located in Riau 
16 These contributions were coordinated by Tim Ahli Seknas Jokowi (Jokowi National Secretariat 
(Seknas) Expert Team] in a research symposium conducted on 20 March 2014 in Jakarta. The 
presentations are published as Jalan Kemandirian Bangsa [Path to National Self-Reliance].  
17 The original was in Indonesian: "Natuna direbut, kami rebut kembali!"Confidential views of Jokowi 
advisor, Jakarta, 3 September 2014. 
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Islands Province. Secondly, Indonesia sees itself as a key arbiter of the regional 
order. Through its founding role in the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, and as 
ASEAN’s largest state, Indonesia has a proprietorial view of the organisation. 
Indonesia is the primus inter pares actor in ASEAN and through its leadership 
seeks to preserve Southeast Asia’s autonomy vis-à-vis external powers.  
An analysis of the history of ASEAN indeed reveals that much of its politico-
strategic agenda has been about China. How to socialise China into ASEAN 
norms on the renunciation of the use or threat of force and the peaceful 
settlement of disputes has engaged Indonesia’s foreign policy intellectuals for 
decades. But there are cracks appearing in Indonesia’s China policy, both in 
terms of government unanimity with respect to the undeclared territorial dispute 
with China, and in Indonesia’s hedging against Chinese dominance through 
regional multilateral organisations.  
Indonesia’s official position on China’s claim to waters near the Natuna Islands 
is to ignore it. But this approach by Indonesia’s foreign ministry is getting more 
difficult as TNI officers break ranks and publically express concerns about the 
vulnerability of Natuna to China’s creeping encroachment.18 On 10 September 
2014, for example, Head of the Maritime Security Coordination Agency 
(Bakorkamla) Vice Admiral Desi Albert Mamahit was the latest in a series of 
senior TNI officers to publicly express concern: “Sooner or later, whether we 
like it or not, Indonesia will be affected by the South China Sea conflict either 
directly or indirectly.” 19 Meanwhile, Indonesia itself has been subject to 
18 See Greta Nabbs-Keller, "Is Indonesia shifting its South China Sea policy?", The Interpreter, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 16 April 2014, 
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/04/16/Indonesia-Natuna-shift-south-china-sea-
policy.aspx?COLLCC=1491051479& 
19 "Konflik Laut Cina Selatan Berpengaruh ke Indonesia"[South China Sea Conflict Impacts on 
Indonesia], Tribun News, September 11, 2014, 
http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2014/09/11/konflik-laut-cina-selatan-berpengaruh-ke-indonesia. 
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increasingly coercive measures by Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels in 
its EEZ, particularly in relation to illegal fishing activities.20 
ASEAN unanimity, the core of Southeast Asia’s resilience and autonomy, is 
being increasingly tested by China’s actions in the South China Sea.  Serious 
schisms, like the 2012 Phnom Penh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting which ended 
in acrimony and without a communique, reflects Beijing’s leverage over smaller 
states like Cambodia and Laos. Although Indonesia’s foreign minister, Marty 
Natalegawa, reached a face-saving agreement on a six-point statement on the 
South China Sea, the incident illustrated the potential of the South China Sea 
issue to divide ASEAN.21  
Risk of Waning Leadership, Rising Nationalism 
South China Sea territorial disputes represent one of the most pressing foreign 
policy and security challenges that the Widodo Government will inherit in 
October. Indonesia’s regional leadership and national prestige is invested in its 
mediation role between Beijing and the four ASEAN claimant states — 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. So far Indonesia has been able 
to keep China negotiating on a South China Sea Code of Conduct, but Beijing 
appears in no hurry to sign, preferring a bilateral approach. Further belligerent 
actions by China, like its erection of a deep water oil drilling rig in Vietnam’s 
EEZ last May and ongoing land reclamation activities in the Spratly Island 
chain, undermine regional stability and risk Indonesia’s ability to maintain 
ASEAN cohesion in the face of rising interstate tensions.  
20 For example, Scott Bentley, "Mapping the nine-dash line: recent incidents involving Indonesia in the 
South China Sea", The Strategist, The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog, October 2013, 
http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-dash-line-recent-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-
the-south-china-sea/. 
21 Bagus BT Saragih, "RI finds common ASEAN ground in sea dispute", The Jakarta Post, 23 July 
2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/ri-finds-common-asean-ground-sea-
dispute.html. 
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There is another important domestic political dimension to the South China Sea 
conflict for Indonesia.  The anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam in response to the oil 
rig incident have not been lost on Widodo’s advisors. Indonesia suspended 
diplomatic relations with China for 23 years for its alleged complicity in 
Indonesia’s 1965 coup attempt. Although Indonesia has not seen serious anti-
Chinese violence since the May 1998 riots that preceded Suharto’s resignation, 
perceived illegitimate Chinese actions in the Natuna Islands, or a more serious 
confrontation between Chinese paramilitary vessels and an Indonesian 
government vessel (than has already occurred), could inflame Indonesian 
nationalism and unleash latent anti-Chinese sentiment. Chinese diplomats in 
Jakarta have been warned apparently that Indonesia will not tolerate the kind of 
rough treatment recently meted out to Vietnam and the Philippines.22  
Salafist Extremism 
The Long War 
The latest deadly incarnation of Salafist extremism, as represented by the 
Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda backed al-Nusra Front, represents a new and 
insidious challenge to the Indonesian state and regional counter-terrorism 
efforts. According to some estimates, there are currently around 300 
Indonesians fighting in Syria and another 56 in Iraq.23  Much like Afghanistan 
before it, conflicts in Syria and Iraq have the potential to re-energise Indonesia’s 
22 Respondent was referring to China's placement of a giant oil rig in Vietnams's EEZ last May and the 
permanent presence of Chinese paramilitary vessels in Philippines waters. Chinese diplomats were 
reminded, reportedly, of the razing of the Chinese embassy in Jakarta in 1967 in reprisal for violence 
against Indonesian diplomats. Confidential discussion with Widodo advisor, Jakarta, 3 September 
2014. 
23 Peter Alford, "Abu Bakar Bashir's supporters quiet over his backing for Islamic State", The 
Australian, 17 September 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/abu-bakar-bashirs-
supporters-quit-over-his-backing-for-islamic-state/story-e6frg6so-1227060637092. 
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radical Salafist groups and undermine the country’s cohesion and pluralist 
Pancasila ideology.24  
Islamist extremism is not a new challenge for Indonesia, but one which 
Indonesia’s security forces have confronted since the Darul Islam insurgency of 
the 1940s. Although the Darul Islam insurgency was defeated by the Indonesian 
military in 1962, the desire for an Islamic state and imposition of Shariah Law 
has long inspired Indonesia’s radical Islamist movement. The 2001 September 
11 attacks on the United States, combined with deadly sectarian violence in 
Indonesia’s Maluku and Sulawesi provinces in the early years of Indonesia’s 
democratic transition, gave rise to the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). 
In a series of deadly bombings between 2000 and 2009, JI-linked operatives 
were responsible for the death and injury of hundreds of Indonesian and foreign 
nationals, including 88 Australians killed in two Bali night club bombings in 
2002.  
Indonesia’s radical Islamist movement has splintered into a number of smaller 
groups since mainstream JI renounced violence within Indonesia in 2007. 
Among the most dangerous of these is the Sulawesi-based terrorist network, the 
Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), led by Abu 
Wardah Santoso. Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), a direct offshoot of JI is led 
by incarcerated terrorist mastermind Abu Bakar Ba’asyir [aka Bashir]. The 
group has recently divided over Ba’asyir’s pledge of allegiance (baiat) to IS 
with around 95% of JAT’s claimed 3,000 membership (including Ba’asyir’s 
24 Pancasila, derived from the Sanskrit words panca and sila, was devised by Indonesia's first 
president, Soekarno, and form the ideological basis of the state. They are summarised as follows:  1) 
belief in one god; 2) a just and civilised humanity, 3) unity, 4) democracy, 5) social justice. 
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sons and senior executives), forming a new organisation Jamaah Ansharusy 
Syariah (JAS).25  
Radical groups JI, JAS and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis 
Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) are reportedly cooperating on the disbursement of 
humanitarian aid to Syria in support of the al-Nusra Front, rather than IS. These 
groups reject the legitimacy of the caliphate declared by IS encompassing 
eastern Syria and Western Iraq, as well as its brutal treatment of fellow Sunni 
Muslims.26  
The Government’s Response 
The propagation of IS ideology through social media is of concern to 
Indonesian authorities. An Indonesian terrorism expert who runs an anti-
radicalisation program in Indonesia estimated that around 2,000 Indonesians 
had pledged their online allegiance to the Islamic State.27 IS’s strong anti-Shia 
ideology, furthermore, risks inflaming tensions between Indonesia’s majority 
Sunni community and minority Shia and Ahmadiyah Muslims, who have been 
the target of violence, discrimination and displacement in Indonesia over recent 
years.  
The Indonesian government fears that the Iraq and Syrian conflicts, like 
Afghanistan before it, will radicalise a new generation of militants with the 
funding, networks and combat experience to launch new attacks. In response, 
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Djoko Suyanto, 
said government agencies had been instructed to prevent Indonesians from 
25 Alford, "Abu Bakar Bashir's supporters quiet over his backing for Islamic State". 
26 Ibid. 
27 Taufik Andrie quoted by George Roberts, "Islamic State: Indonesian terrorists discuss reprisal 
attacks over action against IS, increasing threat to Australians, researcher says", ABC News, 15 
September 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-15/indonesian-terrorists-discuss-attacks-over-
is-action/5743076. 
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flying to the Middle East to join IS, including by denying them passports. “The 
government is collecting names of Indonesians who have travelled to Syria and 
is monitoring their activities”, he said.28 
The Government has also placed a ban on IS membership and ideology in 
Indonesia and announced that Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency 
(BNPT) would lead law enforcement efforts against the extremist group in 
Indonesia. The government has not placed a similar ban on the al-Nusra Front, 
however, a concern identified by some terrorism analysts who point out that the 
bulk of Indonesian fighters have in fact joined al-Nusra rather than IS.29  
Converging with the impact of IS and al-Nusra is the release from prison in 
2014 of large numbers of Indonesian jihadis, some of whom have been 
previously involved in bombings against Western targets. In September, Det-88 
arrested four Chinese Uighurs in Sulawesi with links to IS, who were reportedly 
attempting to make contact with MIT leader Santoso.30  These arrests illustrate 
that aside from Indonesian fighters travelling to the Middle East, foreign 
Islamists are also travelling to Indonesia to coordinate with Indonesian jihadis. 
On a more positive note, the arrests also demonstrate the relative effectiveness 
of Indonesian police and intelligence networks in monitoring the threat. 
The “Intermestic” Challenge  
President Obama’s September announcement that the US would lead a coalition 
against IS has added a dangerous new variable into the revival of Salafist 
extremism in Indonesia. With a Muslim population of around 87%, Indonesian 
28 Richard C Paddock and Ben Otto, "Indonesia: Detainees Likely Uighurs Who Planned to Meet With 
Militant", The Wall Street Journal, 15 September 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-says-
detainees-are-likely-uighurs-who-sought-meeting-with-militant-1410810096. 
29 Peter Alford, "Bashir's terror call sparks exodus to Syrian rival", The Australian, September 17, 
2014.  
30 Paddock and Otto, "Indonesia: Detainees Likely Uighurs Who Planned to Meet With Militant". 
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governments need to maintain a difficult balancing act between placating the 
sensitivities of their Muslim constituencies and maintaining Indonesia’s image 
as a moderate Muslim country and vital actor in regional counter-terrorism 
efforts.  
In the past, senior Indonesian policy-makers have been mindful of the potential 
for local jihadism fuelled by Western-led military interventions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq to “merobek” (to tear) the county apart.31 In an attempt to avert a 
dangerous Huntington-like32 schism pitting the Muslim East against the 
Christian West, Indonesia’s foreign ministry led a deliberate strategy of 
countering Western media discourse and public opinion equating Islam with 
terrorism. Under former foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, for example, it 
instituted weekly foreign policy breakfasts with the interfaith community and 
sent religious leaders abroad to places like Australia to understand there were 
also groups in the West which opposed the Iraq War.33  
Whilst the Jokowi policy platform makes no specific mention of terrorism, it 
does contend that globalisation is having a dislocating impact on Indonesia’s 
youth, which is in turn, strengthening primordial identities.34 The impact of IS 
and al-Nusra ideology on Indonesia will be multidimensional with security, 
economic, religious and foreign policy implications. The succour IS and al-
Nusra provide to the local jihadist movement combined with US-led military 
action will potentially heighten the risk of terrorist attack including against 
Western targets, harming Indonesia’s investment climate. Perhaps most 
31 Interview with retired senior Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta, 12 October 2012. 
32 In 1993, Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington published his 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis which 
contended that the fundamental source of conflict for humankind would be cultural, i.e. between 
different civilisations. Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations", Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 3 
(Summer, 1993): 22-49. 
33 Interview with retired senior Indonesian diplomat, Jakarta, October 12, 2012. 
34 Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla 2014, Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri Dan 
Berkepribadian: Visi, Misi Dan Program Aksi,Visi, Misi Dan Program Aksi, 2.  
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dangerously for the new government, it risks sharpening Indonesia’s internal 
schisms along sectarian lines. Such pressing security challenges highlight the 
importance of Widodo’s choice of defence and foreign affairs ministers, as well 
as the powerful position of Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal and 
Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam). Fortunately for Widodo, Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla has a proven track record in quelling communal conflict.35  
Policy Priorities and Opportunities for Australia 
The election of a new government in Indonesia heralds both risk and 
opportunity for Australia-Indonesia relations. On the one hand, rising strategic 
uncertainties posed by China’s maritime territorial claims and the revival of 
Salafist extremism in Southeast Asia are proving powerful imperatives for 
closer cooperation between Indonesia and Australia. On the other hand, Widodo 
has yet to develop any personal investment in maintaining strong bilateral ties 
with Australia and there is residual anger over the spying revelations according 
to a Widodo advisor.36 Chairwoman of Jokowi’s party vehicle PDI-P Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, meanwhile, is an ardent defender of the Unitary State (NKRI) 
and will undoubtedly exert influence over aspects of the government’s defence 
and foreign-policy decision-making. It is said Megawati has not forgotten the 
loss of East Timor or indeed Australia’s role in it. Further intelligence 
revelations risk doing longer term damage to bilateral relations. 
• Given the advent of a domestic political environment in Indonesia 
that is potentially less conducive to close bilateral relations, the 
35 Kalla has a record of achievement in government, including conflict resolution. He was instrumental 
in brokering the 2005 Helsinki Accord which saw the cessation of protracted separatist violence in 
Aceh. Whilst serving as Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare in the government of Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, he was similarly instrumental in quelling sectarian violence in Maluku and Central 
Sulawesi under the Malino II Accords. 
36 Confidential interview, Jakarta, 3 September 2014 
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Australian Government might consider formulating a risk mitigation 
strategy to allay future tensions. 
The new administration in Jakarta will see a shake-up of key portfolios of 
foreign affairs (Kemlu), defence (Kemhan), and politics, legal and security 
affairs (Kemenkopolhukam). These are strategic portfolios for Australian 
security and foreign policy engagement and it will take time for Australian 
ministers and senior bureaucrats to build rapport with their new counterparts.  
• At the executive and senior bureaucratic level of the Australian 
Government, the priority should be to build rapport with Indonesia’s 
new president, cabinet and departmental heads.  
Forthcoming policy changes in Jakarta require that Australian policy-makers 
understand the defence and security platform of the new government and align 
engagement priorities accordingly. The objectives of Widodo’s foreign policy 
platform reflect Indonesia’s attempts to balance an ascendant China through 
strengthening cooperation in the Indian Ocean theatre. As Indonesia seeks to 
operationalise its ‘maritime axis doctrine’, there are obvious opportunities to 
enhance defence and security cooperation among Indian Ocean littoral states, 
which also include Australia and India.  
• Australia, India and Indonesia share common democratic values and 
a commitment to international maritime law. Shared identities and 
common security goals should be reflected in Australian narratives 
on the Indian Ocean. 
• Australian policy-makers might consider how to facilitate closer 
trilateral cooperation with India and Indonesia in IORA.  
• The Australian Government's facilitation of new initiatives and 
enhanced cooperation in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 
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(IONS), as well as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus 
(ADMM Plus), converge well with Indonesia’s policy emphasis on 
intensified defence diplomacy and reduction of regional maritime 
rivalries. 
For the defence relationship, the first priority will be to restore engagement 
activities to pre-November 2013 levels. Defence was doing a lot with Indonesia. 
Providing bilateral defence engagement is fully restored, the issue will be more 
about recalibrating defence international engagement objectives to suit the 
shared policy priorities of Australia and the new Indonesian Government.  
• Enhanced maritime surveillance and information sharing; submarine 
escape and rescue training, visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) 
training and defence science and technology germane to Indonesia’s 
maritime geography will be of high interest to Indonesian 
government agencies.  
• As Indonesia’s Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) coordinates 12 
agencies under its command, the Australian Government could 
promote its maritime safety and security architecture as relevant to 
Indonesia’s requirements.  
Widodo’s policy platform signals a restructure of Indonesia’s foreign ministry 
and an emphasis on building skills in strategic research, law of the sea and asset 
recovery.  Australian universities, the private sector and think-tanks in 
partnership with DFAT are well placed to facilitate the research skills of 
Indonesia’s diplomatic corps and deepen subject matter expertise. 
• Australian Government agencies might give consideration to 
providing professional training courses to Indonesian defence, 
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security, and foreign ministry personnel and whether they can 
leverage off existing funding mechanisms or indeed devise new ones. 
The loss of nearly one hundred Australian lives in previous terrorist attacks in 
Indonesia ensures Australia retains a fundamental interest in the success of 
Indonesia’s counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation efforts. The Joint 
Understanding on a code of conduct between the Republic of Indonesia and 
Australia, signed on 28 August 2014 in Bali, has provided for enhanced 
intelligence exchanges between Indonesia and Australia in face of the IS threat. 
In addition: 
• There may be lessons learned from Indonesia’s deradicalisation 
programs in the context of managing Australia’s growing Islamist 
threat. 
• For Defence, the threat posed by IS and the al-Nusra Front in 
Indonesia may require changes to intelligence targeting and 
information sharing protocols, and the possible incorporation of new 
tactics in combined CT exercises with TNI. 
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Introduction 
With the election of a new Indonesian president in October comes the prospect 
of an unchartered foreign policy from the world’s fourth most populous country 
and the largest Muslim democracy. President Joko Widodo (widely known as 
Jokowi) is expected to concentrate on a domestic agenda that includes 
addressing uneven wealth distribution, improving health and education 
standards, tackling poor infrastructure, and stimulating local business. He has 
mainly left foreign affairs to Retno Marsudi, the former ambassador to the 
Netherlands who also served as information secretary at the Indonesian 
Embassy in Canberra from 1990 to 1994. Nevertheless, Widodo faces a number 
of foreign policy challenges, driven not only by an international environment in 
flux but also the way in which those challenges affect his domestic agenda. 
How Indonesia’s foreign policy unfolds is of key interest to Australia. We are 
yet to know what kind of emphasis Widodo will place on our particular bilateral 
relationship, relative to other priorities. To understand Australia’s place in 
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Indonesia’s worldview, we need to situate that bilateral relationship within 
Indonesia’s broader foreign policy. 
This paper serves as a primer on Indonesia’s future international outlook, and 
considers structural features of the international system and, to a lesser degree, 
the role of individuals such as the foreign minister in shaping Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. The discussion begins with an overview of the past decade of 
Indonesia’s foreign engagement under former President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (widely known as SBY). The second section is a lengthier 
discussion of four main challenges and opportunities facing Indonesia in the 
international realm: maritime issues, great power relations, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and economic diplomacy. The third section 
assesses how the development of Indonesia’s foreign policy under Widodo will 
affect Australia in terms of bilateral relations with Indonesia and opportunities 
for cooperation on multilateral issues. The conclusion touches on how 
Marsudi’s ministerial role and diplomatic experience will shape and realise 
Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions. 
Indonesia’s Foreign Policy under Yudhoyono from 2004 to 2014 
Yudhoyono presided over a decade of political stability and strong economic 
growth. During his tenure, Indonesia was much more assertive on the 
international scene—often seen as in stark contrast to Yudhoyono’s inactivity 
on economic and social reforms.  
Foreign policy under Yudhoyono was characterised by the continuation of long-
standing principles such as ‘bebas dan aktif’, a free and active foreign policy, in 
place since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. However, Yudhoyono also 
encouraged high levels diplomatic activity to enhance Indonesia’s stature as a 
‘regional power/global player’—a recurring concept in a number of his 
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speeches in his ten-year tenure since 2004—as well as the idea of ‘a million 
friends and zero enemies’. 
To make the country a global player, Yudhoyono championed Indonesia’s 
membership of multilateral groupings, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), 
the G20, the United Nations, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), and proudly proclaimed such memberships as foreign policy successes in 
his domestic speeches. At the Asia-Pacific level, Indonesia took a more activist 
approach within ASEAN, with Yudhoyono’s second-term foreign affairs 
minister, Marty Natalegawa, spearheading shuttle diplomacy between Southeast 
Asian states and championing initiatives such as the ‘Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation’ in the Indo-Pacific. Although there has not been further discussion 
of treaty since December 2013, it demonstrated Indonesia’s international 
leadership aspirations and involvement in foreign affairs at the time. 
Another particular feature of Yudhoyono’s tenure was his increasing emphasis 
on the Islamic and democratic credentials of Indonesia’s post-reformasi foreign 
policy. In addition to its OIC membership, Indonesia showed an interest in 
matters across the Muslim world, from the Israel–Palestine peace process to 
Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Although Indonesia has limited diplomatic 
influence in these matters, showing solidarity with Muslim states was an 
enduring and domestically popular feature of Yudhoyono’s foreign policy. The 
Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) was a Yudhoyono government initiative 
established in 2008 to help Indonesia share its experiences with democratisation 
and draw together Muslim states to discuss their own. Although not a decision-
making body (and criticised as being another ‘talk shop’), the BDF further 
exemplifies Indonesia’s desire to be an influential state in world affairs. 
Although Indonesia became a more prominent foreign policy actor under 
Yudhoyono, the country arguably drew limited diplomatic gains for its efforts. 
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Despite its global ambitions, the Yudhoyono administration lacked commitment 
to follow through, as a result of which many of its diplomatic initiatives have 
not yet come to fruition. For example, Yudhoyono was involved in the 
Millennium Development Goals panel of the United Nations with British Prime 
Minister David Cameron and Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, but he 
made lacklustre progress on reducing wealth inequality in his own country. 
Similarly, the fizzling out of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation reflects a 
lack of interest either by member states (which means Indonesia did not solicit 
enough backers before announcing the treaty) or the Indonesian Government in 
pursuing the treaty. In other words, being diplomatically active was seen as an 
end in itself—and possibly the prime foreign affairs legacy of the Yudhoyono 
presidency. 
Foreign Policy Challenges ahead for Indonesia 
Turning now to 2014, President Widodo and Vice President Jusuf Kalla have 
only made nascent pronouncements about Indonesia’s future foreign policy in 
their presidential debates, speeches, and ‘vision and mission’ (visi misi) 
statements during the election campaign. The ‘vision and mission’ statement 
articulates four foreign policy priorities: preserving Indonesia’s maritime 
domain; increasing middle power diplomacy; consolidating both economic and 
security relationships in the Indo-Pacific (particularly with other ASEAN 
states); and formulating foreign policy that both involves and reflects the 
interests of the community as well as reforming the foreign ministry. 37 Widodo 
also unveiled the concept of ‘poros maritim dunia’, which aims to make 
Indonesia the ‘world’s maritime axis’. Overall, Widodo is expected to be more 
37 “Jalan perubahan untuk Indonesia yang berdaulat, mandiri dan berkepribadian: visi misi, dan 
program aksi”, Vision Mission statement of the Jokowi Jusuf Kalla 2014 campaign, May 2014, 
http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf, pp. 12–14. 
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pragmatic than Yudhoyono in his foreign policy approach, electing to commit 
Indonesia’s diplomatic time and resources to grassroots level concerns such as 
foreign workers. 
What follows is a discussion of four important foreign policy areas requiring the 
Widodo administration’s immediate attention. For example, the impact of 
maritime conflicts on regional stability and the long lead times required to 
sustain economic and trade cooperation in the Asia-Pacific need to be addressed 
as a matter of priority. Other global challenges such as climate change require 
Indonesia’s attention but as an introduction to the new administration’s foreign 
policymaking, this paper will focus on the four priority areas listed below. 
I. Maritime Issues 
Throughout his election campaign and in his inauguration speech, Widodo 
emphasised the primacy of Indonesia’s maritime surrounds as fundamental to 
the nation’s wellbeing and future.38 Maritime conflicts, most notably the rising 
tensions in the South and East China seas over territorial disputes between 
China and other states, present Indonesia with diplomatic and security 
challenges. 
China has increasingly exhibited more assertive and aggressive behaviour in the 
region, but with trade worth approximately US$5 trillion passing through the 
South China Sea,39 regional states are concerned that stand-offs between 
Chinese vessels and those of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam and the 
Philippines could disrupt regional peace and prosperity. 
38 “Jokowi’s Inaugural Speech as Nation’s Seventh President,” unofficial translation, The Jakarta 
Globe, October 20, 2014, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowis-inaugural-speech-
nations-seventh-president/. 
39 Council on Foreign Relations, “China’s Maritime Disputes,” CFR InfoGuide Presentation (2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-
china_sea_InfoGuide. 
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In May this year, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 
accompanied by 80 ships (including military assets), placed a deep-water oil rig 
in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam claimed was located 
on its continental shelf. The move sparked a number of confrontations, 
including clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels, with one 
Vietnamese fishing vessel sinking after being rammed by a Chinese one.40 In 
another incident, Chinese Navy vessels blocked the resupply of food and fresh 
Filipino Marines to the Second Thomas Shoal.41 Such confrontations risk 
clashes between international vessels and military action by one or both 
parties.42 They also carry uncertainty as to whether China would use more 
coercive measures to claim what it sees as its territory. 
Along with other Southeast Asian states, Indonesia has urged for these claims to 
be resolved according to international law, not by force. In 2010, Indonesia 
issued a letter to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
contesting China’s position on the South China Sea and urging China to clarify 
its claim on part of the Natuna Islands’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (located 
in Indonesia’s Riau province).43 China has so far ignored the letter,44 but there 
40 Jane Perlez and Keith Bradsher, “In High Seas, China Moves Unilaterally,” The New York Times, 
May 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/10/world/asia/in-high-seas-china-moves-
unilaterally.html; Jane Perlez, “Vietnamese Vessel Sinks in Clash Near Oil Rig,” The New York Times, 
May 26, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/27/world/asia/vietnam-boat-sinks-in-clash-near-oil-
rig.html. 
41 Jim Gomez, “Philippine ship slips past Chinese blockade in disputed South China Sea”, The Star, 
29 March 2014, 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014/03/29/philippine_ship_slips_past_chinese_blockade_in_disp
uted_south_china_sea.html. 
42 A Filipino captain said a swerving manoeuvre avoided collision between his resupply ship and 
Chinese vessels. See “China-Philippines Navy Spat Captured on Camera,” BBC News, March 30, 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26806924. 
43 “Indonesia Wades In,” The Economist, August 2, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/08/indonesia_and_south_china_sea. 
44 Felix K. Chang, “Even Indonesia: Concerns over China’s Reach in the South China Sea,” E-notes 
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, October 2014), 
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/10/even-indonesia-concerns-over-chinas-reach-south-china-sea. 
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seems to be an overlap between an area of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands’ EEZ and 
China’s claim made under the historic Nine-Dash Line.45 
However, Indonesia’s ability to mediate in these disputes could be undermined 
by recent developments. In March 2013, a vessel from the Indonesian Ministry 
of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries encountered a Chinese fishing vessel 
operating in the Natuna Islands’ EEZ. All the Chinese crew were arrested and 
taken aboard the Indonesian vessel, but the captain was later forced to release 
them following threats and harassment by an armed Chinese maritime law 
enforcement vessel.46 Subsequent reports suggest that the Chinese vessel tried 
to jam the transmission system of the Indonesian vessel to block communication 
with headquarters ashore—an act that, as one analyst has noted, in addition to 
other coercive measures, might “have proved dangerously escalatory” had the 
Indonesian captain not released the Chinese prisoners.47 
A sprawling archipelago, Indonesia lacks the naval power to satisfactorily 
safeguard its maritime domain. The country’s military modernisation program, 
known as Minimum Essential Force, is in part intended to mitigate this 
vulnerability. But for now, Widodo and his foreign minister have to employ 
diplomatic levers to prevent maritime confrontations from escalating into 
military conflict. 
Widodo also has to address maritime issues resulting from illegal activity. 
Corruption and malpractice among some maritime security forces in the region, 
45 “Indonesia’s military flexes muscle as S. China Sea dispute looms”, The Jakarta Globe, 13 March 
2014, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-military-flexes-muscle-s-china-sea-
dispute-looms/.  
46 Scott Bentley, “Mapping the Nine-Dash Line: Recent Incidents Involving Indonesia in the South 
China Sea,” The Strategist, October 29, 2013, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/mapping-the-nine-
dash-line-recent-incidents-involving-indonesia-in-the-south-china-sea/. 
47 Scott Bentley, “Indonesia’s ‘Global Maritime Nexus’: Looming Challenges at Sea for Jokowi’s 
Administration,” The Strategist, September 24, 2014, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/indonesias-
global-maritime-nexus-looming-challenges-at-sea-for-jokowis-administration/. 
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coupled with a relatively unmanned and permissive environment, has 
engendered illegal fishing, fuel smuggling, and people trafficking. Speaking 
about the ease with which illegal activities like fuel smuggling occur on 
Indonesia’s shores, a spokesperson for Indonesia’s Navy, Manahan 
Simorangkir, said the problem was partly due to the lack of a coast guard, and 
the 13 institutions left uncoordinated to manage Indonesia’s waters.48 
II. Great Power Relations 
The Asia-Pacific region is being increasingly characterised by rising economic 
growth and strategic rivalry. Aside from negotiating its bilateral relationship 
with China, Indonesia has to contend with the growing strategic competition 
between the United States and China as the latter seeks a greater say in the 
Asia-Pacific order. As mentioned above, skirmishes between China and 
Southeast Asian states also risk escalating into military confrontation. Thus far, 
the United States has avoided being dragged into disputes that involve the 
Philippines, an alliance partner, but this may change should China’s behaviour 
become more aggressive. Although regional security continues to be 
underwritten by the United States, the Asia-Pacific is witnessing a broad 
strategic shift with China increasingly challenging the primacy of US power and 
influence in the region. 
As its economic and military clout increases, China is also seeking greater 
security and economic cooperation with regional states. Indonesia and China 
have strengthened diplomatic relations: last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
and President Yudhoyono agreed to elevate the bilateral relationship to a 
48 Manahan Simorangkir, quoted in Dwi Sadmoko, Brian Leonal, and Rieka Rahadiana, “Fuel 
Smugglers from All Walks of Life Drain Indonesia’s Economy,” gulfnews.com, October 23, 2014, 
http://gulfnews.com/business/oil-gas/fuel-smugglers-from-all-walks-of-life-drain-indonesia-s-economy-
1.1403239. 
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comprehensive strategic partnership that expands and deepens cooperation in a 
number of areas, including economic and investment cooperation.49 Security 
cooperation has also increased—Indonesia is developing anti-ship missiles with 
China and broadening military engagement in areas such as counterterrorism 
training.50 
At the same, the United States is consolidating its relationships with Asia-
Pacific states, particularly in Southeast Asia, as part of its Asia pivot strategy. 
Building on the 2010 US–Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, the Obama 
administration is deepening security and economic cooperation with Indonesia. 
The United States is also encouraging Indonesia to take a more active role in 
international affairs, notably in leading and coordinating ASEAN diplomacy, 
spearheading climate change initiatives, and supporting counterterrorism efforts 
against radical extremism both at home and abroad. 
Indonesia’s growing economic ties with China and other Asia-Pacific states, as 
well as the heightened strategic tension between regional powers, create another 
foreign policy challenge for the Widodo administration. With a few brief 
exceptions in its history, Indonesia has not aligned with any major power bloc, 
instead following an official policy of ‘non-alignment’. Indonesia’s traditional 
approach has been to draw larger actors like China and the United States into 
multilateral groupings to prevent any one power from dominating regional 
affairs. The Yudhoyono administration stressed that US policies to ‘contain’ 
China were not conducive to regional harmony, and Natalegawa proposed the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to build strategic trust in the Indo-Pacific. 
49 “Indonesia, China Forge Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Various Fields,” Antara News, 
October 7, 2013, http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/91035/indonesia-china-forge-comprehensive-
strategic-partnership-in-various-field. 
50 “Chinese, Indonesian Airborne Troops Conclude Anti-Terrorism Exercise,” People’s Daily Online 
(English edition), November 13, 2013, http://english.people.com.cn/90786/8454787.html. 
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Should the status quo prevail, and both the United States and China continue to 
deepen relations with regional states, Indonesia can maintain its non-aligned 
posture. However, should China’s behaviour become more aggressive towards 
Southeast Asian states, especially Indonesia, Widodo will have to walk a fine 
line between securing Indonesia’s strategic interests and maintaining strong 
economic cooperation with China. 
Other complicating factors include recent developments in Japan towards 
greater militarisation under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Japan has also sought 
to deepen its strategic and economic relationships with Southeast Asia. As one 
Indonesian diplomat has warned, greater security cooperation between Japan 
and ASEAN would upset China.51 
III. ASEAN 
Despite accusations of being a mere ‘talk shop’, ASEAN continues to be an 
important forum to discuss the region’s political and security issues forty-seven 
years since its foundation. With an impressive average annual GDP growth of 
6% since 2004 and aggregate GDP comprising 3.3% of the world’s total,52 
ASEAN remit now includes economic integration. The world is taking notice 
and the United States, China, Japan and India, among others, are knocking on 
ASEAN’s door. 
Despite these positive developments, there are challenges ahead for ASEAN. 
Indonesia, traditionally seen as the de facto leader of ASEAN, needs to 
encourage unity in light of a more assertive China, ensure effective regionalism, 
51 Ferry Akbar Pasaribu commenting in his personal capacity, “Revisiting Indonesian Foreign Policy,” 
The Jakarta Post, June 13, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/13/revisiting-
indonesian-foreign-policy.html. 
52 Giovanni Capannelli, “ASEAN’s First ‘Myanmar’ Summit: Moving Beyond 2015,” East Asia Forum 
(May 11, 2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/11/aseans-first-myanmar-summit-moving-
beyond-2015/. 
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and lead ASEAN towards its goals of economic and strategic integration. 
Domestic issues within member states like Thailand will test the group’s ability 
to stay focused on multilateral cooperation and external security challenges. 
Towards this end, in his ‘vision and mission’ statements, Widodo stated his 
intentions to consolidate Indonesia’s place within ASEAN. 
As an example of the need for effective leadership within ASEAN, territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea have challenged the group’s unity; indeed, 
states are divided on how to best respond as a grouping to China’s assertiveness. 
At the 20th ASEAN Summit held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012, member 
states were divided over including in the summit agenda the respective disputes 
of the Philippines and Vietnam with China in the South China Sea.53 At the 
summit’s conclusion, a joint communiqué was not issued for the first time in the 
group’s history, with the Philippines accusing Cambodia of blocking the 
inclusion. Then Natalegawa embarked on a regional tour and was successful in 
securing a six-point statement on the South China Sea in replacement of the 
joint communiqué.54 Such dissensions prove the need for united positions 
through fora like ASEAN to reaffirm the importance of encouraging the use of 
international law and restraint over force in other conclaves such as the ASEAN 
Defence Ministers Meeting and the EAS. 
There are similar challenges in reaching a common position for a maritime code 
of conduct in the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia can provide strong backing for such 
initiatives. During his visit to Jakarta in February this year, US Secretary of 
53 “ASEAN Nations Fail to Reach Agreement on South China Sea,” BBC News, July 13, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148. 
54 Donald K. Emmerson, “Indonesia saves ASEAN’s face”, Asia Times Online, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NG24Ae01.html.  
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State John Kerry expounded the value his country places on Indonesia’s role in 
promoting the maritime code of conduct.55 . 
Indonesian leadership can spearhead unity and diplomatic cooperation within 
ASEAN in other ways, too. In 2003, as part of the decision to establish an 
ASEAN Community by 2020, the grouping agreed to form an ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015—a commitment reaffirmed in 2007.56 
An economic community would deepen economic integration by transforming 
“ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, 
skilled labour, and freer flow of capital”.57 The AEC should be finalised by 
2015, although many analysts doubt the deadline will be met. 
The AEC is a means to ensure the Asia-Pacific region’s prosperity and stability, 
a key interest for Indonesia. Peter Drysdale writes that income disparities 
between ASEAN states, particularly with Myanmar, “will be narrowed 
importantly only through building a more deeply integrated ASEAN economy 
nested into global markets”.58 Nevertheless, deep structural reforms are 
required. Other commentators note the structural limitations of the ASEAN 
Secretariat’s ability to push the AEC forward, including the lack of financial 
and intellectual resources: In 2012, the secretariat employed around 300 people, 
in stark contrast to the European Commission’s staff of 34,000.59 
55 John Kerry, “Remarks with Indonesian Foreign Minister Raden Mohammad Marty Muliana 
Natalegawa” (Jakarta: US Department of State, February 17, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/02/221711.htm. 
56 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint” (Jakarta: 
ASEAN, 2008), http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf, 5. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Peter Drysdale, “Economic Community Key to ASEAN’s Centrality,” East Asia Forum (May 12, 
2014), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/05/12/economic-community-key-to-aseans-centrality/. 
59 Ji Xianbai, “Why the ASEAN Economic Community Will Struggle,” The Diplomat, September 24, 
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/why-the-asean-economic-community-will-struggle/. 
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Indonesia’s recognised status as an Asia-Pacific leader, plus the economic focus 
within Widodo’s foreign policy, makes the country an appropriate driver to set 
targets and impel reform in the region. A renewed emphasis on ASEAN’s 
effectiveness could be bolstered by reallocating resources to the secretariat. For 
Indonesia to spearhead AEC developments, a careful balance needs to be struck 
between Widodo’s intentions to protect local economies (discussed below), 
while seeking opportunities to consolidate ASEAN and encourage the regional 
market to grow through further economic integration. 
Maintaining Economic Growth and Attracting Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) and foreign policy advisor to the Jokowi 
Government, emphasises the link between diplomacy and economic 
development. “You can’t eat an international image. The key focus is to use 
diplomacy for economic benefit”.60 Economists have identified maintaining 
Indonesia’s economic growth as key to a number of domestic matters such as 
reducing the gap in income inequality; creating more jobs; and raising the 
revenue needed for health, education and infrastructure spending. Economic 
growth is also required to support the Indonesian military’s modernisation 
program, which in turn will help strengthen Indonesia’s response to 
international challenges. 
Indonesia has enjoyed high rates of GDP growth of around 6% for the past 
decade. The Asian Development Bank has noted that Indonesia’s economic 
growth rate of 5.3% in the first half of this year has been the slowest since 
60 Rizal Sukma, quoted in Joe Cochrane, “Indonesian Leader in Global Spotlight,” The New York 
Times, October 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/business/international/many-hope-
joko-widodo-indonesias-new-leader-will-raise-countrys-regional-stature.html?emc=eta1&_r=2. 
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2009.61 Also, to boost its competitiveness, Indonesia has to increase its limited 
pool of expertise, compared to other countries in the region. Widodo has to lure 
back foreign investment by implementing microeconomic reforms, including 
upgrades to infrastructure such as ports to stimulate economic development.62 
Keen to move up the value chain, Indonesia must be careful in implementing 
nationalist economic policies. In January this year, the Indonesian government 
extended a ban on exporting certain unprocessed mineral ores, hoping to 
increase the value of the country’s exports.63 A significant portion of value of 
some ores is added during the smelting process, and more smelters are being 
built in Indonesia by Chinese firms.64 Although this has reduced the profits 
made by multinational mining companies operating in Indonesian mines, 
economic analysts cite it as a ‘short-term pain, long-term gain’ move.65 
While moves towards finalising the AEC will improve regional cohesion, it will 
be hard for Indonesia to rely just on intra-ASEAN trade. There are, however, a 
number of opportunities to forge economic ties with other middle powers and 
emerging economies. 
Implications for Australia 
The election of Widodo is a generally positive development for Australia–
Indonesia relations; during his time as mayor of Surakarta and governor of 
61 Asian Development Bank, “Indonesia: Economy” (Manila: ADB, 2014), 
http://www.adb.org/countries/indonesia/economy. 
62 Rajiv Biswas, quoted in Gabriel Dominguez, “Jokowi Presidency ‘Crucial’ for Reshaping Indonesian 
Economy,” Deutsche Welle, October 21, 2014, http://www.dw.de/jokowi-presidency-crucial-for-
reshaping-indonesian-economy/a-17723636. 
63 “Mining in Indonesia: Smeltdown,” The Economist, Jakarta 18, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21594260-government-risks-export-slump-boost-metals-
processing-industry-smeltdown. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Satria Sambijantoro, “RI’s ‘Hard Stance’ Wins in Mineral Ore Export Ban Policy,” The Jakarta Post, 
August 4, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/04/ri-s-hard-stance-wins-mineral-ore-
export-ban-policy.html. 
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Jakarta, Widodo appears to have been guided by a sense of pragmatism, rather 
than overt nationalism or the need to ‘save face’, as was the case with 
Yudhoyono. The key for Australia is to understand that the bilateral relationship 
will not be as high a priority for the Widodo administration as it was for the 
Yudhoyono administration. As this paper outlines, foreign policy priorities in 
addition to a pressing domestic agenda will capture most of the Widodo 
cabinet’s attention. How the relationship plays out will also depend on the 
extent to which the Widodo administration is reformist or resilient.66 A more 
ambitious foreign policy might foster more opportunities for Australia to work 
with Indonesia on ASEAN-led cooperation, for example. On the other hand, a 
more reserved foreign policy might require Australia to be selective about 
which initiatives it wishes to pursue with Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, Australia–Indonesia relations have an important role to play in 
realising countries’ trade, security and diplomatic goals. Therefore, 
strengthening existing areas of cooperation while seeking initiatives that 
prioritise shared interests will be a good start. 
One of those common interests is a stable and prosperous Southeast Asia. 
Indonesia’s role in ASEAN will focus on leading initiatives both within the 
organisation and responding to external challenges. Australia is best able to 
cooperate with Indonesia on the external environment, particularly on ASEAN-
based security architecture. Continued attendance by the Australian prime 
minister and other key ministers to fora such as the EAS and ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting will underscore the centrality of ASEAN in Asia-Pacific 
multilateralism. Continuing to address key multilateral security and economic 
66 Peter McCawley, Joko Widodo’s Indonesia: Possible Future Paths, Strategy Paper (Barton, ACT: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2014), 33, 
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/joko-widodos-indonesia-possible-future-paths. 
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challenges in those fora will achieve the same goal. To this end, Widodo has 
expressed his keenness to rebuild security ties with Australia and encourage 
mutually beneficial areas of security cooperation.67 
Maintaining strong levels of economic growth and reducing wealth inequality in 
Indonesia will depend on the Widodo administration’s ability to implement 
microeconomic reforms and tackle corruption in Indonesia. Interestingly, 
Widodo wants to attract Australian investment. He has promised to address 
grievances from Australian investors on fuel subsidies; bureaucracy reform, 
licences and permits; infrastructure; and power plants.68 Widodo is also keen to 
build education links, and encourage more Indonesians to study in Australia and 
for more Australians to travel to parts of Indonesia beyond Bali.69 
A cautionary note is needed about the potential friction between domestic 
politics and the bilateral relationship. For one, Australia’s domestic policies on 
border protection and asylum seekers have caused consternation in Jakarta. In 
early 2014, Australian naval vessels strayed into Indonesian sovereign waters as 
part of a boat turn back policy.70 In the lead-up to his inauguration, Widodo 
warned that he would take a firm stance on protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty, 
specifically against Australian naval incursions under Operation Sovereign 
Borders. 
There are other causes for diplomatic shocks in the Australia–Indonesia 
relationship. In 2013, Edward Snowden leaked information alleging that 
67 John Garnaut and Michael Bachelard, “Joko Widodo’s blunt warning to Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott,” The Sydney Morning Herald, October 18, 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/federal-
politics/political-news/joko-widodos-blunt-warning-to-prime-minister-tony-abbott-20141017-
117l9i.html. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Latika Bourke, “Navy Breached Indonesian Waters Six Times under Operation Sovereign Borders, 
Review Finds,” ABC News, February 20, 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-19/navy-
breached-indonesian-waters-six-times-review-finds/5270478. 
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Australia had tapped the mobile phones of President Yudhoyono and his inner 
circle. Such incidents can damage Australia’s standing in the Indonesian 
public’s eye and render Australia a political whipping boy among Indonesian 
parliamentarians and more nationalistic observers.71 
Conclusion 
With a humbler and more grassroots-oriented president like Widodo, it will be 
interesting to see how Indonesia responds to the challenges to its international 
aspirations. While interested in foreign policy matters, Widodo is expected to 
focus on his domestic agenda and delegate foreign policy management to 
Foreign Minister Marsudi and her advisory team.72 This will leave the heavy 
lifting to Marsudi, an experienced diplomat. Indeed, her previous experience in 
Canberra as an information officer at the Indonesian Embassy in early 1990s 
has given her a sense of what to expect from Australia’s domestic politics. As 
the president of the world’s fourth most populous country and with a global 
outlook, Widodo has the next five years to prove he can balance fulfilling his 
domestic promises and exploring opportunities abroad. 
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Introduction  
Indonesia, like many developing countries, has a large population of young 
people. According to Indonesia’s National Census of 2010, 62 million of the 
population was aged 16 to 30 years, representing 26% of the total population.73 
More recent data shows that 65% of Indonesia’s 250 million population is of 
working age (15 to 64 years old).74 The National Population and Family 
Planning Board projects that the nation’s productive population will peak 
between 2020 and 2030, potentially yielding a so-called ‘demographic 
dividend’ whereby the country’s working-age population will be greater than 
the number of dependent children and the elderly population.75 Additionally, the 
National Election Commission states that first time voters make up 20% of all 
73 BPS, "Statistik Pemuda Indonesia 2010,"(Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik, 2010). 
   Indonesia’s 2009 Law No. 40 defines ‘youth’ as citizens aged between 16 to 30, but this age range 
is not used consistently.   
74 The World Bank, "Wold Development Indicators: Population Dynamics," (2014), 
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.1. 
75 BKKBN, "Bonus Demografi Bisa Jadi Ancaman," Badan Kependudukan dan Keluarga Berencana 
Nasional, http://www.bkkbn.go.id/ViewBerita.aspx?BeritaID=2064. 
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voters.76 It is in this context that youth in Indonesia garnered attention before, 
during, and after the 2014 presidential election campaigns, particularly given 
young people’s visible engagement with the campaigns through social media.  
However, as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) states, “[t]he 
situation for young people in Indonesia is as diverse, promising and complex as 
the nation itself.”77 With this in mind, this paper explores the experiences of 
youth in Indonesia, and their role in shaping the social and political landscape. 
Instead of providing a current overview of issues faced by Indonesian youth as 
UNFPA has already done in its July publication, this paper aims to showcase 
new and unpublished work by young researchers from the University of 
Western Australia (UWA), for a closer look at different segments of Indonesian 
youth.78 It begins with a brief overview of young people’s role in influencing 
Indonesia’s political history, and subsequently identifies issues faced by young 
people in relation to the economy, religion and environmental education based 
on current research. It ends with a discussion of Australia’s engagement with 
Indonesian youth.  
Youth and the State: Political engagement in times of crises  
Historically, the youth in Indonesia have played a significant role in effecting 
regime and political changes. The most visible among the group are the 
educated youth who have been at the frontline during historic moments of 
regime change. The role they play, however, is mediated by the social and 
political space available to them at varying times, which in turn shapes their 
relationship to the state. Generally, the youth have been perceived positively as 
76 KPU, "Modul 1: Pemilu Untuk Pemula,"(Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2010), 48. 
77 Nicholas Goodwin and Irma Martam, "Indonesian Youth in the 21st Century,"(Jakarta: UNFPA, 
2014), vii. 
78 For UNFPA's publication see ibid. 
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agents of change by incoming regimes, but as a threat to their legitimacy once 
the new leadership becomes the status quo. Therefore it will be of interest to see 
whether Joko Widodo (Jokowi) will continue to engage with the youth during 
his term as he did leading up to his presidential inauguration.  
The youths’ role in establishing the nation is enshrined in the much-celebrated 
Youth Pledge of 1928 that drew together a group of young men and women 
who envisioned an independent ‘Indonesia’ while still under Dutch rule. 
Ironically, many of these young activists were from the Dutch educated elite 
and had spent some time studying overseas in the Netherlands. Subsequently, 
segments of the youth were instrumental in winning the revolutionary war 
against the Dutch colonial army between 1945 and 1949 and establishing 
Indonesia as a sovereign nation state.79  
Their victory installed Sukarno as the first president in 1945, but by the 1960s a 
new generation of youth had joined their voices in opposition to Sukarno’s 
ineffective leadership. Their opposition to Sukarno helped legitimize Suharto’s 
New Order regime which came into power in 1966, though their activism was 
soon perceived as a threat to the newly established regime. Much of the more 
visible youth activism of this time occurred on university campuses, prompting 
Suharto to depoliticize universities in the name of stability. Nevertheless, youth 
activism grew in the decade leading up to Suharto’s downfall among the 
“burgeoning middle class, where confidence and entrepreneurship were valued 
qualities”.80  
79 Manneke Budiman et al., "New Enemy of the State: Youth in Post-New Order Indonesia," in 
Panorama: Insights into Asian and European Affairs(Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2012). 
80 Lyn Parker and Pamela Nilan, Adolescents in Contemporary Indonesia, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013). 
28. 
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The youth were again at the forefront of political change in 1998, when they 
forced Suharto to resign from the presidency through sustained political 
demonstrations that were held over many months on university campuses. The 
economic pressure from the 1997 Asian financial crisis had created the social 
and political space that enabled the youth to express their political 
dissatisfaction with the then 32-year-old regime. These student demonstrations 
occurred in major cities across the archipelago, but it was the media images of 
demonstrations held in Jakarta by middle class students that stole the national 
imagination. When four students from Trisakti University, a private tertiary 
institution, were shot dead by the military, they became martyrs of democracy 
in the eyes of the public, whereas the hundreds of lower class (young) men and 
women who were killed in the riots that broke out on the streets in the ensuing 
days were not.  
Once the crisis passed, however, the youth were again perceived as an “enemy 
of the state”.81 According to Manneke Budiman et al., the SBY (Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono) administration faced increasing erosion of legitimacy in 
its second term (2009-2014), due to a decline in public opinion about its 
lacklustre performance, with the youth once again losing trust in the state. In 
this context, Budiman et al. argue that the state turned to branding the youth as a 
threat to both national security and “the dominant moral values that the state 
claims to safeguard”.82  
Nevertheless, the post-Suharto reforms have created public political space, 
which have shifted the way in which the youth, particularly the educated youth, 
engage in politics; they can now be seen to work within the confines of existing 
structures to bring about change. The shift in the nature of youth political 
81 Ibid., 51. 
82 Budiman et al., "New Enemy of the State: Youth in Post-New Order Indonesia," 53. 
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engagement was particularly visible during the Jakarta gubernatorial election in 
September 2012, and in the recent presidential election held in July 2014. The 
2012 gubernatorial election campaigns marked the beginning of a highly visible 
form of youth engagement through social media. During the gubernatorial 
election, a group of youth from one of Jakarta’s largest churches produced a 
parody of the song ‘What makes you beautiful’ by the boy band One Direction, 
which they uploaded onto YouTube.83 The parody was made in support of 
gubernatorial candidate Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and his running mate Basuki 
Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok). The YouTube clip went viral and was soon adopted 
by the candidates as one of their official campaign videos and aired on live 
television. The youths’ efforts culminated in a dancing flash mob on the streets 
of Jakarta’s central district near the iconic Hotel Indonesia roundabout in 
September 2012. In this way the youth contributed to Jokowi’s popularity and 
the festive feel to the campaigns, as well as creating more space for youth 
political engagement during non-crisis times.  
More recently, the presidential election campaigns of July 2014 saw a surge in 
the use of social media among youth, particularly urban youth, in expressing 
their political views. In 2013, Indonesia had the world’s second largest number 
of Facebook users and third largest number of Twitter users, with Jakarta 
declared the world’s Twitter capital.84 As the polarizing election came to a head, 
young people’s social media pages became a battleground for election images 
and music videos. Candidates on both sides of the fence used Facebook and 
Twitter to engage with its young voters, though the Jokowi camp appeared to 
83 The clip was made by Cameo Productions and uploaded to YouTube in August 2012 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-zR65eXXPc.  
84 Waleed Aly, "Welcome to Jakarta, the World's Number One Twitter City," ABC RN, 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/about/. 
    Indonesia-Investments, "Internet in Indonesia: Indonesia's Growing Number of Internet Users," 
Indonesia-Investments, http://www.indonesia-investments.com/news/todays-headlines/internet-in-
indonesia-indonesias-growing-number-of-internet-users/item776. 
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have had the upper hand. Their voters initiated the use of red ‘twibbons’ on 
their profile pictures that stated (in white letters), “I stand on the right side”, a 
tactic copied by Prabowo’s young voters within days.85 Jokowi and his running 
mate Jusuf Kalla also produced the election’s most iconic ‘selfie’ where the two 
peered into the camera as they held up two fingers to symbolize their number on 
the ballot paper.86  
Indeed, these are merely passing images from the election. There are also many 
youth organizations that have made sustained efforts at raising political 
awareness among youth, such as Provocative Proactive and Pamflet, which this 
paper has not discussed. But it is clear that there is more space now than in the 
past for youth to engage politically with the issues faced by their generation. 
Most likely, the state under Jokowi’s leadership will not push the youth back 
into a corner as previous leaderships have done once the euphoria of change 
subsides. Engaging the community in decision-making processes has been a 
trademark of Jokowi’s leadership style since his days as Mayor of Solo, which 
he was prior to becoming Governor of Jakarta.87 Even so, whether or not the 
youth can continue to play a role in shaping Indonesia’s political future will be 
dependent on whether or not they can move beyond “virtual activism” and 
engage in “real-world politics”.88    
Notably, the youth who have been most visible on the national scene during 
times of change have been from the more secular, educated middle and upper 
85 Ibnu Azis, "I Stand on the Right Side: Tren Di Media Sosial, Aksi Tangkis Kampanye Hitam," 
Sidominews 2014. See http://sidomi.com/297544/i-stand-on-the-right-side-tren-di-media-sosial-aksi-
tangkis-kampanye-hitam/  
86 Ananda Teresia, "Jokowi-Jk's Selfie Faces," Tempo, 6 July 2014. See 
http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/06/240590828/Jokowi-JKs-Selfie-Faces  
87 Rushda Majeed, "Defusing a Volatile City, Igniting Reforms: Joko Widodo and Surakarta, Indonesia 
2005-2011," (2012), http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/publications/defusing-volatile-city-
igniting-reforms-joko-widodo-and-surakarta-indonesia-2005-2011. 
88 Diatyka Widya Permata Yasih and Andi Rahman Alamsyah, "Youth Politics in the Age of Social 
Media," Inside Indonesia Forthcoming. 
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class segments of the population. Young people’s effectiveness in making their 
voices heard has partly been mediated by their socio-economic background, 
which in turn influences their access to information as well as university, the 
Internet, and media spaces. Their central role in these changes thus does not 
ensure that there will be a sustained commitment among these youth to work 
towards an Indonesia that is defined by greater levels of social justice. 
Sociological research has shown that class structures and values are reproduced, 
particularly through education, from one generation to the next despite the 
appearance of change. Narrowing the vast gap between the rich and poor will 
largely depend on the nature of the new leadership, and whether or not it can 
engage larger segments of the youth population. 
Youth and the economy: The bread and butter issue 
Among the broader issues concerning Indonesian youth at present is widespread 
unemployment and underemployment, both in urban and rural areas. The 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) indicated that 23% of urban and 33% 
of rural youth (ages 15 to 24) were unemployed in 2012.89 Nilan et al. write that 
“[t]he current generation of Indonesian youth is the most educated in history” 
but these educated youth face difficulties transitioning into an economically 
independent adulthood.90 This section will focus on a case study by Thijs Schut 
from the University of Western Australia. It is based on his ongoing doctoral 
research on educated youth in central Flores in eastern Indonesia, one of the 
89 Suzanne Naafs and Ben White (2012), both scholars on Indonesian youth, suggest that these 
figures do not reflect the further number of youth who are underemployed. Naafs and White also point 
out that the statistics for youth vary depending on the age range used. For example, Indonesia’s 
Ministry of Youth uses the extended definition of youth as aged between 18 and 35, which they 
suggest artificially lowers the unemployment rate for youth.     
90 Pam Nilan et al., "Indonesian Youth Looking Towards the Future," Journal of Youth Studies 14, no. 
6 (2011): 711. 
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poorest regions in the country, and aims to illustrate the issues faced by 
educated youth.91  
Education is conceived as a pathway towards upward mobility by both the 
government and the public in Flores as it is elsewhere, but the local economy is 
increasingly unable to absorb educated youth into the workforce. According to 
Schut, the existence of a surplus of young, educated people in the workforce is 
relatively new in areas like Flores.92 The main employer of educated youth in 
Flores is the government, which up until recently had no difficulty absorbing 
the new workforce into its bureaucracy. The move towards decentralization that 
occurred in the post-reformation era created new opportunities for the youth in 
Flores as the regional bureaucracy expanded. But after more than a decade of 
decentralization, the local bureaucracy is now saturated. Schut’s fieldwork 
shows that not only have there been very few new job openings in government 
agencies since 2012, but that even the waiting lists, for example, at local health 
clinics for volunteer workers have grown. In May 2014, there were hundreds of 
young people either waiting for volunteer positions (i.e. unpaid internships), 
volunteering for no pay, or volunteering while being paid an honorarium that is 
well below the minimum wage. Most of them were young people with nursing 
degrees who hope that volunteering will afford them networking opportunities 
that may, in some cases, lead to paid employment. At the same time, these 
clinics cannot operate without their volunteers. 
In the meantime, Schut notes that another university is being built in the area, 
which will likely exacerbate the problem of under- and unemployment of 
91 The information in this section is based on an interview with Thijs Schut on 8 October 2014. Some 
of his preliminary fieldwork observations can be found in the article “Is there a future for educated 
youth in rural Flores” published in The Jakarta Post on 10 October 2014. 
92 Thijs Schut, "Is There a Future for Educated Youth in Rural Flores?," The Jakarta Post, 27 October 
2014. 
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educated youth. In the absence of paid employment, Schut projects that the 
waiting list for the unpaid positions described above are likely to expand, thus 
creating a surplus of free or cheap labor and making it even less necessary for 
the government to create the paid positions required to operate local agencies 
like the health clinics. Surprisingly, Schut found that the head of the local health 
department was unaware of the extent of the problem. At the moment, the 
educated youth whom Schut studied keep themselves occupied with various 
unpaid or underpaid activities which utilize their skills. He suggests, however, 
that if the present situation continues and even the volunteer positions become 
saturated, these youth may become idle.  
Schut’s case study on educated youth in Flores illustrates that youth 
unemployment and underemployment is a pressing issue. Without a concerted 
effort to address the mismatch between education and employment, the 
‘demographic dividend’ may instead turn into a demographic problem. Jokowi 
has promised much with regards to the creation of jobs and supporting young 
entrepreneurs, with his aims to develop the agricultural sector, traditional 
markets, creative industries likely to be relevant to young people in both rural 
and urban areas. His vocal promises to hold the state accountable in ensuring 
the financial welfare and health of its citizens will also help ease the strain on 
communities in supporting young people through their prolonged transition to 
economic independence. How these promises will affect the youth depend on 
whether or not he will be able to deliver.  
Youth and religion: Piety amid globalization 
In a rare large-scale survey of Indonesian secondary students, Nilan et al. found 
that young people ranked “religious faith” as the third most important element 
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in their lives.93 The finding reflects the fact that “[r]eligious faith is far more 
important for everyday life in Indonesia than in many other countries”.94 
However, the way Indonesian youth perceive Islam is in stark contrast to the 
public perception in some non-Muslim countries that equates Islam with 
terrorism. Muslim youth in Indonesia see Islam as a pathway for modernisation 
and for engaging with a globalising world. This section showcases Hariyadi’s 
research on university-aged young people’s engagement with Islamic popular 
culture, with a focus on Islamic films and self-help books.95  
As popular culture had long been considered a product of the West, the 
“alliance of Islam with popular culture” since the 2000s took Indonesia by 
surprise.96 According to Hariyadi, many Indonesian Muslim youth feel that 
global Islamic popular culture offers a fresh alternative to ‘Westernisation’. 
Muslim young people, like other young people, are at a stage in their lives 
where they are searching for an identity. At the same time, they are living in a 
modernizing Indonesia where global influences are increasingly penetrating 
their lives through popular culture and becoming more easily accessible through 
the media. Global popular culture is often perceived in non-Western societies 
broadly as ‘Westernisation’ and more narrowly as ‘Americanisation’. However, 
as Hariyadi notes, Muslim youth feel that the dominant popular culture 
emanating from the West does not suit their lifestyle and promotes values that 
are contrary to their own. They perceive Western popular culture as 
entertaining, but heavily materialistic and thereby spiritually empty. In contrast, 
they feel global Islamic popular culture is simultaneously entertaining and 
93 Nilan et al., "Indonesian Youth Looking Towards the Future," 715. 
94 Ibid. 
95 This section is based on Hariyadi’s (2013) doctoral dissertation and an interview conducted with 
him on 18 October 2014.  
96 Hariyadi, "Islamic Popular Culture and the New Identities of Urban Muslim Young People in 
Indonesia: The Case of Islamic Films and Islamic Self-Help Books" (Doctoral dissertation, University 
of Western Australia, 2013), 1. 
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educative, as it offers both material and spiritual content. It is within this 
context that Hariyadi finds that the current generation of young people in 
Indonesia enjoys consuming Islamic popular culture.  
Hariyadi argues, however, that Muslim youth are not passive consumers of 
Islamic popular culture and that this culture is diverse. In fact, Islamic popular 
culture represents a space of ideological contestation between various producers 
who offer differing interpretations of Islam, some of which are more open and 
moderate than others. Young people consume Islamic popular culture of 
varying ideological orientations whilst remaining critical of their choices. They 
are not blank slates to be written on. Among Islamic films that have been hitting 
the big screen in the post-Suharto era, most young people find that those which 
push for a closed, conservative view of Islam are more religiously educational 
but “boring”.97 These films make young people feel as though they are 
attending a religious sermon. Instead, they find that movies that draw on more 
moderate interpretations of Islam tend to be more entertaining and aesthetically 
pleasing.  
 
Furthermore, young people’s interest in Islamic popular culture does not signify 
that they are closed to non-Islamic popular culture. Even among conservative 
Muslim youth, Hariyadi found that they were open to enjoying Hollywood and 
other Western movies, such as Avatar, which they deem aesthetically pleasing 
and perceive as propagating universal values that are not in contradiction with 
Islam. The more moderate Muslim youth were also quite taken by popular 
culture from other parts of Asia, such as Japan and especially Korea. In their 
view, says Hariyadi, Korean and Japanese popular culture present lifestyles that 
97 Ibid., 61. 
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overlap with their own Islamic lifestyles. For example, moderate Muslim youth 
feel that the dating practices presented in Korean films are closer to their own 
than Hollywood films, which tend to show dating practices that include 
premarital sexual relations, or conservative Islamic films, which show arranged 
marriages where the bride and groom meet for the first time at their wedding. In 
contrast to these two extremes, Muslim youth feel Korean films show dating 
practices that take the middle road. Thus, being attracted to Islamic popular 
culture does not preclude Muslim youth from being open to other influences.  
Hariyadi’s research further shows that the popularity of Islamic self-help books 
among young people, particularly in the 2000s, illustrates that Muslim youth see 
Islam as a framework that can help them become ‘modern’ without losing their 
identity. Islamic book fairs are usually flooded with a wide range of titles from 
the self-help genre. Islamic self-help books often use Islamic teachings to 
present American-style neo-liberal values that emphasise individualism within a 
capitalist context as long as they do not contradict Islamic values. For example, 
since Islam does not forbid wealth accumulation, some self-help books outline 
the importance of values which contribute to work and business success, such as 
time management, entrepreneurship, and so on. Success and failure are 
attributed to the individual rather than to the existing social structures. Hariyadi 
points out that these self-help books may appear highly Islamic, but their 
content reflects neo-liberal influences and, moreover, their covers often carry 
Japanese-style manga (comic) designs. In more recent years, Hariyadi observes, 
the Islamic self-help genre appears to be shifting from targeting youth to 
targeting younger children and young parents. 
According to Hariyadi, young people are consuming Islamic popular culture in 
ways that reflect the changes faced by the present generation. As the Indonesian 
middle class expands, young people are seeking new ways of living in a 
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globalising neo-liberal world that will accommodate their Muslim identity. 
Islamic popular culture offers a middle ground to the youth that is neither 
radical in its interpretation of Islam, nor accepting of the imposition of Western 
lifestyles that deny their Muslim identity. Contrary to public perception in the 
West, Indonesia’s youth demonstrate that Islamic identity is dynamic and 
cosmopolitan.  
Hariyadi notes that these developments also come at a time when the elite, 
particularly the political elite, seem to have failed to offer guidance to young 
people. According to Hariyadi, the participants in his research feel that, 
regardless of their religion, the ruling elite see young people as a source of 
problems instead of a source of creativity and creators of a “dynamic economy”.  
Jokowi has repeatedly stated his commitment to developing Indonesia’s creative 
industry. He first made this statement during the second presidential debate held 
on June 15, 2014, and it was this statement that saw Jokowi’s opponent in the 
election, Prabowo Subianto, make a dramatic gesture of rising from his chair to 
hug Jokowi as he indicated support for this commitment because his own son 
works in the creative industry as a fashion designer. Jokowi has clearly 
expressed his interest in developing the creative potential of Indonesia’s youth 
and has demonstrated this interest in the way he engages with young people, 
notably through social media.  
It will thus be important for Australia and others to tap into this creative 
potential. Policies designed to engage with young Indonesians would need to go 
beyond the traditional framework of focusing on tertiary education. It is 
important to engage with young Indonesians through soft power diplomacy to 
ensure that their (Islamic) cosmopolitan outlook is favorable towards Australia.  
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 Youth and environment 
Indonesian youth also demonstrate their creativity in the way they engage with 
the environment. This section outlines the preliminary findings of Kelsie 
Prabawa-Sear’s ongoing research on environmental education in Indonesia.98 
While her fieldwork was conducted at two main sites, Yogyakarta and 
Surabaya, this paper will only discuss preliminary findings from the latter where 
environmental education has had more success.  
Prabawa-Sear found that the environmental education implemented in schools 
in Surabaya is “really hands on action learning—very little theory and a lot of 
practical learning”. Her observations run contrary to the prevailing assumption 
that Indonesian secondary education is focused on impractical rote learning. 
The results of the action-focused learning were obvious. Prabawa-Sear found 
that young people were “really inventive” as there were “no rules about what 
you can or cannot do”. In some places young people had designed ways to 
effectively capture water that they use to wash their hands and feet as part of an 
Islamic ritual before prayer, and recycling this water for their school or 
community’s vegetable gardens. In other places, water left over from air-
conditioning systems were used for the same purpose. At another high school in 
West Surabaya, Prabawa-Sear found that the students were very proud of their 
efforts to clean their school environment and eager to show her around the 
grounds. The area around the school used to be a major dumping ground for 
waste and thus a breeding ground for mosquitoes. While the work was not yet 
complete at the time of her visit, Prabawa-Sear found that the area bore little 
98 This section is based on an interview with Kelsie Prabawa-Sear that was conducted on 19 October 
2014. 
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resemblance to what it used to be. There was not a single piece of litter on the 
ground and students often stayed after school to clean the grounds and work on 
their recycling efforts. Prabawa-Sear notes that, in addition to improving the 
environment that they live in, these efforts are also beneficial to the community 
more broadly as they ensure that young people engage in healthy activities. 
According to Prabawa-Sear, there are two main reasons for the success of 
environmental education in Surabaya. Firstly, it has come about through a 
partnership between Tunas Hijau, a Surabaya based organization, and 
Millennium Kids, an organization based in Surabaya’s sister city Perth, 
Australia. Tunas Hijau began by sending five young people to Australia in 
March 1999. The two organizations have maintained cross cultural exchanges 
on environmental education since, partly sponsored by Australian government 
agencies as well as Indonesian corporations and agencies. There are currently 
1,500 schools in Surabaya that are involved in the environmental education 
program that was initially set up by Millennium Kids and currently run by 
Tunas Hijau. Secondly, participants in these programs cited the strong and 
committed leadership of Surabaya’s popular Mayor Tri Rismaharini as 
instrumental in the success of the city’s environmental education. Rismaharini 
has a graduate degree in city planning and she is the first female mayor who 
was elected through the direct regional elections that were implemented after 
1998. Rismaharini has been highly supportive of the environmental education 
programs.  
The projects implemented through Tunas Hijau have, in fact, been more 
successful than the government’s efforts to implement environmental education. 
The government-sponsored programs tend to be focused on the acquisition of 
knowledge for examination purposes and there is a perception among 
bureaucrats that environmental education requires large amounts of money for 
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building infrastructure. In contrast, Prabawa-Sear found that the programs that 
were successful were based on projects that had tangible, practical outcomes. 
When Prabawa-Sear asked the young people participating in her research 
whether or not the hard work and the heat from the tropical sun put them off 
from implementing their environmental projects, they said that none of that 
mattered as long as Surabaya became “green”. Young people had a very 
positive view regarding community engagement and the opportunity to 
participate in effecting change. Similarly, teachers reported that the time taken 
to implement projects was not an impediment to their educational curriculum as 
long as these projects are integrated in to it.    
Having seen the success of environmental education in Surabaya, Prabawa-Sear 
feels that it is important to frame cross-cultural exchange as a two-way process. 
The prevailing perception, Prabawa-Sear states, is that “Australia needs to help 
and train Indonesia”, but this comes at the cost of overlooking opportunities 
where “Australian teachers and kids can learn from Indonesia”. There needs to 
be a shift in the way bilateral exchanges are perceived and implemented such 
that both sides learn from each other.  
Australian engagement with Indonesian youth 
Currently there are several valuable programs that foster people-to-people links 
between Australian and Indonesian youth. The Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) have educational programs at the school level (BRIDGE 
Program, Schools Exchange Small Grants Program) and tertiary level (Australia 
Awards, New Colombo Plan, Australian Studies Program), as well as the 
Australia-Indonesia Youth Exchange Program (AIYEP) targeting 21 to 25-year-
olds. Apart from DFAT, the Australian Consortium for ‘In-Country’ Indonesian 
Studies (ACICS) arranges study abroad programs for mainly undergraduate 
students.  
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These programs, however, do not capture the full potential of people-to-people 
links for various reasons. The Australia Awards program, for example, 
incorrectly assumes that placing people within physical proximity of each other 
will naturally produce people-to-people links. It focuses on bringing Australians 
to Indonesia and Indonesians to Australia, yet it does not provide any deliberate 
opportunities for networking among the award recipients or with host country 
nationals. Indonesian students, for example, often do not develop meaningful 
relationships with locals while living in Australia even though they may 
develop some links, possibly due to cultural barriers and a general lack of 
interest among Australians towards Indonesians.99 In contrast, the American 
Fulbright programs purposefully integrate networking opportunities and 
publicity support into their programs, and maintain an alumni association with a 
closed online database.100 The money being invested into various scholarship 
programs would yield greater returns via the deliberate creation of networking 
opportunities for Australian and Indonesian recipients and alumni, as well as 
those from other countries. These opportunities can also be created both in 
Australia and overseas through consular offices. These social networks can add 
prestige to the scholarship programs and further attract high calibre individuals.  
Secondly, these programs tend to frame Australia-Indonesia exchanges through 
a dichotomous view of bilateral relations. They measure success through 
building capacity among ‘Australians’ and ‘Indonesians’ with the assumption 
that these two categories of people are perpetually distinct from one another. In 
fact, Monika Winarnita’s research on Australian citizens of mixed Australian 
and Indonesian descent show that Australian-Indonesian youth have a high level 
99 Jemma Purdey, "Scholarships and Connections: Australia, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea (No. 
46)," in Working Papers Series, ed. Robert Kenny (Melbourne: Alfred Deakin Research Institute, 
2014). 
100 See the website for Australian-American Fulbright Commission: 
http://www.fulbright.com.au/scholarships/scholarships-2?id=243 
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of bicultural knowledge and skills that are underutilized in Australia’s efforts to 
engage in soft power diplomacy towards Indonesia.101 Ironically, while some 
Australian youth of Indonesian descent or of mixed Australian and Indonesian 
descent participate in the existing programs, those who already have a high 
level of bicultural skills do not, and are thereby precluded from the networking 
circles of the these programs which focus on fostering bicultural skills that are 
yet to be developed.    
It is within this context that several Australian youth founded the Australia 
Indonesia Youth Association (AIYA). According to Arjuna Dibley, he and a 
few others founded AIYA upon noticing that there were “returnees on both 
sides who were not speaking to each other—Indonesians in Australia returning 
to Indonesia and vice versa.”102 There was no structured way for those two 
communities to interact and network with each other, across programs, or the 
wider community of youth who may be interested in Australia-Indonesia 
relations. AIYA was founded in 2011 and there was immediate and strong 
interest in it, particularly among Australian youth, and the organization grew 
rapidly across the Australia, including Perth. Dibley notes that “eight of the nine 
people who have sat on the National Executive have studied Indonesian 
language and/or politics formally at university—including five of whom 
participated in an ACICIS program—demonstrating the importance of formal 
study as a key pathway for sustained engagement.” It is also important to note 
that as many as three out of the seven Australian members of the National 
Executive committee have ties with Indonesia that began in childhood. Two of 
101 Monika Winarnita and Danau Tanu, "The Missing Link: Australian-Indonesian Youth in Australia, 
Cultural Performance and Intercultural Hyphenated Identity," in Making Connections: People-to-
People Exchange "Soft Power" Diplomacy in Australia's Engagement with Indonesia, ed. Antje 
Missbach and Jemma Purdey(Berlin: Regiospectra, Forthcoming 2015). 
102 Based on an interview conducted with Arjuna Dibley, President and Co-Founder of AIYA, on 14 
October 2014. 
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them (including Dibley) had spent several years growing up in Indonesia during 
their primary school years, while another is of Indonesian descent. The fact that 
nearly half of the National Executive of the youth initiative have childhood ties 
to Indonesia attests to the importance of building cultural capacity from a young 
age, as well as of incorporating Australian youth of Indonesian and mixed 
descent into bilateral youth programs and strategies for soft power diplomacy.  
Conclusion 
One theme that comes through strongly across the disparate topics covered in 
this paper is the enthusiasm and creative energy of young people. Arjuna Dibley 
who founded AIYA remarks that the rapid growth of their organization and 
others of a similar nature shows that “the notion of youth is a powerful one”. 
According to Dibley, the strong sense of motivation found among young people 
means that, “If you engage this section of the population, there’s a high yield.”  
Dibley further points out that those who have a high stake in the near future—
labeled by the Government as the ‘Asian Century’—are the youth and therefore 
it “makes sense to engage that group”. In fact, UNFPA states that participation 
is a “basic right for young people” and that young people should be allowed to 
participate in a “genuine manner” so that they can “trust their ability to play a 
productive role”.103 Thus it would beneficial for countries engaging with 
Indonesian youth to seek the input of their own youth, as well as Indonesia’s, in 
designing policy. In Australia’s case, it needs to seriously consider AIYA’s 
policy recommendations.104  
103 Goodwin and Martam, "Indonesian Youth in the 21st Century," vii. 
104 AIYA, "Submission to the "Australia in the Asian Century White Paper","(Australia-Indonesia Youth 
Association, 2012). 
   "Response to the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper,"(Australia-Indonesia Youth 
Association, 2013). 
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In addition to the recommendations that have been included in previous 
sections, it is also important to engage a wide range of academics in policy-
making. Australia possibly has one of the largest concentrations of expert 
knowledge about Indonesia outside of Indonesia, even among postgraduate 
students as showcased above. However, this high level of knowledge among 
academic experts is not reflected in the media or the general public.105 Most 
academic researchers do not publish their research for policy-makers or the 
public due to several reasons: lack of time, lack of incentive, and lack of skill in 
writing for policy-makers and the public. In the case of Indonesian postgraduate 
students who conduct research about Indonesia in Australia there is usually the 
added language barrier. While some research may find its way to the public 
through non-profit publication outlets such as Inside Indonesia or The 
Conversation and commercial media, most languish in dissertation 
repositories.106 Therefore it is important to be more deliberate about engaging 
researchers, providing training for writing policy papers, and providing 
incentives to publish in genres other than academic journals. The initiative to 
support the establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Centre based at Monash 
University is valuable, but the effort to engage academics needs to be broader. 
A majority of Indonesian citizens voted for Jokowi in July 2014 because he has 
shown that he engages the community in policy-making processes. It is for this 
same reason that he has attracted the attention of the international community, 
as this approach promises a better future for Indonesia. In light of this, it would 
   "Submission to the 'Towards 2025: Australia's Indonesia Strategy in the Asian Century',"(Australia-
Indonesia Youth Association, 2013).  
See AIYA’s website for policy recommendations: http://www.aiya.org.au/about/policy/ 
105 Alex Oliver, "The Lowy Institute Poll 2013. Australia and the World: Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy,"(Lowy Institute, 2013). 
106 Disclosure: The author is Commissioning Editor for Inside Indonesia. 
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be wise for Australia to also engage its stakeholders, including its youth, in 
making policies related to its soft power diplomacy with Indonesia.  
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Introduction 
Without much foreign policy experience, President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo was 
considered reserved on Indonesia’s foreign affairs in the lead-up to the 
presidential election. However, the joint ‘Vision and Mission’ (visi misi) 
statements of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla team, submitted to the General Elections 
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), tell a different story. Indeed, the 41-
page document emphasises “how the foreign-affairs sector can contribute to the 
Trisakti vision”107 of revitalising Indonesia’s political, economic and cultural 
identity, not only as an ‘archipelagic state’ (negara kepulauan) but also as a 
107 Despite the praise being lauded upon the inauguration of Indonesia’s first female Foreign Minister, 
many questioned the rationale behind Retno Marsudi’s appointment to the helm given the Widodo 
Administration’s ambitions of projecting Indonesia as a powerful ‘maritime state’. As Indonesia’s 
ambassador to the Netherlands and The Hague in her previous appointment, Retno’s track record did 
not seem to have much to do with the maritime sector or the Asia Pacific Region. See Hasyim 
Widhiarto and Bagus B.T. Saragih, “Retno Still to Learn the Ropes, No Clear Vision Yet,” The Jakarta 
Post, October 28, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/28/retno-still-learn-ropes-no-
clear-vision-yet.html.  
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‘maritime state’ (negara maritime), while adhering to the long-standing 
principle of a ‘free and active’ (bebas dan aktif) foreign policy.108 
The concept of a ‘maritime state’ has since received wide attention from 
commentators and media as the key focus of the Widodo Government’s foreign 
policy.109 Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Jakarta-based Center for 
Strategic and International Studies and foreign policy advisor to the Widodo 
Government, calls the concept of a maritime state a new doctrine that would 
further elevate Indonesia’s current position in world politics as the ‘world’s 
maritime axis’ (poros maritim dunia).110 It is apparent that this concept clearly 
capitalises on Indonesia’s geographically strategic location between the Indian 
and Pacific oceans. The centrality of Indonesia within the regional architecture 
of the Indo-Pacific is thus crucial to the maritime axis concept, and indicates 
Indonesia’s growing regional ambitions. 
Prominent Indonesian scholars Suryo A.B. and Lelly Andriasanti have tried to 
distinguish between the concepts of an ‘archipelagic state’ and ‘maritime state’. 
Citing the doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara (Wasantara, also known as “The 
Archipelagic Concept”), which derives its legitimacy from the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Suryo claims the focus on a ‘maritime 
108 A strong Sukarnoist influence can be seen in the prominence of the concept of Trisakti (emphasis 
on self-determination in politics (berdaulat dalam politik); self-reliance within the economy (berdikari 
dalam ekonomi); and a strong national culture (kepribadian dalam kebudayaan)) in the framework of 
the vision and mission statement of the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla team. This speaks volumes of the 
increasing importance of the ideology of President Widodo’s party—Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P)—in the nation’s foreign policy. It is also evident of the firmer stance that the new 
Widodo Administration will likely take particularly in the aspect of maritime sovereignty. See “Vision 
Mission,” Jalan Perubahan untuk Indonesia yang Berdaulat, Mandiri dan Berkepribadian: Visi Misi, 
dan Program Aksi (Jakarta: Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla, 2014). 
109 Ibid., 6. Point 6 of the mission statement states: “The realization of Indonesia as a maritime nation 
that is independent, progressive, strong and one based upon national interests” [author’s translation]. 
The original statement reads: “mewujudkan Indonesia menjadi Negara maritime yang mandiri, maju, 
kuat, dan berbasiskan kepentingan nasional”. 
110 See “Pengamat: Jokowi Telah Lahirkan Doktrin Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia,” 
Tribunnews.com, June 24, 2014, http://www.tribunnews.com/pemilu-2014/2014/06/24/pengamat-
jokowi-telah-lahirkan-doktrin-baru-politik-luar-negeri-indonesia. 
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state’ shows Indonesia is reprioritising its maritime environment and sea lanes 
over a traditional land-centric focus.111 On the other hand, Andriasanti sees the 
‘maritime state’ as a geographic construct subordinate to the ‘archipelagic 
state’, but stresses the development of Indonesia’s sea and maritime power 
above all.112 This change of focus from the land to the sea would imply that 
Indonesia’s military posture is likely to gravitate towards developing naval 
power, though the details of how such a transition will proceed is not yet 
known. There have been stated plans to boost Indonesia’s defense spending 
from 0.8% to 1.5%. Although the decision to choose Ryamizard Ryacudu as 
defence minister is largely seen as a compromise choice, it is telling that the 
new government’s choice for Coordinating Minister for Security, Tedjo Edy 
Purdijatno is a navy man. In a recent interview Tedjo mentioned of the special 
attention Indonesia will be paying to the maritime security sector, specifically in 
the formation of a new coastguard force.113 
What does the primacy of a ‘maritime state’ mean for the ‘big picture’ of 
foreign policy under the Widodo presidency and for Indonesia’s global image? 
How, and to what extent, will it affect Indonesia’s relations with other nations? 
111 See Suryo, A.B., “Geopolitik Maritim Indonesia,” Tim Ahli Sekans Jokowi: Jalan Kemandirian 
Bangsa (Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2014), 173–34. Wansantara, a geostrategic concept that was first 
initiated in 1957 and gained traction in the early 1990s was based largely on the Djuanda Declaration 
of 1957 and Law No.4/1960 on Indonesian waters. It contends that Indonesia should be perceived 
geographically as a single, autonomous archipelagic state with prescribed baselines around all 
Indonesia’s islands and enclosed waters within the island chains. The domestic legislation also 
expanded Indonesia’s overall territory by about 2.5 fold, from 2,027,087 sq km to 5,193,250 sq km. As 
such, there is a tendency to consider sea lanes rather than land demarcations as borders. The 
declaration was ignored by maritime states and Indonesia did not choose to enforce it. In its latest 
interpretation, the legal principle of the archipelagic state was claimed by Indonesia under the August 
1996 Act No. 6 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea following Indonesia’s 
submission of its designated Archipelagic Sea Lanes. 
112 Lelly Andriasanti, “Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di Bawah Jokowi” (Jakarta: Megawati Institute, 
July 4, 2014), http://www.megawatiinstitute.org/megawati-institut/artikel/260-politik-luar-negeri-
indonesia-di-bawah-jokowi.html. 
113 See Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, “Indonesia to create new coastguard, boost defense 
spending” in Reuters, November 13, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/13/us-indonesia-
security-idUSKCN0IX10220141113. 
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And to what extent will Widodo continue with the foreign policies of his 
predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono? 
Awidya Santikajaya expects to see an “ideological and substantial foreign 
policy change”114 under the Widodo Government over the next five years—a 
change from the long-standing tendency of Indonesian politics to strive for 
‘consensus’ that usually results in a ‘middle way’. He also cites inherent 
structural limitations of the reformasi political system that restricts Indonesia’s 
abilities to project its influence more prominently in global affairs.115 Peter 
McCawley argues that foreign policy will probably not be a top priority for the 
Widodo presidency, at least in its early years, with domestic issues carrying 
greater weight and urgency. McCawley says an inward-looking ‘resilience path’ 
will be the more popular option for now, rather than an outward-looking 
‘reform path’ littered with substantial obstacles.116 
The Widodo Government has a lot of opposition to contend with. With an 
obstreperous majority opposition coalition to manage in Parliament, and a 
policy platform that requires introducing unpopular reforms to the fuel subsidy 
system, much of Widodo’s focus will be on remedying and consolidating his 
domestic power base. Nonetheless, with several major international summits 
(APEC in Beijing; East Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar; and G20 in 
Brisbane) to attend soon after taking office in October, Widodo must put forth 
clear foreign policy guidelines that will indicate how different they will be from 
precedents set by Yudhoyono. 
114 Awidya Santikajaya, “Indonesia: Foreign Policy under Jokowi and Prabowo,” The Diplomat, June 
5, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/indonesia-foreign-policy-under-jokowi-and-prabowo/. 
115 Awidya Santikajaya, “Indonesia as an Emerging Power,” GREAT Insights 3, no. 4 (European 
Centre for Development Policy Management, April 2014). 
116 Peter McCawley, “Joko Widodo’s Indonesia: Possible Future Paths,” The Strategist (Barton, ACT: 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2014), http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/joko-
widodos-indonesia-possible-future-paths/. 
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Yudhoyono’s Foreign Policy Legacy  
Under Yudhoyono, who was Indonesia’s first directly elected president since 
reformasi, foreign policy took on a more internationalist focus beyond the usual 
confines of its region, particularly during his second term. Making foreign 
policy a highly personal endeavour, Yudhoyono sought to project Indonesia 
beyond the regional architecture of the Asia-Pacific and, in particular, the 
confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).117 This was 
assisted by the growing perception of Indonesia as a middle power on the 
rise.118 Adhering  to the mantra of maintaining “a thousand friends and zero 
enemies” early in his second term, Yudhoyono strategically and consciously 
avoided contentious issues, such as disputes in the South China, that could 
jeopardise Indonesia’s interests or escalate regional tensions, while embracing a 
middle power leadership role.119 Indonesia’s ambiguous stance allowed 
Indonesia to remain free from being entangled in disputes that may not be 
congenial towards cultivating ties with bigger powers in the region such as 
China. Yet at the same time Indonesia cultivated strong ties with the United 
States while projecting its own standing within the Muslim world. 
117 See Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Indonesia’s Post-Election Foreign Policy: New Directions?” RSIS 
Commentaries No. 113/2014 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, June 13, 
2014), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/indonesias-post-election-foreign-policy-new-
directions/#.VCUKPk1xmM8. 
118 Middle powers have been described as states that have “sufficient strength and authority to stand 
on their own without the need of help from others”. They are also looked upon as “medium-sized 
states with the capacity and willingness to employ proactive diplomacy with global visions”. See Kevin 
Rudd, “Leading, Not Following: The Renewal of Australian Middle Power Diplomacy,” The Sydney 
Papers 19, no. 1 (Summer 2007). See also Kim Sung-han, “Global Governance and Middle Powers: 
South Korea’s Role in the G20” (Council on Foreign Relations, February 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/south-korea/global-governance-middle-powers-south-koreas-role-g20/p30062. 
119 See Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “SBY’s Inaugural Speech: The Text,” Jakarta Globe, October 
20, 2009, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/sbys-inaugural-speech-the-text/. On the aspirations 
of Indonesia’s role as a middle power, see Santo Darmosumarto, “Indonesia: A New ‘Middle-Power,’ ” 
The Jakarta Post, October 30, 2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/30/indonesia-a-
new-middle-power039.html. 
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Despite Indonesia’s long-standing preference for neutrality and non-interference 
in the affairs of other nations, the country has a growing role as an advocate of 
human rights and democracy throughout the region.120 Indonesia’s active 
historic role and interests within ASEAN as primus inter pares (“first among 
equals”) took on a new significance as it enhanced its engagement in other 
regional bodies such as the East Asia Summit (EAS) and G20. Indonesia co-
chaired a UN panel setting the development agenda for the post-2015 
Millennium Development Goals and initiated the ‘Bali Concord II’ as chair of 
ASEAN in 2011. More recently however, Indonesia’s participation and 
leadership in ASEAN has been less than enthusiastic,121 due to the evolving 
geopolitics of the ASEAN region and the particularly contentious chairmanship 
of ASEAN under Cambodia in 2012.122 Several divergent views on how 
Indonesia should approach ASEAN have emerged along with Indonesia’s 
growing global profile; specifically, Rizal Sukma promotes a ‘post-ASEAN’ 
foreign policy.123 
Another salient aspect of Yudhoyono’s foreign policy was the projection of 
Indonesia’s newfound confidence from democratic gains at home and its 
conception of human rights.124 The Bali Democracy Forum, established in 2008, 
120 Indonesia’s new-found presence and confidence on the world-stage allows it to be assertive in the 
projection of aspects of its foreign policy. However this may not run contrary to the non-interference 
concept because Indonesia’s projection has largely been symbolic and obliging. 
121 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Southeast Asia and ASEAN Running in Place,” Southeast Asian Affairs 
2012 (2012): 4–5. Weatherbee argued that the ‘Bali Concord III’ did not go beyond the norms of an 
“ASEAN talk shop,” staying within the safe boundaries of polite and platitudinous officialdom. 
122 See Rodolfo C. Severino, “Cambodia Faces Tests with 2012 ASEAN Chairmanship,” Jakarta 
Globe, February 22, 2012, http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/cambodia-faces-tests-with-2012-
ASEAN-chairmanship/. 
123 See Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia Needs a Post-ASEAN Foreign Policy,” The Jakarta Post, June 30, 
2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indonesia-needs-a-postASEAN-foreign-
policy.html. 
124 For a good summary of Indonesia’s newfound confidence and assertion in foreign policy, see Ted 
Piccone and Bimo Yusman, “Indonesian Foreign Policy: ‘A Million Friends and Zero Enemies,’ ” The 
Diplomat, February 14, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-
friends-and-zero-enemies/?allpages=yes. In terms of human rights, Indonesia has actively supported 
the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. 
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is a key medium through which Indonesia promotes its democratic ideals in the 
Asia-Pacific region.125 Indonesia’s projection of democratic ideals in ASEAN, 
however, distanced non-democratic ASEAN member-states such as Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (known collectively as CLMV), while receiving a 
lukewarm reaction from other ASEAN member-states.126 Under Yudhoyono, 
Indonesia took an active role on issues in the Muslim world, both within and 
outside of ASEAN. For example, Indonesia was proactive in seeking to halt 
conflict between the Arakan Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar.127 
Indonesia also expressed its concerns over the Syrian and Egyptian crises, but 
Yudhoyono limited himself to making strong statements because of his 
country’s commitment to non-alignment.128 Clearly, while Indonesia’s voice in 
both the international community and the Muslim world had grown markedly 
under Yudhoyono, its leadership role in regional bodies like ASEAN needs to 
be revived by Widodo. 129 
Yudhoyono took a strong interest in managing the country’s foreign affairs, 
sometimes clashing with Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. Their differences 
125 See 
http://bdf.kemlu.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&Itemid=106&lang=en. As 
of date, four Bali Democracy Forums have been conducted, the latest being in 2011. 
126 Shortly after the Burmese crackdown on the Saffron Revolution in 2007, Yudhoyono sent General 
(ret’d) Agus Widjojo to cajole the Burmese Junta into accepting a democratic transition based on a 
model similar to Indonesia’s experiences. 
127 See Margareth S. Aritonang and Bagus B.T. Saragih, “RI Ready to Fight for Rohingya,” The 
Jakarta Post, July 31, 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/31/ri-ready-fight-
rohingya.html. 
128 See “Editorial: RI’s Activism on Syria,” The Jakarta Post, January 9, 2013, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/01/09/editorial-ri-s-activism-syria.html. See also Teddy 
Kurniawan and Fitri, “SBY Leads Chorus of Dismay over Egypt,” Jakarta Globe, July 30, 2013, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/sby-leads-chorus-of-dismay-over-egypt/199059/. 
129 See Ralf Emmers, “Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN: A Case of Incomplete and Sectoral Leadership,” 
The Pacific Review 27, no. 4 (2014): 543–62. One way Widodo can revive the relevancy of ASEAN is 
via the resuscitation of Indonesia’s commitment as ‘big brother’ and honest broker amongst the 
member states that had largely been neglected under the latter part of the Yudhoyono Administration. 
It must also be said that the integrity of ASEAN solidarity had been compromised lately in part to the 
corridor of rivalry between the United States and China. This pattern is set to persist. Given this new 
geostrategic consideration, collective ASEAN solidarity may still very much be a cornerstone of 
Widodo’s foreign policy objectives particularly in the protection of its own maritime interests in the 
South China Sea. However, it is not likely to be the only cornerstone. 
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on foreign policy issues spilled into the public sphere over issues like 
Indonesia’s stance on the trans-boundary haze issue, the stationing of US 
Marines in northern Australia, asylum seekers, and the Free Papua Movement. 
On the other hand, Yudhoyono championed closer relationships and strategic 
partnerships with several middle power countries deemed non-threatening to 
Indonesia, particularly South Korea.130 
Yudhoyono elevated Indonesia to a more prominent role on the world stage, 
while enhancing his own profile as an international statesman. His distinctive 
contribution to Indonesia’s foreign policy goes far beyond the regional 
architecture. Yudhoyono’s foreign policy clearly took into account the 
geopolitics of the region, most conspicuously the US pivot to Asia and a rising 
China. It would be surprising if Widodo does not build on Yudhoyono’s foreign 
policy legacy and successes, though to what extent the new government will 
succeed in doing so remains uncertain. 
Potential Foreign Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Widodo 
Widodo is Indonesia’s first elected president from outside Indonesia’s 
traditional ruling oligarchy. His humble background as a furniture entrepreneur 
did hold him back from his political ambitions when running for political office 
as mayor of Surakarta, governor of Jakarta and now, president of Indonesia.131 
His rapid rise onto the national scene as a popular figure and political upstart 
was seen as a threat to the power of the country’s elite. The Widodo team has 
already had to face the challenges posed by the abolishment of a decade-long 
130 See JP/Desy Nurhayati and Novan Iman Santosa, “South Korea’s Lee Myung-bak Honored,” The 
Jakarta Post, November 9, 2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/11/09/south-korea-s-lee-
myung-bak-honored.html. In particular, President Lee Myung-Bak had described the relationship with 
Indonesia as “heartfelt”. 
131 Marcus Mietzner, “Jokowi: Rise of a Polite Populist,” Inside Indonesia 116 (Apr-Jun 2014), 
http://www.insideindonesia.org/feature-editions/jokowi-rise-of-a-polite-populist. 
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direct local election process (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada)).132 Widodo 
won the intense presidential election by a small margin, with much of his 
support coming from volunteers.133  This did not stop the opposition Merah-
Putih Coalition, led by Prabowo Subianto, from setting up roadblocks134 in 
protest before Widodo’s inauguration as the Indonesian president. Similarly, 
balancing the national budget is proving to be a challenge for the Widodo 
Government, particularly in negotiations over fuel subsidy reforms.135 
A proactive foreign policy of the type demonstrated in Yudhoyono’s second 
term may pose further challenges for Widodo, given his relative inexperience in 
foreign affairs and the likely political rivalries within and between his 
government and the bureaucracy. Amid modifications to the Widodo Cabinet 
reducing the number of ministries, deputies and political positions within, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains the only ministry with a representative 
deputy (following Widodo’s own preferences). In addition, several older 
ministries received new designations, including the Ministry of Marine Affairs 
132 Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, “Abolishing Indonesia’s Direct Local Elections: Missing the 
Forest for the Trees?” RSIS Commentaries C014187 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, September 23, 2014), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/CO14187.pdf. See also Joe Cochrane, “Parliament in Jakarta Rolls Back 
Election Rights,” The New York Times, September 25, 2014. 
133 “Unsung Heroes,” Tempo.co, July 29, 2014, 
http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/07/29/080596291/Unsung-Heroes. 
134 See Jonathan Chen and Keoni Indrabayu Marzuki, “MD3 Laws in Indonesia: Sword of Damocles 
over the Jokowi Presidency?” RSIS Commentaries CO14208 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, October 21, 2014), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/CO14208.pdf.  
135 See Reuters and JG, “2015 Budget Enough for Jokowi’s ‘Basic Government Operations,’ ” Jakarta 
Globe, September 28, 2014, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/business/2015-budget-enough-
jokowis-basic-government-operations/. Requests for a transition budget jointly formulated with 
Yudhoyono’s government were rebuffed. For a good summary of the potential challenges Widodo 
faced even before his inauguration, see Ulla Fiona and Francis E. Hutchinson, “Crossing the River 
While Avoiding the Stones: Jokowi’s Run-up to the Presidency,” ISEAS Perspective 49/2014 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, September 29, 2014), 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS_Perspective_2014_49.pdf. 
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and Fisheries (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan) which is currently named 
the Ministry of Maritime Affairs (Kementerian Kemaritiman).136 
Coupled with a strong intent to capitalise on Indonesia’s ‘middle power’ status 
and reassess its priorities by re-designating sea lanes as the country’s political 
and geostrategic axis, Widodo is signalling significant foreign policy changes 
that will invariably affect relations with other countries. Refocusing foreign 
policy directives towards Indonesia’s strategic role as a ‘maritime state’ and a 
‘middle power’ will also expand the ‘state-centric’ prism in several sectors. This 
includes increasing Indonesia’s role in the master plan for South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation (Kerjasama Selatan-Selatan dan Triangular) and the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association; strengthening ASEAN Centrality and gaining a 
more prominent role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation;137 and actively 
participating in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peace-building.138  
Widodo may abandon Yudhoyono’s bilateral foreign policy initiatives, and 
revert to a more traditional multilateral approach (regional and global) and 
consolidate Indonesia’s leadership role within ASEAN. While the Yudhoyono 
Administration may have prided itself on establishing very close bilateral 
relationships with similar ‘middle power’ nations such as South Korea during 
the era of President Lee Myung-bak, Widodo may not have the same personal 
136 Agus Dwi Darmawan, “Racikan Kabinet Presiden Ketujuh,” katadata, September 16, 2014, 
http://katadata.co.id/infografik/2014/09/16/racikan-kabinet-presiden-ketujuh. 
137 See “Vision Mission.” Widodo had also indicated during his campaign an interest in setting up an 
embassy in the Palestine. See Jay Waluyo, “Jokowi Diminta Prioritaskan Palestina dalam Program 
Politik Internasional,” Jurnal Parlemen, September 18, 2014, 
http://www.jurnalparlemen.com/view/8289/jokowi-diminta-prioritaskan-palestina-dalam-program-
politik-internasional.html. 
138 For more on the master plan for South-South and Triangular cooperation (KSST), launched during 
Yudhoyono’s second term, slated for 2011 to 2025, see “Indonesia Preparing Master Plan for South-
South Cooperation,” Antaranews.com, June 15, 2014, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/82861/indonesia-preparing-master-plan-for-south-south-
cooperation. See also “Vision Mission,” 13. 
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inclinations. Foreign policy matters may fall primarily on the shoulders of the 
Foreign Minister.  
China 
Indonesia has been watching China’s rise and growing strength in the region 
with considerable interest while maintaining a rather ambiguous stance. While 
Indonesia’s relationship with China has indeed improved since resumption of 
diplomatic relations in 1990, it has not moved beyond the merely pragmatic. 
Daniel Novotny notes that compared to other major powers such as the United 
States, attitudes towards China have been ambivalent.139 Christine Susanna 
Tjhin says Indonesia’s long-standing relations with China have been 
“productive and pragmatic but not yet a strategic partnership”.140 The seeming 
lack of warmth between the two nations is partly explained by history and partly 
by the current circumstances. Franklin B. Weinstein had noted back in the late 
1970s that Indonesian leaders’ deep-rooted antipathy towards ‘Chineseness’ 
was often a stumbling block to cultivating close relations.141 
This perception has not changed much with the rise of China in recent years. On 
the negative side, China’s rise is seen primarily in terms of economic 
competition and military threats.  Indonesia is concerned with an influx of 
cheap Chinese-made goods into Indonesian markets that could gradually 
139 See Daniel Novotny, Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign 
Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 200–28. 
140 See Christine Susanna Tjhin, “Indonesia’s Relations with China: Productive and Pragmatic, But 
Not Yet a Strategic Partnership,” China Report 48, no. 3 (2012): 303–15, doi: 
10.1177/0009445512462303. 
141 See Franklin B. Weinstein, “Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From 
Sukarno to Soeharto,” Foreign Affairs (April 1977). The term Chineseness apparently referred more to 
the innate Chinese character and Chinese nationalism rather than Maoist ideology, although the 
Communist Party of China was not seen in a flattering light even in recent years. This can be 
attributed to China being seen as an inherently aggressive and expansionist power. 
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develop into a dependency relationship.142 The military threat is centred on 
uncertainty surrounding China’s claims in the waters off the Natuna Islands in 
the South China Sea (Indonesia claims Natuna Islands as its own).143 The 
Indonesian military is not optimistic about China’s rise. The commander-in-
chief of Indonesia’s armed forces has not been enamoured with China’s 
posturing, particularly by putting areas of the Natuna Islands on official Chinese 
maps. The mood among the Indonesian military has also been described as 
“dismayed” with China’s actions.144 Commodore Fahru Zaini, assistant deputy 
to the chief security minister for defence strategic doctrine, said that China had 
claimed the seas surrounding the Natuna Islands as its territorial waters, which 
are officially “related to the territorial zone of the Unitary Republic of 
Indonesia”.145 It is still uncertain whether China’s growing assertiveness poses a 
direct military threat to Indonesia’s security, with hostilities softening 
perceptibly over the years. China’s recent actions of instituting the nine dash 
lines within proximity of the Natuna Islands have heightened security tensions, 
raising the need for a strategic reassessment by Indonesia.146 
142 This was probably to do with the prevailing “Pretty Maiden Analogy” popularised in the 1970s 
describing Indonesia as a land of great economic and geopolitic importance amid a hostile and 
exploitative world. 
143 Beijing’s disputed claims over the South China Sea had raised concerns in Indonesia as early as 
1995 when an Indonesian Defence White Paper warned against China’s growing clout in the region. 
See Indonesian Ministry of Defence and Security, “The Policy of the State Defence and Security of 
the Republic of Indonesia,” White Paper (Jakarta: Ministry of Defence and Security, August 17, 1995), 
4–5. 
144 See Moeldoko, “China’s Dismaying New Claims in the South China Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, 
April 24, 2014, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304279904579515692835172248. In addition, 
the Natunas Islands are also prized for its rich oil resources, with the untapped gasfields in East 
Natuna being one of the world’s largest. See Andrew R.C. Marshall, “Remote, Gas-Rich Islands on 
Indonesia’s South China Sea Frontline,” Jakarta Globe, August 26, 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/remote-gas-rich-islands-indonesias-south-china-sea-
frontline/. 
145 See “China Includes Part of Natuna Waters in its Map,” Antaranews.com, March 13, 2014, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/93178/china-includes-part-of-natuna-waters-in-its-map. 
146 See Greta Nabbs-Keller, “Is Indonesia Shifting its South China Sea Policy?” The Lowy Interpreter 
(blog), April 16, 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/04/16/Indonesia-Natuna-shift-south-
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On the positive side, Indonesia’s economy has greatly benefited from China’s 
rise. From 2006 to 2011, Indonesian exports to China increased from 3.8% to 
11.5%.  Meanwhile, Indonesia reduced its exports to other markets such as the 
European Union and the United States.147 The economic and material benefits to 
Indonesia from China’s growing economy are evident for all to see.148 The 
growing demand for energy and raw materials in China has increased 
investments and trade between both countries. China became a net importer of 
coal in 2007 and Indonesia emerged as its primary supplier. China invested 
US$1.9 billion into Bumi Resources, Indonesia’s largest coal producing 
company.149 By 2011 approximately 1,000 Chinese enterprises had invested in 
Indonesia—amounting to a total of US$592.2 million up from a 2003 figure of 
US$29.8 million.150 The highlight of China’s charm offensive in Indonesia 
under Yudhoyono came in 2013 when President Xi Jinping became the first 
ever foreign leader to address the Indonesian Parliament. A currency swap 
agreement worth US$16 billion was signed, and China promised to upgrade its 
commitment to ASEAN, with Indonesia as a ‘big brother’ of the region, from a 
‘golden decade’ to a ‘diamond decade’.151 Yudhoyono nullified the notorious 
Cabinet Presidium Circular (1967) obliging Indonesian government agencies to 
use the terms Tiongkok or Tionghua  to describe ethnic Chinese individuals 
china-sea-policy.aspx. See also Philip Bowring, “Indonesia Draws a Line in the Sea,” Asia Sentinel, 
April 29, 2014, http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/indonesia-draws-line-sea/. 
147 See International Monetary Fund, Direction of International Trade Statistics Yearbook 2012 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
148 See Zhao Hong, “China-Indonesia Economic Relations: Challenges and Prospects,” ISEAS 
Perspectives 42 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, July 4, 2013), 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/iseas_perspective_2013_42_china_indonesia_econo
mic_relations.pdf. 
149 See Anthony Deutsch, Amy Kazmin, and Leslie Hook, “Asia Giants’ Scrabble [sic] for Coal 
Reaches Indonesia,” Financial Times (Chinese ed.), September 9, 2010, 
http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001034547/en/?print=y. 
150 Ministry of Commerce of China, 2011 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Investment (Beijing: 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2011). 
151 See “Li Shares Thoughts on China-ASEAN Cooperation,” mysinchew.com, October 8, 2013, 
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/92424. 
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instead of the derogatory Cina—a gesture welcomed by both Indonesian 
Chinese and China.152 
Despite inherent reservations, Yudhoyono had engaged China to a significant 
degree, at least in economic and trade dealings. China appears confident that 
Indonesia’s China policy will continue under Widodo, so will Indonesia’s 
commitment to the EAS and the previous policy of “a million friends and zero 
enemies”.153 The two countries are slated to increase trade and investments to 
US$800 million by 2015, according to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
signed during President Xi’s visit. This reflects Yeremia Lalisang’s observation 
that Widodo’s vision of Indonesia as the “world’s maritime axis” ties in with 
China’s plan of building a “New Maritime Silk Road.”154 A further sign of 
cooperation are the maritime-based sister-cities planned between the Chinese 
city of Qingdao in Shandong province and the Indonesian city of Makassar in 
South Sulawesi.155 
Some observers say the newly elected president needs to tread carefully in 
handling relations with China, and is seen as a “test” of foreign policy 
152 Cina is seen as a derogatory term refering to the Chinese residing in Indonesia often with negative 
connotations of being greedy, unclean, lazy, weak and even immoral. Tiongkok/Tionghua is a neutral 
term which simply refers to the Chinese community without the added stereotypes. By issuing the 
decree at this point in time, Yudhoyono sought to improve relations between the indigenous and 
Indonesian Chinese populations, promoting cordial relations with Beijing and foremost of all, be 
remembered as the president who abolished the official use of the term. See Leo Suryadinata, “An 
End to Discrimination for China and the Chinese in Indonesia?” ISEAS Perspective 26 (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, April 25, 2014), 
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/documents/publication/ISEAS_Perspective_2014_26-
An_End_to_Discrimination_Chinese_in_Indonesia.pdf. 
153 Li Guo Zhang, “Indonesia’s New Administration Will Continue Existing Policy of Building Strong 
Partnership with China,” China Economic Net, July 22, 2014. 
154 See Yeremia Lalisang, “President-Elect Jokowi and Indonesia-China Relations,” The 
Establishment Post, August 1, 2014, http://www.establishmentpost.com/jokowi-indonesia-china-
relations/. 
155 See Natalia Santi, “Indonesia, Qingdao to Initiate Maritime Cooperation,” Tempo.co, April 27, 
2014, http://en.tempo.co/read/news/2014/04/27/056573507/Indonesia-Qingdao-to-Initiate-Maritime-
Cooperation?utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+-
+28+April+2014&utm_campaign=Info+Alert+20140428&utm_medium=email. 
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acumen.156 Widodo will have to balance his desire “to show that he’s his own 
man” with the need to open up greater economic opportunities by cooperating 
with China. This is typical of the conflicting stances characteristic of 
Indonesia’s relations with China. Widodo’s administration looks like it will  not 
deviate much from this ambivalent and cautious approach, understanding the 
need for greater investment and cooperation, yet inevitably wary of China’s 
growing strategic assertions in the South China Sea. China is likewise keen to 
engage with Indonesia on economic matters. So far, Chinese diplomat Wang 
Jiarui made overtures when he visited Widodo in mid-September, inviting him 
during the APEC Summit in Beijing to meet with President Xi.157 Under an 
overall policy shift in maritime affairs and security issues, nevertheless, Widodo 
may adopt a firmer stance  on Indonesia’s sovereignty (kedaulatan) if China 
chooses to aggressively assert its claim in areas along the nine-dash line that fall 
under what is considered Indonesia’s sovereign territory.158 
 
 
156 See David Tweed, “China Test Looms for Widodo as Indonesia Faces Xi’s Campaign,” Bloomberg, 
August 5, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-04/china-test-looms-for-widodo-as-
indonesia-faces-xi-s-sea-campaign.html. 
157 See Luqman Rimadi, “Kirim Utusan, Presiden China Ucapkan Selamat Kepada Jokowi,” 
Liputan6.com, September 15, 2014, http://indonesia-baru.liputan6.com/read/2105654/kirim-utusan-
presiden-china-ucapkan-selamat-kepada-jokowi. 
158 Jokowi’s foreign policy so far has been big on issues of sovereignty, largely influenced by the 
doctrines of Trisakti. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Indonesia’s approach to China will neither be 
cautious nor ambivalent because Indonesia is both suspicious of China’s intentions yet understands 
the need for Chinese investment. In this instance, the singular aspect of foreign diplomacy in 
Indonesia that may appear more conspicuous will be that of a stronger stance against the potential 
infringement of Indonesia’s sovereignty – be it land, air or in particular, the sea. Recent Indonesian 
attitudes towards sovereignty issues are telling of its more hardline position. See Steve Creedy, 
“Australia-bound plane intercepted by Indonesia en route to G20” in The Australian, November 4, 
2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/in-depth/australiabound-plane-intercepted-by-
indonesia-en-route-to-g20/story-fnpebfcn-1227111952745. See also Karamjit Kaur, “Singapore 
aircraft intercepted by Indonesian air force released” in The Straits Times, October 29, 2014, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/news/singapore/transport/story/singapore-aircraft-intercepted-indonesian-
air-force-released-20141029.  
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Japan 
Indonesia-Japan relations are on an upward trajectory and Indonesia views 
Japan as a benign Asian power.159 Rebounding from a low point of the anti-
Japan Malari riots in 1974 a day after Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka 
arrived in Indonesia for a state visit, Indonesia no longer sees Japan as a direct 
threat but increasingly as a “countervailing power to China’s military might”.160 
Attitudes towards Japan have taken a significant detour since the hostilities of 
World War II.161 Previous suspicions of Japan’s politically motivated economic 
agenda in Southeast Asia have faded in the shadow of China’s assertiveness in 
the region. Despite the fact that Japan has been gradually moving away from 
pacifism to a more assertive military posture, Indonesia has never been more 
receptive of Japan. 
Through a few sensible measures, Japan has successfully repositioned its post-
WWII belligerent image by “trying to appear as unthreatening as possible.”162 
Formal relations were established with Indonesia following the 1951 San 
Francisco Treaty regarding war reparations. Japan became a source of much-
needed economic aid during the turbulent years of Sukarno’s rule which has 
continued today. In addition, Japan showed its commitment to the region by 
joining the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality in 2004. An alliance with the United States has kept Japan’s 
159 See Novotny, Torn between America and China. 271–79. 
160 See Mak Joon Num and Hamzah Bin Ahmad, “The External Maritime Dimension of ASEAN 
Security,” Journal of Strategic Studies 18, no. 3 (1995): 123–46. 
161 Even so, elite perceptions of Japan have generally been seen in a positive light despite the 
wartime atrocities it committed during World War II. Many viewed the Japanese invasion and 
adventurism in Southeast Asia primarily as an attempt to free them from the yoke of their colonial 
masters. See Novotny, Torn between America and China. 275. 
162 See Sebastian Moffett, et al. “Marching on to a New Role,” Far Eastern Economic Review (January 
15, 2004). 
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military and political adventurism in check.163 Furthermore, Japan has been 
giving official development assistance (ODA) to Indonesia since the late 
1960s.164 Indeed, Indonesia has been the biggest beneficiary of Japan’s ODA 
among ASEAN countries in recent years.165 Yudhoyono maintained strong 
economic ties with Japan, including signing the Indonesia-Japan Economic 
Partnership in 2006 and the Metropolitan Priority Area project.166 Indonesia 
would continue to benefit from maintaining and expanding strong relations and 
cooperation with Japan not only in economic matters but also in politics and 
security, primarily in the area of maritime security and the promotion of related 
international rules and laws.167 In a recent meeting with the new Indonesian 
Foreign Minister at the 2014 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 
Beijing, Japan’s Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida followed up on its earlier 
pledge to bolster cooperation in maritime security by focussing on the 
importance of settling disputes based on the principle of the international rule of 
law.168  
163 See Lam Peng-Er, “Trading Places?: The Leading Goose & Ascending Dragon.” Comparative 
Connections 4, no. 1 Japan-Southeast Asia Relations (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, April 2002), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0201qjapan_seasia.pdf. 
164 See “Welcome to Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan to Indonesia Website,” 
Official Development Assistance from Japan to Indonesia, http://www.id.emb-japan.go.jp/oda/en/. 
165 See Bachtiar Alam, Japan’s ODA to Indonesia: Statistical Data, No. 1/2001 (Jakarta: The Center 
for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia, 2001), 17–24. See also Nobuyuki Takahashi, “The 
Scandal of Japanese Aid to Indonesia,” Asiatimes Online, August 2, 2002, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DH02Dh01.html. 
166 See Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Responding to Global Challenges and Strengthening 
Indonesia-Japan Relations,” Presidential lecture delivered to the National Graduate Institute for Policy 
Studies (GRIPS) (Tokyo: June 17, 2011), 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/docs/img/2011_News/513_3/Presidential_Lecture.pdf. 
167 See “SBY, Fukuda Expect Stronger RI-Japan Relations,” The Jakarta Post, September 1, 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/01/sby-fukuda-expect-stronger-ri-japan-relations.html. 
See also “Kishida, Indonesia’s Jokowi Seek Enhanced Security, Economic Ties” in The Japan Times, 
August 12, 2014, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/08/12/national/kishida-indonesias-jokowi-
seek-enhanced-security-economic-ties/#.VGb4wzSUeSo.  
168 See “Japan, Indonesia Agree to Bolster Maritime Security Cooperation” in Kyodo News, November 
8, 2014, https://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2014/11/321351.html.  
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Will Widodo’s administration deviate from the existing trajectory set by 
Yudhoyono? As a counterweight to the growing uncertainty involving the rise 
of China, amicable Indonesia-Japan relations can act as a bulwark and an 
“indirect psychological insurance” in the form of an additional bargaining 
chip.169 Japan can be a partner and ally as Indonesia endeavours to become a 
mediator between China and Southeast Asia over sovereignty issues in the 
South China Sea.170 Nonetheless, at a time when China-Japan relations have 
reached an antagonistic high, a closer partnership with Japan may compromise 
Indonesia’s relations with China, hindering Indonesia’s ambitions to become the 
‘world’s maritime axis’. While Indonesia and Japan enjoy an overlapping 
interest in maritime security and the protection of their sovereignty over the 
South China Sea and East China Sea respectively, Indonesia will have to tread 
carefully in this relationship when considering China.    
India 
Indonesia’s affinity with India has not always been the strongest, yet it has 
received a boost in light of recent geopolitical developments. A treaty of 
friendship was signed in 1951 between both countries, setting the foundation of 
relations in the future.171 The relationship strengthened when President Sukarno 
and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, among others, came together to 
form the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. India and Indonesia share some 
common political features: both are salient examples of democracy and 
decentralisation. Although deeply religious countries, both have remained 
169 See Daniel Novotny, Torn between America and China. 279. 
170 See Tadao Onaga, “Indonesia Ready to Mediate Sovereignty Disputes in the South China Sea,” 
The Asahi Shimbun, August 12, 2014, 
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/around_asia/AJ201408120038. See also Clint Richards, “Joko Looks 
to Japan to Boost Indonesia’s Regional Influence,” The Diplomat, August 12, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/joko-looks-to-japan-to-boost-indonesias-regional-influence/. 
171 See “Treaty of friendship between India and The Republic of Indonesia” (Djakarta: March 3, 1951), 
http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1951/7.html. 
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committed to secularism as a democratic principle.172 Increasingly, Indonesia 
views India as a non-threatening power located strategically in the South Asian 
subcontinent and crucial as a possible counterbalance to “the overwhelming 
influence of Northeast Asia—China in particular”.173 
Trade exchanges and economic cooperation between Indonesia and India have 
not been noteworthy, though President Yudhoyono and Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh signed a bilateral strategic partnership agreement in 
November 2005. The results of the agreement have been more than satisfactory 
with total bilateral trade surpassing US$12 billion.174 There are plans to follow 
up with a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement after a joint study 
group presents its results. Indeed, overall trade relations between Indonesia and 
India show great growth potential.175  
 On the security front, Indonesia and India are expanding their engagement. 
With the signing of the India-Indonesia Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
2005, Indonesia resumed its defence engagement with India in all branches of 
the armed forces. Military-to-military cooperation usually revolves around 
counterterrorism and counter-insurgency efforts.176 Given that both countries 
172 See Navrekha Sharma, “Why Indonesia is Important to India,” IDSA Issue Brief (New Delhi: 
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 20, 2011). 
173 See Landry Haryo Subianto, “ASEAN and the East Asian Co-operation: Searching for a Balanced 
Relationship,” The Indonesian Quarterly XXXI, no. 1 (1st Quarter 2003), 9–10. 
174 See Rahul Mishra, “India and Indonesia: Trade and Investment Complementarities,” IDSA Issue 
Brief (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 25, 2011). 
175 See Ardyan Mohamad, “DPD Ingin Indonesia-India Perkuat Hubungan Dagang,” merdeka.com, 
August 23, 2014, http://www.merdeka.com/uang/dpd-ingin-indonesia-india-perkuat-hubungan-
dagang.html. 
176 See Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “India-Indonesia Defence Cooperation: Back on Track?” RSIS 
Commentaries No. 103/2013 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, May 29, 
2013). 
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share common littoral boundaries on the Indian Ocean, India and Indonesia are 
keen to counter China’s footprints in Myanmar.177 
Under the ‘world’s maritime axis’ concept, which shifts Indonesia’s 
geostrategic focus on the Indo-Pacific, continued positive engagement with 
India by Widodo will give Indonesia an additional counterweight to the growing 
influence of China.178 
Singapore 
By virtue of their proximity, Singapore-Indonesia relations have been described 
as being “subject to large fluctuations, shifting between periods of tension and 
relatively close cooperation”.179 The marked asymmetries between the two 
countries—in population and wealth per capita—have been commonly cited as 
the defining characteristic of the relationship. However, Singapore is also 
anxious about the rising assertiveness of the Chinese giant against the backdrop 
of a US pivot to the Asia-Pacific– a concern that may potentially compromise 
the solidarity of the regional architecture.180 Indonesia and Singapore are 
turning to the solidarity and centrality of the ASEAN framework as a de facto 
defence against China, while building on multifaceted and complex bilateral 
relations. For example, in a recent statement made during the ASEAN Summit 
in Nay Pyi Daw in Myanmar, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
stressed that ASEAN should maintain its centrality and respond in a decisive 
177 See Pankaj K. Jha, “India-Indonesia: Towards Strategic Convergence,” IDSA Comment (New 
Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, January 24, 2011), 
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiaIndonesiaTowardsStrategicConvergence_pkjha_240111. 
178 See Leonard C. Sebastian and Emirza Adi Syailendra, “Jokowi’s “Look West” Foreign Policy: 
Expanding Indonesia’s Sphere of Influence?” in RSIS Commentaries CO14207 (Singapore: S. 
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, October 21, 2014). http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/CO14207.pdf. 
179 See Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Indonesia and Singapore: Structure, Politics and Interests,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 31, No. 2, August 2009, 249–71. 
180 See Bilahari Kausikan, “The Dynamics of Size and the Burden of History,” The Straits Times, 
October 3, 2014, http://news.asiaone.com/news/asian-opinions/dynamics-size-and-burden-history. 
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and coordinated manner to geopolitical developments in the region such as 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea and cooperation on counter-
terrorism.181 
Bilateral relations with Singapore under successive presidents since reformasi 
in 1998 are seen as “acerbic exchanges and occasionally obstructive policies, 
interspersed with declarations of cooperative intent and ongoing close relations 
in many functional areas”.182 The most recent highlight of such dissension came 
earlier this year with the fiasco over the renaming of an Indonesian frigate KRI 
Usman Harun, and the trans-boundary haze disputes.183  Indonesia reopened 
historic wounds and raised lapsed memories of confrontation—Usman and 
Harun are controversial figures in Singapore seen as perpetrators of violence but 
hailed in Indonesia as national heroes.184 The trans-boundary haze dispute 
demonstrates a perennial bilateral sticking point. Pollutant Standards Index 
(PSI) readings reached an all-time high of 401 last year and Singapore became 
one of the hardest hit nations after Malaysia to suffer from effects of the 
181 See Dylan Loh, “ASEAN Must Respond in Decisive, Coordinated Way to Regional Issues” in 
Channel NewsAsia, November 12, 2014, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/asean-
must-respond-in/1468054.html.  
182 See Hamilton-Hart, “Indonesia and Singapore: Structure, Politics and Interests.”. 
183 On the Usman-Harun issue, see Yvonne Guo, “Singapore and Indonesia: An Uneasy 
Coexistence?” The Diplomat, February 15, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/singapore-and-
indonesia-an-uneasy-coexistence/. On the transboundary haze issue surrounding Singapore-
Indonesia ties, see Ng Jing Ying, “Transboundary Haze: Singapore Seeks Indonesia’s Cooperation 
on ASEAN Agreement,” todayonline.com, May 10, 2014, 
http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/transboundary-haze-singapore-seeks-indonesias-cooperation-
ASEAN-agreement. 
184 Usman Mohamed Ali and Harun Said were two Indonesian marines involved in the Macdonald 
House bombing that occurred on 10 March 1965 during the period of the Indonesia-Malaysia 
Confrontation. The bombing of the 10-storey MacDonald House was the most serious spate of 
bombings in Singapore, killing three people and injuring thirty-three others. Both Usman and Harun 
were caught within four days of the bombing and were tried for murder and hanged three years later 
in 1968 despite pleas from Indonesia to free them. The hanging of the marines affected relations 
between Indonesia and Singapore. It was not until 1973 that the event reached a closure with 
Singapore’s then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew placing flowers on the graves of the executed 
marines. For a quick update of the Indonesian frigate KRI Usman-Harun saga with Singapore see 
Leonard C. Sebastian, “The Usman-Harun Issue: Some Thoughts for Indonesia to Ponder,” RSIS 
Commentaries No. 029/2014 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, February 12, 
2014), http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/19905/RSIS0292014.pdf?sequence=1. 
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Indonesian forest fires.185 The two matters were eventually dealt with 
sensitively by both sides despite initial outbursts of strong rhetoric. Nonetheless, 
they are a reminder of the fragile state of affairs between the two countries. 
Under Yudhoyono, relations with Singapore under were generally cordial and 
positive despite the brief periods in between that consisted of curt exchanges 
during disagreements. Close defence ties between the Indonesia and Singapore 
resumed, and reached a high mark towards the end of Yudhoyono’s term when 
he was invited to Singapore to be conferred the Order of Temasek (First Class), 
acknowledging his contributions to building regional cooperation and 
stability.186 Stronger ties were reaffirmed as a further milestone was achieved 
with the signing of the second maritime boundary treaty delineating the 
territorial seas in the eastern part of the Straits of Singapore.187 This solid 
foundation of diplomacy sets a good tone for the Widodo presidency’s 
engagement with Singapore. Widodo himself is no stranger to the island nation 
of Singapore. As governor of Jakarta, he had on various occasions consulted 
with the authorities in Singapore on the development and management of the 
mass rapid transit project in Jakarta.188 Widodo’s younger son is studying his 
International Baccalaureate at a Singapore school.189 Given these close personal 
185 See “Singapore haze hits record high from Indonesia fires,” bbc.com, June 21, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22998592. 
186 See Zakir Hussain, “Indonesia’s President Yudhoyono Awarded Order of Temasek by Singapore,” 
The Straits Times, September 3, 2014, http://www.straitstimes.com/news/asia/south-east-
asia/story/indonesias-president-yudhoyono-awarded-order-temasek-singapore-
20140#sthash.qjzdRlPI.dpuf. Apparently, only 11 people have received the prestigious award, 
including Queen Elizabeth II, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and 
President Ferdinand Marcos, since it was instituted in 1962. In 2014, President Soeharto also 
received the same award. 
187 See Saifulbahri Ismail, “Singapore and Indonesia Sign ‘Milestone’ Maritime Treaty,” 
channelnewsasia.com, September 3, 2014, 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-and-indonesia/1344564.html. 
188 See Sita W. Dewi, “Jokowi Seeks Advice from Singapore,” The Jakarta Post, April 2, 2013, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/02/jokowi-seeks-advice-singapore.html. 
189 See Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, “Jokowi’s Low-Key Wife, 3 Kids Give Moral Support,” The Straits 
Times, June 29, 2014, http://www.stasiareport.com/the-big-story/asia-report/indonesia/story/jokowis-
low-key-wife-3-kids-give-moral-support-20140629. 
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connections Widodo has with the island nation, Indonesia and Singapore are 
well-poised for a closer partnership. 
Conclusion: Can the Widodo Administration Fully Project its 
Foreign Policy? 
Despite his relative inexperience, Widodo possesses a formidable team of 
foreign policy experts and security advisors in his inner circle, including Rizal 
Sukma and defence experts from the University of Indonesia, Andi Wijajanto 
and Edy Prasetyono.190 Efforts to fully capitalise on outward, reform-minded 
policies in Widodo’s first term may be stymied by internal power plays within 
Parliament, and externally by the geopolitical realities of the region. Internally, 
the Widodo administration faces an unprecedented challenge from a largely 
disruptive parliamentary opposition that may spill into foreign affairs. A Law on 
Legislative Bodies (MD3) threatens to undermine the scope and capacity of 
Widodo’s intended policies.191  In particular, one of the clauses of the newly 
implemented MD3 Law known as the “packet system” requires the vote of two-
thirds majority in parliament for legislative matters. This particular clause alone 
certainly disadvantages the Widodo Coalition in parliament, given the current 
one-third minority coalition. If MD3 goes unhindered, the House in particular 
190 See Sita W. Dewi and Margareth Aritonang, “Understanding Jokowi’s Inner Circle,” 
news.asiaone.com, July 5, 2014, http://news.asiaone.com/news/asia/understanding-jokowis-inner-
circle. Andi Wijanjanto is now serving as Cabinet Secretary of the Widodo’s Administration. For a 
more comprehensive summary of the notable figures and advisors behind the Widodo Administration 
see Aaron Connelly, “Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi” in Lowly Institute 
Publications, October 16, 2014, http://m.lowyinstitute.org/files/indonesian-foreign-policy-under-
president-jokowi_0.pdf.  
191 In order to prevent power from being centralized only at the top following reformasi, there had been 
a concerted effort to shift the locus of power away from the executive to the legislative. This had 
resulted in the legislative or Indonesia’s Lower House (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) gaining 
considerable clout especially in area of oversight. While it served its purpose in checking the power of 
the executive, this power shift had also led to abuses. See Jonathan Chen and Keoni Indrabayu 
Marzuki ibid.  
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will have overwhelming supervisory, legislative and budgetary powers.192 
Although the implications of MD3 are still not fully evident, the law is slated to 
affect Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions in more ways than one, now that 
politicians themselves are furnished with new diplomatic duties. Widodo will 
have to think of ways to limit the development of extraneous bureaucratic red 
tape that may compromise the realisation of his policies. When implementing 
his grand narrative of a ‘world maritime axis’, the Widodo Administration may 
have to consider the ecological dimension of such an endeavour in light of the 
threat of rising sea levels due to climate change.193 
Externally, the continued rise of an assertive China will undoubtedly create less 
room for Indonesia’s foreign policy and diplomatic efforts to manoeuvre. 
Indonesia has always relied on its “mendayung antara dua karang” (rowing 
between two reefs)194 stance, but it may need to rethink this strategy. 
Strengthening ties with other neighbouring powers such as India and Singapore 
is a good start. It is also imperative that Indonesia exercises greater leadership in 
ASEAN, particularly in reinvigorating ASEAN centrality amid geopolitical 
trends that threaten to undermine the archipelago’s integrity.195 
Indonesia’s first female foreign minister Retno Marsudi, recently expressed 
intentions of eschewing Yudhoyono’s ‘thousand friends’ policy for a less 
192 See Djoko Susilo, “It’s Going to be a Bumpy Ride for Jokowi,” The Straits Times, October 3, 2014, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/indonesia/story/its-going-be-bumpy-ride-jokowi-
20141003. 
193 See Erwida Maulia, “Rising Seas Threaten Jokowi’s Maritime Plan” in Jakarta Globe, November 
11, 2014, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/rising-seas-threaten-jokowis-maritime-plan/.  
194 Such a foreign policy stance emerged in Indonesia at the dawn of the Cold War era under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta who first broached the concept in 1948. The future 
direction that Indonesia’s diplomacy henceforth took was to avoid the major conflicts of the day by not 
taking sides between the superpowers in the form of a ‘free and active’ foreign policy. In practice such 
a policy stance had been qualified by clear indicators in the past, most conspicuously in the Non-
Aligned Movement of 1955. 
195 See Awidya Santikajaya, “East Asia Summit: ASEAN’s Centrality and the Challenges Ahead,” The 
Jakarta Post, October 29, 2010, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/10/29/east-asia-summit-
ASEAN%E2%80%99s-centrality-and-challenges-ahead.html. 
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aggrandized, down-to-earth ‘pro-people policy’.196 According to Retno, a ‘pro-
people policy’ means a more humanistic foreign policy that includes for 
example, protecting Indonesia’s own citizens overseas.  It also includes being 
more active in public diplomacy by requiring Indonesian diplomats to perform 
Widodo-style ‘blusukan’ (impromptu visits to the constituents by state 
officials).  It remains to be seen whether this stated goal of the new foreign 
minister represents will run tangent to the ‘maritime axis’ ambitions of the 
Widodo himself. 
Overall, these two tasks of offsetting both internal and external threats are not 
unattainable. The Widodo administration already has a good strategy that aims 
to make Indonesia the ‘world’s maritime axis’. Such a paradigm shift is 
essential for a breakthrough in Indonesia’s efforts to become a credible global 
middle power and a key leader in the region. Indonesia’s foreign policy may 
only see nuanced changes in the short term. However, if pursued to its fullest 
extent, projecting Indonesia as the ‘world’s maritime axis’ bodes well in the 
long term for a country emerging as a serious middle power and diplomatic 
intermediary.  
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Introduction 
During his first visit to Jakarta as Australian Prime Minister in October 2013, 
Tony Abbott singled out Indonesia as Australia’s most important bilateral 
relationship, on account of “its size, proximity and potential”197.  This, however, 
is not reflected in the two countries’ bilateral trade and investment relationship.  
Indonesia is only Australia’s 12th largest trading partner and 11th largest export 
market, and 19th largest investment destination.198  Likewise, Australia ranks as 
Indonesia’s 9th largest import source and 10th export destination.199  The 
Australian and Indonesian Governments, business and academic communities 
agree the bilateral economic relationship is not living up to its full potential.   
From an Australian business perspective, it is easy to overlook Indonesia and 
focus on the larger, highly-developed North Asian economies.  Australia’s 
success selling iron ore to support China’s economic growth certainly attracts 
the bulk of Australia’s economic attention.  This year, Australia made big 
strides in its economic diplomacy with countries in North Asia, signing free 
trade deals with Korea in April, Japan in July and China in November.  Public 
views are similar: Australians consistently rank China and Japan as their 
country’s ‘top friends’ in Asia and few rank trade and investment as significant 
policy priorities in Australia – Indonesia relations.200 
But Indonesia is an emerging economic powerhouse that offers Australian 
exporters and investors a wealth of opportunities.  Its GDP is nearing US$1 
trillion, making it by far the largest economy in Southeast Asia, and it is 
projected to be the world’s seventh largest economy by 2030.  Over the past 10 
years, average annual GDP growth has been more than 5.8 per cent, helping to 
reduce poverty levels.  With a population of almost 250 million, Indonesia now 
197 The Hon Tony Abbott MP, Prime Minister of Australia “Building an Indonesia-Australia Relationship 
for the 21st Century”, (speech, Jakarta, 1 October 2013), https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2013-10-
01/building-indonesia-australia-relationship-21st-century. 
198 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), “Australia and Foreign Investment”, 
accessed 10 November 2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/investment/australias-investment.html. 
199 DFAT, “Indonesia Fact Sheet”, accessed 31 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/indo.pdf.http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/. 
200 Lowy Institute Poll, 2014, accessed 13 November 2014, 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2014. 
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boasts the world’s third-fastest growing consumer market and a rapidly-growing 
middle class201 (currently around 45 million202). 
Indonesia does, however, face many domestic economic challenges, such as 
poor infrastructure, declining foreign investment, a weak manufacturing sector 
and a heavy dependence on commodity exports, expensive fuel subsidies, 
corruption and excessive red tape.  Its new president, Joko Widodo (popularly 
known as “Jokowi”) has outlined an ambitious program of reforms to overhaul, 
restructure and reinvigorate the Indonesian economy. 
This paper outlines some of the opportunities and challenges facing the 
Indonesian economy and Widodo Government’s reform program.  We discuss 
ways to remove barriers to bilateral trade and investment, to help grow the 
economic ties between Australia and Indonesia.  A bilateral free trade 
agreement (FTA) has been touted as a positive way forward, but negotiations 
for such an agreement, the Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA), stalled in 2013.  We will look at how IA-
CEPA might build on the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA), and highlight some other avenues for removing trade 
and investment barriers.  Also examined is agriculture, a sector where there is 
much potential to expand trade and investment ties between Australia and 
Indonesia. 
 
Indonesia’s Economy: Opportunities & Challenges 
Indonesia is entering not only a new political and social era, but a new era of 
economic opportunity too.  Its president, Joko Widodo, who took office on 20 
October 2014, presides over an archipelago brimming with economic potential.   
Indonesia has enjoyed average annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth of 5.9 per cent203 and, despite some challenges, continues to attract 
201 Austrade, “Indonesia: Market Overview”, accessed 13 November 2014, 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export/Export-Markets/Countries/Indonesia/Market-profile#.VGntSUuKhFI 
202 DFAT, “Indonesia Country Brief”, accessed 13 November 2014, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/indonesia/indonesia_brief.html. 
203 World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review of Indonesia: Report by the Secretariat,” 
(WT/TPR/S/278/Rev.1)16 July 2013. 
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foreign investment from major countries in Asia and elsewhere.  Economic 
growth has reduced poverty, with the World Bank estimating that the national 
poverty rate fell from 23.4 per cent to 12.5 per cent between 1999 and 2011.  
However, the poverty reduction rate is slowing, with around 65 million people 
still living dangerously close to the poverty line.204  Business consulting firms 
share a positive outlook on Indonesia’s economic prospects and growth 
potential as a market for consumer products: 
• McKinsey & Company estimate Indonesia will be the world’s seventh 
largest economy by 2030 and will have 135 million middle-class 
consumers.205   
• Boston Consulting Group (BCG) projects that Indonesia will have 141 
million “MACs” (middle-class and affluent consumers) by 2020, with 
MACs on the island of Java alone numbering more than the whole 
population of Thailand.206  
Indonesia’s youth are a notable feature of its new economic era.  Millions of 
young Indonesians will enter the job market every year until 2030.  The 
population of working-age Indonesians will grow more rapidly than the 
dependent population, freeing up economic resources for investment, 
consumption and a greater quality of life.  To reap the economic benefits of this 
“demographic dividend”, Indonesia will have to create more jobs and pursue 
effective labour, health and education policies that promote worker 
productivity: McKinsey estimates productivity must grow 60 per cent faster 
than it did between 2000 and 2010.207  Higher sustained growth is also needed, 
204 “Reducing extreme poverty in Indonesia,” World Bank Briefs, 22 October 2014, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/reducing-extreme-poverty-in-indonesia. 
205 “The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential,” McKinsey Global Institute, 
September 2012, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Produc
tivity%20Competitiveness%20and%20Growth/The%20archipelago%20economy/MGI_Unleashing_In
donesia_potential_Full_report.ashx. 
206 “Asia’s Next Big Opportunity: Indonesia’s Rising Middle-Class and Affluent Consumers,” The 
Boston Consulting Group, March 2013, 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/Asias_Next_Big_Opportunity_Mar_2013_tcm80-
128797.pdf. 
207 “The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s Potential,” McKinsey Global Institute, 
September 2012, 
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Produc
tivity%20Competitiveness%20and%20Growth/The%20archipelago%20economy/MGI_Unleashing_In
donesia_potential_Full_report.ashx. 
104 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
as GDP growth rates of under 6 per cent are simply not enough to provide 
sufficient jobs for Indonesia’s youth. 
Obviously, Indonesia’s economic growth will depend on the new Widodo 
Government’s ability to develop and implement good economic policies to 
address internal challenges, of which there are many.  Indonesia must make 
more progress in eradicating corruption and tackling the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies that cripple the country’s competitiveness.  The country performs 
poorly on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index: in 2014 Indonesia’s 
rank was 120, 4 points lower than in 2013. This places it below its neighbours 
Singapore and Malaysia.208  Likewise, it ranks very low (175) in terms of the 
ease of starting a new business; posing a serious challenge to the development 
of small and medium-sized enterprises.  Corruption is ubiquitous, with 
Indonesia ranking 107 out of 175 in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index.209  
Indonesia’s current economic success is linked precariously to China’s resource 
demands.  Mining has been a key industry driving Indonesia’s economy for the 
past decade, making significant contributions to GDP, exports, tax revenue, 
employment and regional development.210  Much like Australia, Indonesia’s 
mining industry faces falling demand from China.  Weak Chinese demand for 
nickel, coal and tin was blamed for Indonesia’s GDP growth slipping to 5 per 
cent in the third quarter of 2014, its slowest in five years.211  China aside, 
Indonesia’s own nationalist policies threaten the viability of its mining industry.  
New foreign direct investment in the industry has been discouraged by 
government regulations requiring divestment by foreign companies and banning 
the export of unprocessed minerals.  
Thus, Indonesia’s economy presents equally large opportunities and challenges.  
On the one hand, it has consistent GDP growth, a growing middle-class, 
208 World Bank Group, “Doing Business 2014 – Economy Rankings,” accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
209 Transparency International, “2014 Corruption Perception Index,” accessed 11 November 2014, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results. 
210 “Challenging times ahead for the Indonesian mining sector,” PwC, February 2014, 
http://www.pwc.com/id/en/media/challenging_times_ahead_for_the_indonesian_mining_sector.jhtml. 
211 Ben Otto,“Indonesia Economy Tests New President as Growth Slows,” The Wall Street Journal, 5 
November 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-economy-grows-at-slowest-pace-in-five-
years-1415166907. 
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favourable demographics and it is rich in resources.  On the other, the country 
faces significant internal problems such as corruption, an inefficient 
bureaucracy, government policies that discourage direct investment and a 
mining industry too dependent on China.  Into this mix comes a new president 
with a can-do, pragmatic attitude and a willingness to address Indonesia’s most 
difficult economic problems.  
Taking Stock of Widodo’s Economic Ambitions 
A successful businessman, President Widodo’s stated economic objectives 
include the ambitious tasks of increasing GDP growth to 7 per cent and 
reducing Indonesia’s fuel subsidies, which currently gouges out roughly 18 per 
cent of the national budget.  Achieving this GDP growth goal will require, 
amongst other things, growth in exports and significant improvements in labour 
productivity; necessitating policies that educate the workforce and improve its 
health, increase agricultural productivity, strengthen the manufacturing sector 
and improve infrastructure.212  The resources for these policy pathways, 
especially those improving health and education, are to be found in freeing up 
the portion of the budget currently spent on fuel subsidies.  If Widodo can 
successfully wean Indonesia off fuel subsidies, he has a greater chance of 
transforming Indonesia’s economy.  
How do the President’s policy objectives match up with the reforms needed?  
Will they take advantage of Indonesia’s youthful population?  The most 
comprehensive overview of Widodo’s policy intentions arrived just a month 
before the presidential election.  In May 2014, Widodo and his running mate, 
and now Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, submitted their “Vision-Mission and 
Action Program” (Visi-Misi dan Program Aksi) to the General Elections 
Commission (KPU).  In it, they outlined their basic policy goals across all 
spheres including foreign policy, education, defence, and economics.  
According to the Jakarta Post’s English-language translation of the visi-misi 
statement, Widodo’s intended reforms as they relate to the economy are:213 
212 Ibid. 
213 Margareth S. Aritonang and Rendi A. Witular, “Widodo-Kalla hawkish on economic policies,” The 
Jakarta Post, 21 May 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/21/Widodo-kalla-hawkish-
economic-policies.html. 
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Increasing productivity and competitiveness: 
• Construct 2000km of new roads. 
• Develop 10 new airports and 10 new seaports. 
• Provide a streamlined, one-stop service for the processing of investments 
and business licenses with a completion target of 15 days. 
• Set up development and infrastructure banks. 
• Build regional science and technology parks, academies and vocational 
schools. 
Economic independence and development of domestic sectors: 
• Set up a bank for farmers and small businesses. 
• Open one million hectares of rice paddies outside Java. 
• Cut energy imports by promoting exploration at home. 
• Construct gas pipelines. 
• Prioritise use of coal and gas to generate electricity. 
• Protect existing agricultural land. 
• Expand irrigation networks for rice fields. 
• Achieve a financial inclusion ratio target of 50 per cent. 
• Target a tax ratio of 16 per cent. 
• Restrict the sale of national banks to foreign investors. 
• Increase research in agriculture and industry. 
Other economy-related points listed elsewhere in the document: 
• Reduce the impact of globalisation, regional economic integration, and 
free trade. 
• Push regional administrations to cut their overhead costs and allocate 
more for public services. 
• Increase educational and training quality through the Smart Indonesia 
program, with 12 years of compulsory and free education. 
• Issue a government regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) to replace 
Upstream Oil and Gas Regulatory Special Task Force (SKKMigas) with a 
new energy management system. 
• Revise the Oil and Gas Law to prioritise the development of national 
capacity and provide legal certainty for businesses. 
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The visi-misi statement highlights Widodo’s commitment to providing 
education and vocational training for young Indonesians.  And his track record 
of delivering practical services to the people during his tenure as mayor of Solo 
and governor of Jakarta indicates he will put similar effort into providing 
healthcare and quality education services to Indonesians at the national level.  
These are precisely the kind of practical policies that will help Indonesia reap 
the benefits of its “demographic bonus”, by increasing the productivity of the 
millions of young Indonesians joining the workforce each year.  If Widodo can 
indeed undertake these initiatives, it should create the right policy environment 
for Indonesia to become the world’s seventh-largest economy by 2030. 
Drawing on his business background, Widodo promises to streamline processes 
for business and investment licenses.  Reducing the cumbersome bureaucracy 
that gets in the way of obtaining business licenses will encourage the growth of 
small and medium-sized enterprises in Indonesia, in turn creating more jobs. 
Although his policy stance is generally pro-business, Widodo’s visi-misi 
statement reveals he does lean towards economic nationalism, a feature of 
Indonesia’s past economic policies.  Indeed, economic nationalism is deeply 
rooted in the country’s national identity as a former Dutch colony.  Indonesians 
share the view that the Dutch grew rich by exploiting Indonesia’s national 
resources, while Indonesia was left impoverished.214   Immediately following 
the country’s independence President Sukarno nationalised Dutch companies 
and confiscated foreign-owned property and assets. These nationalist sentiments 
remain alive in Indonesia today and manifest themselves in policies designed to 
protect Indonesian businesses from foreign competition and develop 
Indonesian-owned industries. 
The Widodo Government is unlikely to diverge far from this policy trend.  
Indicative of this are the President’s pledges in his visi-misi statement to restrict 
the sale of national banks to foreign investors and to cut energy imports in 
favour of domestic exploration.  And his newly-appointed Energy and Mineral 
Resources Minister, Sudirman Said, has already made it clear the government 
will maintain Indonesia’s controversial ban on exporting unprocessed minerals.   
214 Stephen Greenville, “How to manage economic nationalism in Indonesia,” The Interpreter, Lowy 
Institute, 3 June 2014, http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/06/03/Indonesia-economic-
nationalism.aspx?COLLCC=1537672964&.  
108 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
Widodo’s plan to build ports, roads, and other much-needed infrastructure will 
require significant foreign investment.  Chronic under-development and under-
investment in infrastructure has been a major bottleneck for Indonesia’s 
economic growth.215  Indonesia recognises this and is, for example, working 
with countries like the Netherlands to develop maritime infrastructure.216  The 
need for infrastructure development presents opportunities to Australian 
contractors with experience in delivering large-scale projects, such as in 
Australia’s northwest for the mining industry. 
Encouragingly, in November 2014 President Widodo signalled his intentions to 
improve Indonesia’s business and investment climate, implement tax reforms 
and cut fuel subsidies during his speeches at the APEC Economic Leaders’ 
Meeting in Beijing and at the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Brisbane.  At the APEC 
meeting, he urged fellow members to invest in Indonesia, highlighting the need 
for infrastructure development, whilst acknowledging the problems investors 
faced in Indonesia.  At the later G20 Summit, Widodo confirmed his 
commitment to cut fuel subsidies, which will free up money to fund 
infrastructure projects.  These official statements should reassure investors in 
the short-term, but will need to be followed up relatively quickly with concrete 
policy reforms.  There are already signs that the president will push hard for 
these reforms, with Widodo announcing a 30 per cent price increase for 
subsidised fuel on 17 November 2014.   
 
Trade and Investment: A Weak Link in Australia-Indonesia 
Relations 
Australia and Indonesia’s economic ties, whilst not insignificant, are nowhere 
near as strong as they should be for such close neighbours, especially given the 
size, strong economic performance and relative complementarity of the two 
economies.  As noted earlier, Indonesia is only Australia’s 12th largest trading 
partner.  In contrast, tiny New Zealand is Australia’s sixth largest trading 
partner and third largest investment destination, thanks largely to a 
215 Shiro Armstrong and Sjamsu Rahardja, “Survey of Recent Developments”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 50:1 (2014): 22. 
216 “Indonesia, Netherlands Agree to Build Maritime Ties,” Antara News, 5 November 2014, 
http://www.antaranews.com/en/news/96421/indonesia-netherlands-agree-to-build-maritime-ties. 
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comprehensive, long-standing bilateral free trade agreement (FTA).  Malaysia, 
which has around one-tenth the population and less than half the GDP of 
Indonesia, is Australia’s seventh largest trading partner. 217   
A bilateral FTA between Australia and Indonesia has been advocated for some 
time as a good way to grow the trade and investment relationship.  Back in July 
2007, the Australian and Indonesian Governments agreed to conduct a joint 
feasibility study on the merits of a bilateral FTA.  Released in July 2009, the 
study found that, given the complementarities between the two countries’ 
economies, a comprehensive and ambitious FTA covering goods, services and 
investment “could improve trade and investment links, deepen bilateral and 
regional economic integration and provide positive outcomes in key agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors of importance to both Australia and Indonesia”218, 
providing “significant opportunities” for business and exporters.  It showed that, 
to achieve the greatest possible gains, all tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and barriers 
to bilateral services trade should be eliminated, as should be the widest possible 
range of barriers to Australian investment in Indonesia.219 
On the basis of the study’s findings, negotiations for a bilateral FTA, the 
Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-
CEPA), commenced in September 2012.  However, little progress was made 
before tensions in bilateral relations, coupled with the Australian and 
Indonesian electoral cycles, effectively put the negotiations on ice.   
Now that bilateral relations are improving and Australia has completed a trifecta 
of FTAs (with Korea, Japan and most recently China), the Abbott Government 
has indicated its interest in reviving the IA-CEPA negotiations.  In speech to the 
Australia-Indonesia Business Council on 4 December, Australian Foreign 
Minister Julie Bishop said that “in 2015, as President Widodo’s new cabinet 
settles in, we will seek to reinvigorate these [IA-CEPA] negotiations”.220  
217 DFAT, “Australia’s Trade at a Glance”, accessed 29 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/australias-trade-at-a-glance/index.html. 
218 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Indonesian Ministry of Trade, “Australia-
Indonesia Free Trade Agreement Joint Feasibility Study”, April 2009, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/iacepa/aus-indon_fta_jfs.pdf. 
219 Ibid 
220 The Hon Julie Bishop MP, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, “Address to Australia-Indonesia 
Business Council”, (speech, Melbourne, 4 December 2014), 
http://foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/Pages/2014/jb_sp_141204.aspx 
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Following Widodo’s election, the consensus seems to be that it is up to 
Indonesia when negotiations resume and at what pace.  In the next section, we 
discuss the short-term prospects for restarting IA-CEPA negotiations.  And we 
look at other avenues for enhancing Australia’s economic ties with Indonesia, 
including an existing trade agreement, AANZFTA. 
Growing Economic Ties through AANZFTA:  
Australia already has a free trade agreement in place with Indonesia, albeit a 
regional one.  The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(AANZFTA) is Australia’s largest and first multi-country FTA.  Signed in 
2009, it encompasses Australia, Indonesia and 10 other countries (Brunei, 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), a population of over 650 million and a 
combined GDP of over US$4 trillion221.  To date, it is ASEAN’s most 
comprehensive trade agreement, covering trade in goods and services, 
investment, intellectual property, electronic commerce, the temporary 
movement of business people, competition and economic cooperation.  
AANZFTA’s provisions applied to Australia from 1 January 2010222 and to 
Indonesia from 10 January 2012.223  
AANZFTA has significantly liberalised trade in goods between Australia, 
Indonesia and its other member countries: 
• Applied tariffs have been set (“bound”) at existing low levels, so that they 
cannot be increased to levels permitted by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreements. 
• Countries have agreed to eliminate tariffs by 2025 on between 85.2 per 
cent and 100 per cent of products.224 
• In the case of Australia, tariffs have been eliminated tariffs on 96.5 per 
cent of products imported from Indonesia and other AANZFTA 
221 DFAT, “ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement”, accessed 31 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/. 
222 DFAT “Overview and Key Outcomes of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement”, accessed 29 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta_overview_and_outcomes.html 
223 DFAT, “ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA: Indonesia Entry Into Force”, accessed 29 October 
2014, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/AANZFTA-Indonesia-entry-into-force.html. 
224 These commitments are on “tariff lines”, i.e. products as defined in tariff schedules. 
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countries.  Tariffs on 100 per cent of products will be eliminated by 
2020.225   
• AANZFTA provides regional, flexible rules of origin (criteria used to 
determine a product’s country of origin), an important outcome in today’s 
world of global value chains.  These rules allow for regional 
accumulation, 226 whereby producers in one member country may use 
input materials from another member country without losing preferential 
treatment.  
AANZFTA’s outcomes on trade in services are more modest, but improve 
certainty and transparency for service providers.  Many are ‘WTO-plus’, going 
beyond countries’ commitments in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services.  The main outcomes are: 
• Existing levels of market openness have been bound (guaranteed) in some 
sectors, such as professional services, construction services, financial 
services, mining-related services, education and telecommunications. 
• Disciplines on domestic regulation have been imposed (including specific 
disciplines for financial and telecommunications services). 
• Certain legal protections for investment are guaranteed. 227 
Other notable features of AANZFTA include: 
• Improved post-establishment legal protections for investors. 
• Commitments and regulatory disciplines to improve the temporary entry 
of business people, professionals and skilled workers. 
• A comprehensive economic cooperation work program of capacity-
building and technical assistance to help ASEAN countries implement 
the agreement.228 
Importantly, AANZFTA is a “living agreement”.  It contains a number of built-
in agendas and review mechanisms covering areas such as services, investment 
225 DFAT, “AANZFTA Fact Sheets”, accessed 31 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/factsheets/fact_sheets.pdf. 
226 Ibid. 
227 DFAT, “Overview and Key Outcomes of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement”, accessed 29 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta_overview_and_outcomes.html. 
228 Ibid. 
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and non-tariff barriers.229  This means that AANZFTA has the potential to 
further liberalise trade and investment flows between its member countries, 
including Indonesia and Australia.  
AANZFTA and Indonesia 
Indonesian exports and investors face few and relatively low barriers in the 
Australian market, with Australia having one of the world’s most open 
economies.230  While Indonesia’s economy is not as open, AANZFTA has 
removed many impediments to trade and investment, particularly with respect 
to tariffs: 
• Indonesia has eliminated tariffs on 78 per cent of products (tariff lines), 
up from 11 per cent, and agreed to eliminate tariffs on 92 per cent of 
products by 2015 and 94 per cent by 2025.  These commitments cover 
Australian exports such as wheat (our largest export to Indonesia), 
breeding animals, crude petroleum, beef, aluminium, cotton, gold, 
pharmaceuticals, butter, most cheeses, most seafoods, pigments and 
preparations and most copper and lead products. 
• Indonesia will reduce tariffs on a range of other products, so that by 2025 
only 3.3 per cent of tariffs will be over 5 per cent. 231 
Indonesia has taken steps towards opening up its services sectors, including 
banking and insurance, construction, education and legal services.  For instance: 
• Foreign lawyers are permitted to work in Indonesian law firms (although 
Indonesia has placed limits on numbers). 
• Foreign equity limits have been raised for joint ventures in construction 
services and for educational institutions established with a local 
partner.232 
229 Ibid. 
230 World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade Policy Review of Australia:  Report by the Secretariat”, 
WT/TPR/S/244, 1 March 2011, accessed at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp344_e.htm. 
231 DFAT, “ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA: Indonesia Entry Into Force”, accessed 29 October 
2014, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/AANZFTA-Indonesia-entry-into-force.html. 
232 DFAT, “ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA: Indonesia Entry Into Force”, accessed 29 October 
2014, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/AANZFTA-Indonesia-entry-into-force.html. 
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It is much too early to assess AANZFTA’s impact on Australia and Indonesia’s 
economic relationship, as the agreement’s provisions have applied to Indonesia 
since only January 2012.  The full impact of an FTA on trade and investment 
flows takes several years to be realised as exporters and investors gear up to 
take advantage of new market opportunities.  In 2012-13, Australia’s exports of 
primary products to Indonesia grew by 9.7 per cent, exports of manufactures fell 
by 11.5 per cent and exports of services grew by 4.5 per cent.  As for 
Indonesia’s exports to Australia, primary products fell by 4.1 per cent, 
manufactures grew by 21.4 per cent and services by 10.6 per cent.233  
Remaining Barriers to Trade and Investment 
Despite the above improvements, impediments still exist to trade and 
investment flows between Australia and Indonesia.  Detailed information is 
provided in the joint feasibility study and in the Indonesia-Australia Business 
Partnership Group’s comprehensive position paper on IA-CEPA.234   
 
Australian goods and services exporters and investors face barriers across a 
range of areas.  Major goods exports such as sugar, rice, wine and spirits were 
excluded from Indonesia’s tariff reductions under AANZFTA and are subject to 
high tariffs.  Other exports confront significant non-tariff barriers such as import 
quotas, import licensing requirements, complex and overlapping regulations and 
procedures, complicated standards and certification processes and excessive 
labelling requirements.235  For example: 
• Wine and spirits face tariffs of up to 170 per cent. 
• Sugar, Australia’s second-largest export to Indonesia in 2013 is highly 
regulated by the Indonesian Government, with long-standing measures in 
place covering production, prices and trade.  Australian sugar exports 
face tariffs of Rp 550/kg (for raw cane sugar) and Rp 790/kg (for other 
sugars), as well as other restrictions such as import licensing.236 
• Live cattle, Australia’s third-largest export to Indonesia in 2013, is 
subject to a low tariff (currently 5 per cent, to be reduced to 2.5 per cent 
233 DFAT, “Australia’s Trade with East Asia 2013”, October 2014, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/trade_eastasia.html. 
234 Indonesia-Australia Business Partnership Group, “Position Paper on Considerations Towards the 
Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement”, 31 October 2012. 
235 Ibid. 
236 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, “Indonesia Sugar Annual Report 2014”, 14 April 2014. 
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by 2025), 237 but also to import permits based on a reference price 
system.238 
In many instances, these trade barriers form part of a deliberate Indonesian 
strategy to boost self-sufficiency, develop and protect local industry. 
Australian services exporters face barriers in many sectors of the Indonesian 
market, including in education, legal, accountancy, construction and 
architecture services and telecommunications.  For instance: 
• Indonesia limits foreign direct investment in higher education to 49 per 
cent and requires Australian investors to partner with a local institution. 
• Australian law firms cannot establish offices in Indonesia. 
• Australian accountancy firms are only able to operate in Indonesia via a 
cooperation agreement with an Indonesian accountancy firm.  Indonesian 
citizenship is required to practise as a licensed accountant.239 
Australian investment in Indonesia has been curtailed by impediments such as 
foreign equity limits, complex business, labour and bankruptcy regulations and 
infrastructure limitations.240 
From Indonesia’s perspective, while its exporters and investors confront 
significantly fewer barriers, Australia currently imposes low tariffs on important 
Indonesian exports such as textiles, clothing and footwear, consumer and 
furniture products and passenger motor vehicles.  These and all other Australian 
tariffs will be eliminated in 2020 (under AANZFTA).  Indonesian service 
providers experience difficulties obtaining relevant licenses in Australia and in 
237 Indonesia has eliminated the tariff on live pure-bred breeding cattle.  DFAT, “ASEAN-Australia-
New Zealand FTA: Indonesia Entry Into Force”, accessed 5 November 2014, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/AANZFTA-Indonesia-entry-into-force.html. 
238 The Indonesian Government releases import permits each quarter, with the number determined by 
how close the price of beef is to an ‘affordable’ reference price.  Matt Brann, “Indonesia’s Beef Price 
Still High Despite Import Surge”, ABC Rural News, 3 April 2014, accessed 5 November 2014, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-04-03/indonesian-beef-price-high-despite-imports/5362870. 
239 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Indonesian Ministry of Trade, “Australia-
Indonesia Free Trade Agreement Joint Feasibility Study”, April 2009, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/iacepa/aus-indon_fta_jfs.pdf. 
240 Ibid. 
115 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
securing temporary employment opportunities in Australia.241  And Indonesian 
investors in Australia face a screening threshold of $248 million.242 
The Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (IA-CEPA) 
A bilateral FTA between Australia and Indonesia should address these 
remaining barriers to trade and investment and accelerate the tariff elimination 
commitments made in AANZFTA.  Indeed, AANZFTA is envisaged by the 
Australian Government to be a “platform” for the negotiation of bilateral FTAs 
with ASEAN countries, to achieve “AANZFTA-plus outcomes”.243  To date, 
Australia has concluded a bilateral FTA with Malaysia (the Malaysia-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement, MAFTA), which took effect in January 2013.244   
MAFTA provides a good model for IA-CEPA, and for that matter any other 
future Australian FTAs with ASEAN countries.  It improves on AANZFTA’s 
market access for goods and services by cutting or eliminating a wider range of 
tariffs, addressing specific non-tariff barriers to trade, guaranteeing Australian 
investors the right to majority ownership in companies across a wide range of 
services sectors in Malaysia, improving the temporary movement of business 
people and reducing other barriers to bilateral trade.  Also, it contains a 
significant economic development component, providing a program of 
economic and technical cooperation projects in agriculture, automotives, 
tourism, clean coal technology and electronic commerce.245 
It is envisaged IA-CEPA will be comprehensive in scope, covering trade in 
goods and services, investment, movement of natural persons, electronic 
commerce, competition policy, government procurement, intellectual property 
rights, environment and labour and other new relevant new and emerging 
241 Ibid. 
242 Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB), “Monetary Thresholds”, accessed 2 December 2014, 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/monetary_thresholds/monetary_thresholds.asp. 
243 DFAT, “Overview and Key Outcomes of the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade 
Agreement”, accessed 6 November 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/aanzfta_overview_and_outcomes.html. 
244 MAFTA negotiations were originally launched in April 2005 but were suspended in 2006 while 
AANZFTA negotiations were underway.  Formal MAFTA negotiations resumed in August 2009 and 
the agreement was signed in May 2012.  DFAT, “Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement”, 
accessed 6 November 2014, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/mafta/. 
245 DFAT, “Malaysia-Australia Free Trade Agreement”, accessed 6 November 2014, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/mafta/. 
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issues.246  Like MAFTA, capacity-building and economic cooperation will be an 
important feature, as noted by the Australian and Indonesian Governments in 
their joint feasibility study.  For instance, cooperation will likely be 
strengthened in customs services, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
technical regulations and standards and trade and investment promotion.247  
Before stalling, two rounds of IA-CEPA negotiations were held, the last in July 
2013.  The negotiations’ guiding principles, objectives and organisation were 
agreed, a number of procedural matters finalised, economic cooperation and 
stakeholder engagement discussed and an agricultural pilot project launched to 
improve beef cattle production in Indonesia.248 
The Way Forward 
A WTO-consistent, AANZFTA-plus bilateral trade agreement covering goods, 
services and investment would deepen, strengthen and expand trade, investment 
and economic cooperation between Australia and Indonesia; if AANZFTA is 
the cake, IA-CEPA would be the icing.  More broadly, a bilateral FTA would be 
positive for the overall bilateral relationship.  It would help improve each 
country’s understanding of the other and signal the importance placed on the 
bilateral relationship.   
It will likely be a few months before the Widodo Government is in a position to 
restart IA-CEPA negotiations.  As it settles in, the government’s focus will be 
on the president’s ambitious domestic economic agenda.  But export growth and 
foreign investment are needed to help achieve the President’s GDP growth goal 
and build the roads, ports, railways and other key infrastructure outlined in his 
visi-misi statement.  And Indonesia is falling behind in the race to conclude 
FTAs.  Most of Indonesia’s FTAs are ASEAN-negotiated agreements, like 
AANZFTA.  It has just two bilateral FTAs, with Japan (Indonesia’s largest 
investor) and Pakistan, of which only the former has been implemented.  
246 “Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IA-CEPA): Guiding 
Principles, Objectives and Organisation of Negotiations”, 27 March 2013, 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/iacepa/ia-cepa-guiding-principles.html. 
247 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Indonesian Ministry of Trade, “Australia-
Indonesia Free Trade Agreement Joint Feasibility Study”, April 2009, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/iacepa/aus-indon_fta_jfs.pdf. 
248 DFAT, “Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations”, 
accessed 6 November 2014, https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/iacepa/. 
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Concluding an FTA with a developed neighbouring country such as Australia 
should be an easy decision for the Widodo Government.   
Once they restart, the IA-CEPA negotiations should be conducted at a pace with 
which Indonesia is comfortable.  As a minority coalition government, the 
Widodo Government will not want to risk political backlash over an FTA with 
Australia.  The Indonesian public’s attitude towards FTAs is generally negative, 
with the ASEAN-China FTA seen to have prompted a flood of Chinese 
imports.249  And, as discussed above, economic nationalism is strong in 
Indonesia.  In recent years, government regulations on investment, imports and 
exports have been designed to manage trade, not liberalise it, and to protect 
domestic producers.250 
Although the conclusion of IA-CEPA may be some time away, there are other 
avenues available for addressing trade and investment barriers in the meantime.  
These include AANZFTA, bilateral mechanisms and initiatives, APEC, RCEP 
and the WTO.  
AANZFTA, as outlined above, contains a built-in review mechanism, which 
could be used to further reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
investment flows between its members, including Australia and Indonesia.  
Bilateral mechanisms and initiatives can be designed to help resolve specific 
issues and irritants.  A good example is the Indonesia-Australia Partnership on 
Food Security in the Red Meat and Cattle Sector, an initiative designed help 
prevent a recurrence of tensions and disruptions in the bilateral live cattle trade 
(discussed later in this paper).  The partnership, which first met in April 2014, 
brings together government and industry to strengthen bilateral business, trade 
and investment ties across the red meat and cattle sector, develop Indonesia’s 
cattle sector, and foster greater dialogue, cooperation and understanding.251   
249 Yose Rizal Damuri, “Trade Policy in Swing: Indonesia’s Attitude to Liberalisation and the TPP”, 
East Asia Forum, 19 March 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/19/trade-policy-in-swing-
indonesias-attitude-to-liberalisation-and-the-tpp/. 
250 Shiro Armstrong and Sjamsu Rahardja, “Survey of Recent Developments”, Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies 50:1 (2014): 15. 
251 Official Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Indonesia-Australia Partnership on Food Security 
in the Red Meat and Cattle Sector, 17 April 2014, http://www.agriculture.gov.au/about/media-
centre/communiques/indonesia-australia-food-security. 
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APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum) is an important, 
although perhaps unfashionable, regional vehicle for promoting economic 
growth, cooperation, trade and investment.  Its extensive activities cover trade 
and investment liberalisation, business facilitation and economic and technical 
cooperation.  Strong business engagement is one of APEC’s strengths and the 
forum has an active APEC Business Advisory Council.   
APEC’s 21 members252 have reached the only tariff-cutting multilateral 
arrangement in 17 years, agreeing in 2012 to reduce tariffs to 5 per cent or less 
on a list of 54 environmental goods by the end of 2015.253  (This list provides 
the basis for the WTO’s Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations, 
launched in July 2014).254  APEC’s long-term vision of a Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) was given fresh impetus by APEC Leaders at their 
November 2014 meeting in Beijing, after they agreed to a two-year study on 
FTAAP. 
In addition to its formal agenda, APEC’s busy schedule of meetings provides 
opportunities for bilateral trade and investment issues to be discussed on the 
sidelines by government ministers, officials and business representatives.  Both 
Australia and Indonesia are active members and worked closely together during 
Indonesia’s APEC host year in 2013. 
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations offer 
Australia and Indonesia another means to address trade and investment barriers, 
and improve on AANZFTA’s market access commitments.  While the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations have captured the world’s attention, 
RCEP negotiations have been quietly bubbling along.  Launched in November 
2012, RCEP is an ASEAN-led proposal for a regional free trade area, with its 
16 participants comprising ASEAN and ASEAN’s FTA partners, Australia, 
China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.  Together, these countries account 
252 Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the 
United States and Vietnam. 
253 APEC Committee on Trade and Investment media release, “APEC Opening Environmental Goods 
Market”, 21 August 2014, http://www.apec.org/Press/News-Releases/2014/0820_EG.aspx. 
254 World Trade Organization, “Azevêdo Welcomes Launch of Plurilateral Environmental Goods 
Negotiations”, 8 July 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/envir_08jul14_e.htm. 
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for nearly half of the world’s population, almost 30 per cent of global GDP and 
around a quarter of global exports.255   
RCEP’s goal is to deepen economic integration and untangle the web of FTAs 
between its parties.  It will cover trade in goods and services, investment, 
economic and technical cooperation, intellectual property, competition, dispute 
settlement and other issues (including new and emerging issues affecting 
business).  RCEP aims to eliminate progressively tariff and non-tariff barriers 
on goods, restrictions and discriminatory measures on services and to create a 
“liberal, facilitative and competitive investment environment”.256  
To date, five negotiating rounds have been held, with a sixth scheduled for 
December 2014.  The parties aim to complete negotiations by the end of 
2015257, but it appears unlikely this timetable will be met. 
Although its Doha Round of trade negotiations seems permanently stalled, the 
WTO has other avenues for addressing barriers to trade and investment: 
• As noted earlier, negotiations are underway between 14 WTO members, 
including Australia, to liberalise trade in environmental goods.  While 
Indonesia is not a participant, the negotiations are open to any WTO 
member to join.258 
• Negotiations to update the WTO Information Technology Agreement 
(ITA), which liberalises trade in IT products, have begun.  The focus is 
on expanding product coverage, increasing membership and addressing 
non-tariff barriers.  WITA’s 75 participants include both Australia and 
Indonesia.259 
• The WTO’s Trade Policy Review Mechanism provides a forum for 
highlighting trade and investment barriers.  The trade policies and 
255 DFAT, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Negotiations”, accessed 7 November 
2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/. 
256 “Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic  
Partnership”, 31 July 2013, 
http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%
20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf. 
257 DFAT, “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Negotiations”, accessed 7 November 
2014, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/rcep/. 
258 World Trade Organization, “Azevêdo Welcomes Launch of Plurilateral Environmental Goods 
Negotiations”, 8 July 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/envir_08jul14_e.htm. 
259 DFAT, “Information Technology Agreement (ITA)”, accessed 7 November 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/info_tech.html. 
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practices of individual WTO members are reviewed regularly and 
rigorously by both the WTO Secretariat and fellow members.  Members 
are permitted to ask detailed questions of the member under review about 
the latter’s trade and investment policies and practices.   
Although Indonesia is not a participant, this paper would not be complete 
without discussing the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) regional trade agreement 
negotiations.  The 12 negotiating parties, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and 
Vietnam, account for 38 per cent of global GDP, 11 per cent of the world’s 
population and 25 per cent of world trade.260   
Like RCEP, the TPP is designed to address traditional and new barriers to trade 
and investment and promote economic integration.  However, it is intended to 
be a “platinum standard”261 trade liberalisation agreement, one significantly 
more ambitious in scope and depth than RCEP and AANZFTA.  And it appears 
that the TPP members are getting close to a basic deal; according to Australian 
Trade Minister Andrew Robb, they are “within reach of the finish line”.262 
For Indonesia, TPP membership seems a distant possibility.  The current 
members intend the grouping to expand over time to include other Asia-Pacific 
economies263, but want to complete the agreement first.264  While countries such 
as Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines are keen to join, the previous Indonesian 
Government (led by President Yudhoyono) did not seem to share their 
260 DFAT, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement”, accessed 7 November 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp. 
261 Peter Varghese AO, Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Speech 
to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia”, (Perth, 20 May 2013_, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/department/130520-ceda.html. 
262 The Hon Andrew Robb AO MP, Australian Minister for Trade and Investment, (comments made at 
the concluding press conference of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement Ministerial 
Meeting, Sydney, 28 October 28, 2014), 
http://www.andrewrobb.com.au/Media/Speeches/tabid/73/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1742/categ
oryId/1/Andrew-Robb--TRANS-PACIFIC-PARTNERSHIP-TPP-AGREEMENT-MINISTERIAL-
MEETING--CONCLUDING-PRESS-CONFERENCE-SYDNEY.aspx. 
263 DFAT, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement”, accessed 8 November 2014 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp. 
264 In a media release on Korea’s interest in the TPP, United State Trade Representative Michael 
Froman said “the possible entry of any new country would be expected to occur after the negotiations 
among the current members are concluded”.  Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
“Statement by US Trade Representative Michael Froman on Korea’s Announcement Regarding the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership”, 29 November 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2013/November/Froman-statement-TPP-Korea. 
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enthusiasm265, preferring the less ambitious RCEP.  Major economic and trade 
policy reforms would be required for Indonesia to meet the TPP’s high, WTO-
plus standards.  But if the TPP members manage to conclude a deal, this might 
kindle Indonesia’s interest in the TPP.  And a bilateral FTA with Australia 
would be a good stepping-stone to eventual TPP membership. 
 
Using Agriculture to Build Australia – Indonesia Bilateral Ties 
Agriculture, already an important component of trade between Australia and 
Indonesia, is a sector with much promise for deepening bilateral relations across 
trade, investment and economic cooperation.  Australia is well-poised to meet 
growing Indonesian demand for agricultural products, as well as to provide the 
services, investment and technical expertise needed by Indonesia to develop its 
agricultural sector.  In turn, Indonesian investors have shown some interest in 
investing in Australia’s agricultural sector.  As a result of our research, we have 
decided to focus on two important areas of the bilateral agricultural trade: wheat 
and live cattle.   
Wheat 
Indonesia is the largest and fastest-growing market for Australian wheat, with 
Australian exports of wheat growing by 38 per cent between 2008 and 2013.266  
In 2012, Australia accounted for 71 per cent of Indonesia’s wheat imports267 
and in 2013 Indonesia purchased $1.2 billion worth of Australian wheat.268  The 
Indonesian noodle and baked goods industries are the main end-users, with 
Australian wheat used mostly for noodle production.  Fuelled by a growing 
middle-class, westernisation of Indonesian diets and economic growth, 
Indonesia’s consumption of wheat-based products is growing rapidly and its 
265 Yose Rizal Damuri, “Trade Policy in Swing: Indonesia’s Attitude to Liberalisation and the TPP”, 
East Asia Forum, 19 March 2014, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/03/19/trade-policy-in-swing-
indonesias-attitude-to-liberalisation-and-the-tpp/. 
266 DFAT, Australia’s Trade with East Asia, 2013, http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-
pubs/trade_eastasia.html. 
267 Jake Lloyd-Smith, “Indonesians Buying Bread to Spur Wheat Imports Like Egypt’s,” Bloomberg, 5 
March 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-05/indonesians-buying-bread-to-spur-wheat-
imports-on-egyptian-scale.html. 
268 DFAT, “Indonesia: Economic Country Factsheet,” accessed 20 October 2014, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/indo.pdf. 
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wheat imports will continue to climb.269  Rabobank expects Indonesia will need 
to import around 10 million tonnes of wheat per year over the next five years to 
keep up with consumption.270  And the Australian Export Grains Innovation 
Centre predicts Indonesia will be the largest wheat-importing country globally 
in the future.271 
Australia has a competitive advantage over other wheat exporters (namely 
Canada and the United States), due its close proximity to Indonesian ports and 
preferential treatment under AANZFTA (tariffs on wheat are bound at zero).  
However, Australian wheat exports could still face non-tariff barriers such as 
port restrictions and quotas.  In 2012, for instance, Indonesia placed an 
additional tariff on wheat flour imports to defend its milling industry from a 
surge of surplus wheat flour imported from Turkey272(Imports of wheat grain 
are not subject to import duties, protecting Indonesia’s milling industry). 
While IA-CEPA could eliminate Indonesian trade barriers such as import 
quotas, a more effective opportunity to expand Australia’s wheat trade with 
Indonesia exists.  Growth in baked goods consumption in Indonesia far outstrips 
growth in noodle consumption, but Indonesia’s baked goods producers prefer 
US and Canadian wheat over Australian wheat.273  According to the AEGIC, 
Indonesian buyers have indicated they would buy more wheat from Australia if 
it had the same baking qualities as US and Canadian wheat.274  The challenge 
for Australian wheat producers is to seize this opportunity and grow the 
varieties of wheat that Indonesian buyers demand.  
 
269 Rabobank, The Wheat Opportunity: Growing Indonesian Consumption Driving Imports and 
Investment, Rabobank Industry Note #426, Rabobank Nederland, February 2014. 
270 “Rabobank: Indonesia to Establish Itself as a Top 3 Global Wheat Importer in Next Five Years.” 
Rabobank Nederland, 4 March 2014, 
https://www.rabobank.com/en/press/search/2014/20140304_Rabobank_Indonesia_to_establish_itself
_as_a_top_3_global_wheat_importer_in_next_five_years.html. 
271 Australian Export Grains Innovation Centre (AEGIC), “Understanding our Grain Markets, 
Positioning for the Future”. 
272 AEGIC, ”Indonesian wheat flour quotas may impact Aussie exports”, 24 June 2014, 
http://www.aegic.org.au/media/news/2014/06/indonesian-wheat-flour-quotas-may-impact-aussie-
exports.aspx. 
273 Rabobank, The Wheat Opportunity: Growing Indonesian Consumption Driving Imports and 
Investment, Rabobank Industry Note #426, Rabobank Nederland, February 2014. 
274 AEGIC, “Indonesia Hungry for More Australian Wheat”, 1 March 2013, 
http://www.aegic.org.au/media/news/2013/03/indonesia-hungry-for-more-australian-wheat.aspx. 
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Live Cattle Exports 
Like wheat, Indonesia is Australia’s largest export market for live cattle.  Live 
animal exports represent a $300 million trade with Indonesia;275 in 2013-14 the 
country purchased 624,749 head of cattle and accounted for 55 per cent of total 
Australian live cattle exports.276  Darwin, Townsville, and Fremantle are the top 
three ports of embarkation for Australian cattle, boarding over 700,000 head of 
cattle for export.277  Live cattle exports under AANZFTA face a tariff of 5 per 
cent until 2025, when it will be lowered to 2.5 per cent.  Demand for meat in 
Indonesia is predicted to continue to rise, presenting a market opportunity for 
Australian cattle farmers. 
Live animal exports have created tensions in Australia-Indonesia relations and 
had significant domestic economic consequences in both countries.  In 2011, the 
Australia Government under Prime Minister Julia Gillard imposed a six-month 
moratorium on all live exports, following public outcry over animal welfare 
issues.  Indonesia was not consulted before the ban was put in place, 
undermining Australia’s reputation as a reliable trading partner.  The ban not 
only hurt Australia’s domestic cattle industry, but increased the overall price of 
protein Indonesia’s food economy.  
Australia’s exports of live cattle eventually resumed, but in 2012 Indonesia 
placed a cap on live cattle imports without consulting Australia.  This move 
shocked the Australian cattle industry, which pressured the Australian 
Government to take legal action against Indonesia, claiming this non-tariff 
barrier violated AANZFTA.  Indonesia’s decision to cap cattle imports had 
domestic repercussions, increasing the price of beef and other foods.   
The live export trade has since stabilised, with Australian exports increasing 
from $174 million to $461 million between 2012-13 and 2013-14.278  As its 
middle-class expands, Indonesia will continue to grow as a market for 
Australian cattle.  While AANZFTA has secured a low Indonesian tariff on live 
275 Ibid. 
276 “Australian Livestock Export Industry Statistical Review 2013-14,” Meat & Livestock Australia, 
September 2014, http://www.mla.com.au/Prices-and-markets/Trends-and-analysis/Beef/Live-exports. 
277 Ibid. 
278 “Australian Livestock Export Industry Statistical Review 2013-14,” Meat & Livestock Australia, 
September 2014, http://www.mla.com.au/Prices-and-markets/Trends-and-analysis/Beef/Live-exports. 
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cattle imports from Australia, a bilateral FTA could prevent the imposition of 
non-tariff barriers like import and export bans.  And the Indonesia-Australia 
Partnership on Food Security in the Red Meat and Cattle Sector should help 
rebuild trust and promote greater dialogue in this important trading relationship. 
Through commercial diplomacy efforts, such as the Red Meat and Cattle Sector 
partnership, Australia can reassert itself as a reliable trade partner.  Building 
stronger ‘business to business’ relationships with Indonesia will be essential.  
Equally important, Australian businesses and policymakers might develop 
strategies to attract Indonesian investment in Australian agriculture.  Such 
investments would position Indonesia to benefit financially from the success of 
Australian agriculture. 
Agricultural Research Cooperation 
President Widodo’s stated policy objective of increasing agricultural 
productivity through research (see his visi-misi statement above) offers 
Australia further opportunities to engage in capacity-building and research 
cooperation with Indonesia.  The Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR) has provided agricultural research support to 
Indonesia for over 30 years.279  Building on this, agricultural science 
departments at Australian and Indonesian universities could develop 
cooperative research programs focussed on improving agricultural productivity.  
Such programs would enhance ‘people to people’ ties between Australia and 
Indonesia and be the type of cooperation that the Widodo Government would 
likely support: practical solutions that ultimately help ordinary Indonesians and 
their businesses.  As noted above, IA-CEPA is expected to have a substantial 
economic cooperation component and an agricultural pilot project is already 
underway, so a bilateral FTA would be a good vehicle for expanding research 
cooperation in agriculture. 
 
 
 
279 Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR), accessed 20 November 2014, 
http://aciar.gov.au/country/Indonesia. 
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Summary 
Opportunities:  
• Indonesia represents a growing market for Australian wheat and live 
cattle exports, with demand expected to rise. 
• Australia has a competitive advantage over other wheat and live cattle 
exporters due to its proximity to Indonesia and preferential AANZFTA 
tariff rates. 
• Further engagement with Indonesia in the field of agricultural research, 
where there will likely be policy support from the Widodo Government.  
Challenges/Risks: 
• History of tension over live cattle exports may encourage Indonesia to 
look to other exporting countries. 
• Indonesia could impose non-tariff barriers on live cattle imports in an 
effort to protect and value-add to its domestic cattle industry. 
• Indonesia’s preference to develop self-sufficiency in agriculture - it sees 
“food security” as “food self-sufficiency,” rather than securing food from 
reliable trade partners.280 
Recommendations: 
• Australian companies looking to do business with Indonesia learn more 
about Indonesia’s relationship-based business culture and practices. 
• Australian agricultural producers work closely with Indonesian food 
processors, such as flour millers, to ensure they are well-positioned to 
meet changing dietary patterns in Indonesia. 
• Australian state and federal governments continue to pursue strategies to 
attract Indonesian investment, particularly in the agriculture sector.  This 
way, Indonesia has more of a stake in Australia’s agricultural success. 
• Australian states with large agricultural sectors, such as Western 
Australia, maintain an official presence in Jakarta, to promote investment 
opportunities and build rapport with Indonesian customers.  
280 “Position Paper: On Considerations Towards the Indonesia – Australia Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement,” Indonesia – Australia Business Partnership Group (IA-BPG), 31 October 
2012.  
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• Continued development of exchanges, visits and research cooperation 
programs to strengthen “people to people” and “business to business” ties 
in the agricultural sector. 
 
Conclusion 
The outlook for Indonesia’s economy is positive if the Widodo Government can 
implement the right policies needed to take advantage of the country’s 
demographic dividend, create a business-friendly environment, attract 
investment, reduce corruption, and eliminate budget-draining fuel subsidies.  
But Widodo’s reforms may be complicated by domestic political realities.  
Reforming policies such as fuel subsidies will generate opposition and could 
hurt Widodo’s popularity. Economic nationalism and protectionism will likely 
continue to be tempting policy options in sectors like mining.  
Indonesia’s status as an emerging economic powerhouse, coupled with a 
regional trade agreement, AANZFTA, provides ample scope for Australia to 
grow its economic ties with its most important neighbour.  Australian 
businesses and investors would do well to take a closer, more long-term look at 
the huge market opportunities on their doorstep.  Agriculture is one of several 
sectors with considerable potential in terms of both trade and investment, given 
Indonesia’s burgeoning demand for agricultural products, its growing middle 
class and President Widodo’s policy objective of improving agricultural 
productivity. 
A comprehensive, forward-looking bilateral trade agreement that builds on 
AANZFTA would help Australia and Indonesia’s economic relationship 
achieve its full potential.  Encouragingly, the Abbott Government has indicated 
its desire to restart IA-CEPA negotiations in 2015.  At this point in time, it is 
unclear when the Widodo Government will be ready to sit down at the 
negotiating table with Australia; given the president’s ambitious economic 
reform agenda will likely keep his administration busy at first, it may be several 
months.  In the meantime, there are other avenues for addressing trade and 
investment barriers, including AANZFTA, bilateral mechanisms and initiatives, 
regional forums and negotiations such as APEC, RCEP and multilateral 
organisations such as the WTO.   
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Profiles of Selected Ministers in President Joko 
Widodo’s Working Cabinet, by Kyle Springer 
 
 
Sofyan Djalil 
Coordinating Economic Minister 
Sofyan Djalil is a bureaucrat and businessman, born in Perlak in the Aceh 
province of Sumatra. He previously held ministerial-level positions during the 
administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (SBY); as minister of 
communications and information technology (2004-2007), and minister of state-
owned enterprises (2007-2009).281 Additionally, he is listed as a member of the 
board of commissioners at a Jakarta brokerage firm, Trimegah Securities.  
Sofyan has a Bachelor of Laws from the University of Indonesia (1984), later 
travelling to the United States and earning a master’s degree from the Graduate 
School of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University in Massachusetts (1989), and a 
Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (1991). He later earned a PhD in 
international financial and capital market law from the Fletcher School of Law 
and Diplomacy, also at Tufts (1993).  
In 2012, Sofyan was interviewed by Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication 
Commission, (KPK) during an investigation into a graft case. It involved the 
misuse of a procurement budget allocated to implementing a new customer 
information system at a state-owned power company.282 
Political analysts, identifying him as an experienced technocrat who may be 
able to push President Widodo’s ambitious reform agenda, have generally 
welcomed Sofyan’s appointment as coordinating economic minister.283 284   
281 “Indonesia’s New Ministers,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-new-ministers/. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Yenni Kwok, “Indonesia’s New President Appoints a Cabinet of Compromise,” Time, 27 October 
2014, http://time.com/3540622/jokowi-cabinet-compromise-joko-widodo/. 
284 “Indonesia’s New Cabinet Sparks Mixed Reaction,” BBC News Asia, 27 October 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29782675. 
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 Rahmat Gobel 
Trade Minister 
Rahmat Gobel has many years of experience as a businessman 
and heir to the business conglomerate Gobel Group; founded by 
his father Thayeb Mohammad Gobel. In 1970, Gobel Group 
formed a joint venture with the Japanese electronics company, 
Panasonic Corporation, creating PT Panasonic Gobel 
Indonesia.285 Before his appointment as minister, Rahmat served as the 
Chairman of PT Panasonic Gobel Indonesia, where he was known for his 
“tough management style.”286  
Rahmat is very active in Indonesia’s business and economic policymaking 
communities, as a member of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, or KADIN, having served with them as vice chairman of the board of 
advisors.287 He is also a member of the board of commissioners for the 
agribusiness company PT Smart Tbk and likewise PT Indosat Tbk and PT Visi 
Media Asia Tbk (VIVA).288 Former President SBY appointed him as a member 
of the National Innovation Committee.289  
In 1987, Rahmat graduated from Chuo University in Japan with a Bachelor of 
Science in International Trade.290 In 2002, he was awarded an Honorary 
Doctorate Degree from Takushoku University in Tokyo, Japan.  
Rahmat is closely associated with the opposition Golkar Party chairman and 
former presidential candidate Aburizal Bakrie who, like Rahmat, is a successful 
285 “Profile of Rachmat Gobel,” Forbes, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/rachmat-gobel/. 
286 “Jokowi Pins Reform Hopes on Economic Team,” The Jakarta Post, 27 October 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/27/jokowi-pins-reform-hopes-economic-team.html. 
287 Ibid. 
288 “Board of Commissioners,” SMART Agribusiness & Food, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.smart-tbk.com/about_organisation.php?id=BC. 
289 “Profile of Rachmat Gobel,” Forbes, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/profile/rachmat-gobel/. 
290 Ibid. 
Image Credit: 
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130 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
indigenous businessman (pribumi).291 Analysts are divided over the political 
motivations behind President Widodo’s appointment of Rahmat as trade 
minister. Pointing to Rahmat’s association with Bakrie, it seems that his 
appointment could be President Widodo’s attempt to reduce opposition from 
within Golkar while staying true to his promise not to appoint ministers from 
the opposition.292  
Through both his business and academic background, Rahmat has strong ties to 
Japan, Indonesia’s top trading partner. He is also Chairman of the Indonesia-
Japan Friendship Association (PPIJ).293 Rahmat takes office at a time where 
Indonesia is becoming an increasingly important investment hub in Southeast 
Asia for Japanese companies, having overtaken Thailand in 2013 as the top 
ASEAN destination for Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI).294 
 
Bambang Brodjonegoro  
Finance Minister 
Bambang’s background is primarily in academia, trained in 
Indonesia and in the United States. He previously served as 
deputy finance minister during President SBY’s second term 
(2009-2014).  
Bambang earned his bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of 
Indonesia, where he was later a professor and faculty dean.295 He studied in the 
United States at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he 
earned his Masters of Urban Planning and a PhD in regional planning.296 297 
291 “Australian experts say Indonesia's new cabinet is weak despite businessmen chosen for 
agriculture and trade portfolios,”ABC, 27 October 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-
27/indonesian-cabinet-trade-and-ag/5843402. 
292 Ibid 
293 Board of Commissioners,” SMART Agribusiness & Food, accessed 27 October 2014, 
http://www.smart-tbk.com/about_organisation.php?id=BC. 
294 Merger Market Group, Spotlight Asia: Kroll Quarterly M&A Newsletter, 24 October 2014, 
http://mergermarketgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Kroll-Newsletter-Issue-9-English-
Final.pdf. 
295 “Indonesia’s New Ministers,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-new-ministers/. 
296 Ibid. 
Image Credit: Ministry 
of Finance, Republic 
of Indonesia 
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He was a senior researcher for the Laboratory of Economics and Development 
studies at the University of Indonesia, and he has been vice president of the 
Association of Indonesia Bachelors of Economics (ISEI) since 2003.  
Bambang’s previous involvement in fiscal policymaking and his credentials as a 
professional economist make him well poised to serve as minister.298 His 
previous time spent as a deputy minister means he is familiar with the ministry 
and those in the investment community are familiar with him, bringing some 
continuity over from SBY’s administration.299   
 
 
 
Sudirman Said 
Energy and Mineral Resources Minister 
Sudirman Said is the president director of PT Pindad (Persero), a 
state-owned weapons manufacturer. He also held a deputy 
president director position with a local energy and resources 
contractor, PT Petrosea in 2013 and was tipped to become 
director of Indonesia’s large state-owned petroleum company, Pertamina in 
2008.300  
Sudirman graduated from the State Accounting Academy (STAN) in 1981. He 
earned an MBA from George Washington University in Washington, DC 
297 Agus Suhana, Rieka Rahadiana, and Neil Chatterjee, “Indonesia’s Widodo Picks Old Hands For 
New Cabinet,” Bloomberg, 27 October 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-26/widodo-
picks-brodjonegoro-for-finance-chief-in-indonesia-cabinet.html. 
298 Winarno Zain, “Is Jokowi’s economic team tough enough?” The Jakarta Post, 28 October 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/28/is-jokowi-s-economic-team-tough-enough.html. 
299 Agus Suhana, Rieka Rahadiana, and Neil Chatterjee, “Indonesia’s Widodo Picks Old Hands For 
New Cabinet,” Bloomberg, 27 October 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-26/widodo-
picks-brodjonegoro-for-finance-chief-in-indonesia-cabinet.html. 
300 “Indonesia’s New Ministers,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-new-ministers/. 
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(1994), focusing on human resources management and organisational behavior 
and development.301 
His reputation as a corruption fighter began when cofounded the Indonesian 
Society for Transparency (MTI), a not-for-profit supporting anti-corruption 
efforts.302 303 Later, MTI was involved in the formation of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK).304  
It is understood that Sudirman was selected for this cabinet position because of 
his background in anticorruption, with the expectation he will use his 
experience to clean up the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources – a 
bureaucracy known for its entrenched graft and corruption.305 The previous 
energy and minerals minister, Jero Wacik was named as a suspect by the KPK 
in a September 2014 graft case involving the illegal acquisition of $840,000 
through the extortion of mining companies.306 
Along with the task of cleaning up his ministry and re-building its public image, 
Sudirman also faces the challenge of Indonesia’s rising energy demand and lack 
of refineries to meet it, as well as the country’s need to reduce costly fuel 
subsidies.307 Sudirman has publicly stated he will continue Indonesia’s ban on 
unprocessed mineral exports, even as mining companies retaliate with 
lawsuits.308 
301“Board of Directors,” PT Pindad (Persero), accessed 4 November 2014, 
http://www.pindad.com/board-of-director. 
302 Retno Ayuningtyas, “Sudirman Pledges to Fight Corruption at Energy Ministry,” The Jakarta Globe, 
27 October 2014, http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/sudirman-pledges-fight-corruption-
energy-ministry/. 
303 “Factbox: Who’s who among Indonesia’s new cabinet ministers,” Reuters, 26 October 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/26/us-indonesia-politics-factbox-idUSKBN0IF0EK20141026. 
304 “Sudirman Pledges to Fight Corruption at Energy Ministry,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/sudirman-pledges-fight-corruption-energy-ministry/. 
305 Ina Parlina and Hasyim Widhiarto, “New energy, mineral minister Sudirman appointed for anti-graft 
stance,” The Jakarta Post, 26 October 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/26/new-
energy-mineral-minister-sudirman-appointed-anti-graft-stance.html. 
306 Transparency International Indonesia, Indonesia’s Oil Minister Named Corruption Suspect, 4 
September 2014, http://www.ti.or.id/en/index.php/news/2014/09/04/indonesias-oil-minister-named-
corruption-suspect. 
307 Ina Parlina and Hasyim Widhiarto, “New energy, mineral minister Sudirman appointed for anti-graft 
stance,” The Jakarta Post, 26 October 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/26/new-
energy-mineral-minister-sudirman-appointed-anti-graft-stance.html. 
308 Raras Cahyafitri, “Sudirman to retain export ban despite legal challenge,” The Jakarta Post, 29 
October 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/29/sudirman-retain-export-ban-despite-
legal-challenge.html. 
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 Retno Marsudi 
 
Foreign Minister 
Retno Marsudi is Indonesia’s first female foreign minister. A 
career diplomat, she previously served as Indonesia’s 
ambassador to the Netherlands, a diplomatic posting she has held 
since 2012.  
Her diplomatic career began after her graduation from Gadjah Mada University 
in Yogyakarta with a degree in international relations in 1985. She joined 
Indonesia’s diplomatic corps and quickly climbed the ranks, starting in the 
ministry’s Bureau of Analysis and Evaluation for ASEAN Partnerships.309 
Additionally, she has a Master of Laws from The Hague University of Applied 
Sciences.  
Retno served at the Indonesian embassy in Canberra, Australia in the early 
1990’s as an information officer.310 During her time in Canberra, Indonesia’s 
embassy experienced protests in response to the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre 
committed by Indonesian troops in Timor-Leste.311 
A European-track diplomat, Retno served as Ambassador to Norway and 
Iceland (2005-2008), afterwards returning to Jakarta to serve at the ministry’s 
Director General for the Americas and Europe. While based in The Hague, 
Retno led negotiations between Indonesia and the European Union.312 
309 “Indonesia’s New Ministers,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-new-ministers/. 
310 Andrea Booth, “What does the new Indonesian government mean for Australia and ASEAN?” SBS, 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/10/28/what-does-new-indonesian-government-mean-
australia-and-asean. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Agus Suhana, Rieka Rahadiana, and Neil Chatterjee, “Indonesia’s Widodo Picks Old Hands For 
New Cabinet,” Bloomberg, 27 October 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-26/widodo-
picks-brodjonegoro-for-finance-chief-in-indonesia-cabinet.html. 
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During her time in The Hague, Retno earned a reputation as a progressive 
diplomat, and kept her embassy’s door open to Indonesian civil society.313 
President Widodo himself said she is hard working, firm, and visionary.314   
Amran Sulaiman 
Agriculture Minister 
Originally from Makassar in Southeast Sulawesi, Amran Sulaiman is a long-
time Jokowi supporter and was formerly the president director of the Tiran 
Group, a diversified business conglomerate with interests in agriculture, trade, 
industry, and mining.315 
Amran studied agriculture at the Hasanuddin University in Makassar where he 
progressed through earning a bachelors, masters, and PhD on the subject. He 
later lectured at the same university. A practical entrepreneur, Amran won an 
award from SBY in 2009 for inventing a new type of rat poison.316   
A strong supporter of the president, Amran coordinated the civic action arm of 
Jokowi’s campaign, Sahabat Rakyat (Friends of the People) in eastern 
Indonesia. He also donated $41,000 to Jokowi’s campaign for the presidency.317   
 
Ryamizard Ryacudu 
Defense Minister  
Ryamizard Ryacudu is a retired Army general. His inclusion in 
Jokowi’s cabinet is controversial because of his involvement in 
Indonesia’s brutal military operations in Timor-Leste and 
313 Ibid. 
314 “Joko Widodo appoints Indonesia’s first female foreign minister, Retno Marsudi,” The Gaurdian, 26 
October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/joko-widodo-appoints-indonesias-first-
female-foreign-minister-retno-marsudi. 
315 “Factbox: Who’s who among Indonesia’s new cabinet ministers,” Reuters, 26 October 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/26/us-indonesia-politics-factbox-idUSKBN0IF0EK20141026. 
316 “Indonesia’s New Ministers,” The Jakarta Globe, 27 October 2014, 
http://thejakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesias-new-ministers/. 
317 Ibid. 
Image Credit: 
Wikipedia 
135 | P a g e  
 
 
                                                            
 
against other separatist movements in the provinces of West Papua and Aceh.  
Ryamizard has had a long military career which began with his graduation from 
the Indonesian Armed Forces Academy (AKABRI) in 1973. He rose through 
the ranks, attaining the posts of chief of the Army’s Strategic Command (known 
as Kostrad) between 2000 and 2002, 318and Army Chief of Staff between 2002 
and 2005. 
Human rights groups have openly expressed their disappointment with Jokowi’s 
decision to appoint Ryamizard as defence minister, including the Commission 
for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) and the East Timor and 
Indonesia Action Network (ETAN).319 On the other hand, Ryamizard was not 
included in the National Commission of Human Rights’ (Komnas HAM) list of 
generals they accuse of committing human rights violations.320 
 
 
 
 
318 Ibid.  
319 Richard C. Paddock, “Indonesian Leader’s Defense Appointment Draws Criticism,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 27 October 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/indonesian-leaders-defense-appointment-
draws-criticism-1414423427. 
320 “Ryamizard named defense minister,” The Jakarta Post, 26 October 2014, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/10/26/ryamizard-named-defense-minister.html. 
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